

THE

Massachusetts Quarterly

REVIEW.

NO. II.—MARCH, 1848.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE.
ART. I. THE LEGAL BASIS OF AMERICAN SLAVERY,	145
II. THE INDUCTIVE SYSTEM,	169
III. EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE,	198
IV. THE HEBREW MONARCHY,	225
V. BALLAD LITERATURE,	240
VI. SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES,	256
LIST OF NEW PUBLICATIONS,	271

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LITTELL'S LIVING AGE.

PREFACE.—This work is conducted in the spirit of Little's Museum of Foreign Literature, (which was favorably received by the public for twenty years,) but as it is twice as large, and appears so often, we not only give spirit and freshness to it by many things which were excluded by a month's delay, but while thus extending our scope and gathering a greater and more attractive variety, are able so to increase the solid and substantial part of our literary, historical, and political harvest, as fully to satisfy the wants of the American reader.

The elaborate and stately *Essays of the Edinburgh Quarterly*, and other Reviews, and *Blackwood's* noble criticisms on Poetry, his keen political Commentaries, highly wrought Tales, and vivid descriptions of rural and mountain Scenery; and the contributions to Literature, History, and Common Life, by the vagabond *Spectator*, the sparkling *Examiner*, the judicious *Athenaeum*, the busy and industrious *Literary Gazette*, the amiable and comprehensive *Britannia*, the sober and respectable *Christian Observer*; these are intermixed with the Military and Naval reminiscences of the *United Service*, and with the best articles of the *Dublin University*, *New Monthly*, *Fraser's*, *Tait's*, *Ainsworth's*, *Hood's*, and *Sporting Magazines*, and of *Chambers's* admirable *Journal*. We do not consider it beneath our dignity to borrow wit and wisdom from *Punch*; and, when we think it good enough, make use of the thunder of *The Times*. We shall increase our variety by importations from the continent of Europe, and from the new growth of the British colonies.

The steamship has brought Europe, Asia, and Africa, into our neighborhood; and will greatly multiply our connections, as Merchants, Travellers, and Politicians, with all parts of the world; so that much more than ever

now becomes very intelligent American to be informed of the condition and changes of foreign countries. And this not only because of their nearer connection with ourselves, but because the nations seem to be hastening through a rapid process of change, to some new state of things, which the merely political prophet cannot compute or foresee.

Geographical Discoveries, the progress of Colonization, (which is extending over the whole world,) and Voyages and Travels, will be favorite matter for our selections; and, in general, we shall systematically and very ultimately acquaint our readers with the great department of Foreign affairs, without entirely neglecting our own.

While we aspire to make the *Living Age* desirable to all who wish to keep themselves informed of the rapid progress of the movement—to Statesmen, Divines, Lawyers, and Physicians—to men of business and men of leisure—it is still a stranger object to make it attractive and useful to their Wives and Children. We believe that we can thus do some good in our day and generation; we hope to make the work indispensable in every well-informed family. We are not the least anxious in this day of universal ignorance to guard against the influence of the *Quarterly* and *Monthly* in making in any degree deficient the *Living Age's* constant supply of a more accurate and more judicious selection of papers.

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TRANS.—THE LIVING AGE is published weekly, by E. LITTELL & Co., corner of Tremont and State sts., Boston; Price 15¢ cents a week, or \$1 a year in advance. Remittances for the paper should be sent to the publishers, and will be gratefully received and promptly acknowledged. Please send regularly in making the remittance, the address in the city of residence.

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MASSACHUSETTS QUARTERLY REVIEW.

NO. II.—MARCH, 1848.

ART. I.—HAS SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES A LEGAL BASIS?

- 1.—*The Unconstitutionality of Slavery. Parts First and Second.* By LYSANDER SPOONER. 12mo. pp. 281.
- 2.—*Review of Lysander Spooner's Essay on the Unconstitutionality of Slavery.* By WENDELL PHILLIPS. 8vo. pp. 95.

ONE main pillar of domestic slavery, as it now exists in the United States of America, is the idea that it rests upon the law. Law is regarded with veneration, as the great foundation and support of the rights of property—of personal rights; in a word—of social organization. Jurists, with a natural disposition to exaggerate the importance of a profession to which most of them have belonged, have been induced to overlook or to disregard the *natural* foundation of rights. Most of them represent the idea of property as resting on a merely *artificial* basis—the law; not the law of nature, but the law of convention. Upon that same artificial basis, too, they are induced to rest even the most important of personal rights. These ideas, widely spread through the community, greatly modify public opinion upon the question of slavery. In the abstract, slavery, all admit, is sheer cruelty and injustice. But slavery, as it exists in the United States, is supposed to be *legal*; and being legal, is supposed to acquire a certain character of right. To use our best efforts for the suppression of cruelty and injustice, is admitted to be a moral duty. But then it is a moral duty, and, in the opinion of many, a paramount duty, to obey the law.

Prevailing ideas on the theory of government tend precisely

the same way. Those ideas, derived from Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, represent government as a contract. The natural state of man, the state of nature, is assumed to be a state of war, of hostility on the part of each individual against every other. To escape out of this wretched condition, men, we are told, resort to the artificial expedient of government founded on contract. According to this theory, the only moral principle involved in the idea of government is—Contract; and this contract, we are told, must be preserved inviolate, or government is at an end, and chaos comes again. No matter how absurd; no matter how unjust towards ourselves or others: a bargain is a bargain; and though it stipulates for the pound of flesh, it must be fulfilled. Many excellent men, ready to denounce slavery in the abstract as the sum of all iniquities, will tell us, in the same breath, that the “compromises of the constitution” guarantee its existence. It is morally wrong, they say, to attempt to evade or get over, or set aside, those compromises; and this appeal to notions of mercantile honor is not without a powerful influence upon the best portion of the community.

These opinions respecting law and government involve, indeed, the inconsistency and absurdity of supposing that men have power, by arrangement and convention, to make that artificially right which naturally is wrong. There have not been wanting able writers to expose this inconsistency and absurdity. These writers have shown clearly enough, that the basis of law, the basis of property, the basis of personal rights, the basis of government, are to be sought for and found in the nature and constitution of man, not in any artificial contracts, or arbitrary statutes or usages. They have shown clearly enough, that law, so far as it has any binding moral force, is and must be conformable to natural principles of right; indeed, that in this conformity alone its moral binding force consists; and that so far as this conformity is wanting, what is called law is mere violence and tyranny, to which a man may submit for the sake of peace, but which he has a moral right to resist passively, at all times, and forcibly, when he has any fair prospect of success. Such, indeed, was the principle upon which the American Revolution was justified. The acts of parliament of which the colonies complained, had all the forms of law, and Mansfield and other great lawyers said they were law. But in the view of the colonists, they lacked the substance without which law cannot exist. They subverted those

eternal principles of right and equity expressed in that maxim and usage of the English constitution, which coupled taxation and representation together. Taxation without representation was denounced by the colonists as mere robbery, to which, though concealed under the form of law, they were not legally obliged to, and would not, submit.

The principle of the perpetuity and inviolability of contracts, no matter what their object, character, or operation, has been attacked with no less energy and success. It has been triumphantly shown, that the very essence and substratum of contract is, mutual benefit. Contracts, whether in law or morals, have no binding force without a consideration, a good and valuable consideration. Men cannot bargain away either their own rights or the rights of others. All such pretended contracts are void from the beginning—the spawn of fraud in the one party, and ignorance in the other, or of injustice and immoral intentions in both. To say, that by committing the folly or the crime of contracting to do an immoral act a man lays himself under a moral obligation to do that immoral act, is to overturn the very foundations of morality. Nor are these principles the mere notions of theoretical moralists. So far as relates to private contracts, they are fully acknowledged and admitted by all courts of law throughout the civilized world. They constitute, indeed, the fundamental principle upon which those courts administer the law of contracts.

But all these appeals to general principles, however able and conclusive, when applied to the question of slavery have little weight with the great body of the community. Did they relate to points in which that body had a direct, obvious, personal interest, the appeal, no doubt, would be irresistible. When Andros, governor of New England, undertook to deprive people of their lands, under pretence of defective titles, “the men of Massachusetts did much quote Lord Coke;” and finding that useless, they stripped Andros of his power. When Grenville undertook to levy taxes without their consent, they were ready at once to resort to fundamental principles, and, when those principles failed, to their muskets. Then, the case touched themselves. When it only touches the unfortunate negroes of the southern states, or a few poor colored people of our own, it is quite a different matter. Appeal to principle is then denounced as wild and visionary. Always fearful of effort and responsibility, the great mass of the community entrench themselves on this question behind statutes,

decisions, usage, the opinions of lawyers, and the current notions of the day. To be sure, slavery is wrong and unjust, and impolitic and wicked,—but then it is legal.

Nor, indeed, is this conduct to be wondered at. The very courts, those reverend depositories of the knowledge of the law, those vicegerents upon earth of eternal equity and justice, have themselves set the example. In mere questions of private right, the courts resort, without hesitation, to those eternal principles of right reason, that is, of true morality, which they boast to be the foundation of law. They set aside, without hesitation, every private contract which has in it any trace or tincture of fraud or crime. But when it comes to the enforcement of political contracts, a sad change is observable. Individual lawyers, indeed even judges on the bench, of the highest eminence, have not hesitated to say, that an act of parliament contrary to the law of God, that is, contrary to the eternal principles of right, is void. Such opinions have been thrown out incidentally, with great apparent boldness and decision. But when has an act of parliament been set aside on that ground? Never! No court in England or America ever yet dared to do it. Courts have bowed submissively at the feet of the governments, their creators, ascribing to those creators an omnipotence over right and wrong greater than the philosophy of our day is willing to ascribe to God himself. They hold, indeed, to the maxim *Fiat justitia, ruat cælum*, but in this sense: “the will of the government must be done, though heaven itself be trampled under foot.” It must be admitted as the settled doctrine of our courts of law, that the supreme legislative authority has the power to declare to be law even that which is against right. But this has been a forced concession; and as Gallileo, when obliged by the Inquisition to confess that the earth stood still, mumbled yet between his teeth, as he rose from his knees, *E pur’ se muove*, “It moves though,”—so our courts of law, blushing and stammering at the disgraceful concession extorted from them by fear and power, have done their best to limit and to nullify that concession. If the supreme legislature chooses to say that manifest wrong shall be law, the courts submit to enforce it as such. But then they will never presuppose that the supreme legislature intends to do any thing so absurd and cruel. If the intention is plain, manifest, and clear, it must be enforced; but the courts will never resort to implication, or conjecture, or construction, to make out any such intention. This principle in

the interpretation of legal enactments, perfectly well settled and established in all the courts of England and America, is thus laid down by Chief-Justice Marshall, in the case of *United States v. Fisher*, 2 Cranch, 390. "Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects."

In all cases of attempted injustice under the form of law, courts thus reserve to themselves a power to defeat the wicked legislative intention, by refusing to suppose the legislature capable of any such wickedness. The extent to which this is carried out in particular cases, must evidently depend much upon circumstances, especially upon the character and position of the court. Where a court is resolved not to see, and is so situated as to be able to carry out its resolution, "irresistible clearness" is out of the question. No possible form of words can produce it. The disposition on the part of the court to see or not to see a wicked intention, will depend upon two things: first, the opinion of the court as to the degree and aggravation of the wickedness; secondly, their opinion as to the degree of support they will find in the community, if they attempt to defeat that wicked intention.

Take the case of slavery for example. Suppose that in a slave-holding community the question of the legality of slavery is raised, and certain legislative acts are quoted to sustain it. If the court should happen to entertain the opinions professed by Mr. Calhoun, that slavery is not only a blessing in itself, but the essential foundation of a republican government, of course they would see, with great facility, an intention in the quoted acts to give to slavery a legal basis. Even if they entertained the more common opinion, avowed by Mr. Clay, that slavery, though an evil in itself, is yet, under existing circumstances, a necessary evil, the only means of preserving the two races of whites and blacks from a war of extermination, they would still find no great difficulty in perceiving a legislative intention to legalize slavery. But suppose the judges have the feelings proper to men enlightened and humane; suppose their eyes fully open to the enormous wickedness of slavery; suppose they saw in vivid colors all its multiplied evils and miseries, both for masters and slaves; it would be very difficult for any form of words to establish, with "irresistible clearness," in the minds of such men, a legislative inten-

tion to legalize so much folly and crime. If, besides, they saw opinions hostile to slavery openly avowed and spreading around them; if they saw a certainty of being powerfully sustained in reinstating justice on her seat,—what form of words would be able to satisfy such a court that the supreme legislative authority intended to sanction a system so horribly unjust and wicked? At all events, in a case where there were no words at all, or very obscure and vague ones, a court so constituted and so situated, surely never would discover any such intention.

It is the glory of the tribunals of the common law, that, even when trampled in the mud by the feet of power, they have never consented to lie there in quiet. They have struggled, always to a certain extent, often nobly, to rise again; to cleanse the ermine robes of justice from the mire of ignorant, weak, cruel, self-seeking legislation; to lift again on high the balance of equity, and, to the full extent of their power and their light, to weigh out again equal justice to all. But to enable them to do this, the community about them must uphold their hands. What can four or five gray-haired men do against the ferocity, the wrongheadedness, the intentional injustice of a whole community? Men formed by long experience of the world in its least amiable aspects, will not cast their pearls before swine's feet. Like wise men they bide their time.

We shall find in these considerations a complete reply to a taunt frequently thrown in our teeth by the advocates of the legality of slavery. What more absurd, they say, than to question a legality recognized and admitted ever since the settlement of the country! But why absurd? From a period long preceding the settlement of North America down to the famous decision in *Somerset's case*, three or four years before our declaration of independence, the legality of slavery in England was also recognized and admitted. It required the enlightened humanity of a Mansfield, the indefatigable perseverance of a Granville Sharpe, an age awake to the rights of humanity, and a community free, in a great measure, from the bias of interest, to draw up "from the deep well of the law" that "amiable and admirable secret,"

"No slave can breathe in England."

"The knowledge of the law," says my Lord Coke, "is like a deep well, out of which each man draweth according to the

strength of his understanding." Is it too much to hope, that we shall yet have American judges, with hearts and understandings strong enough to draw up out of that same deep well the twin secret, that there is not, and never was, any legal slavery in America? It is not strength of understanding that has failed us. Have we not had on the bench of the United States Supreme Court a Jay, a Wilson, a Marshall, a Story? What has been lacking is heart, conscience, courage; more than all, the surrounding support of an enlightened and humane public opinion, to sustain our judges in looking this lurking devil of slavery in the face. No court of justice in the United States has ever yet dared do it, lest being called on to decide against the legality of slavery, they might be called upon, in so doing, to set at defiance a conglomeration of interests and prejudices which they have not had courage to brave, which no prudent court would venture to brave. What has been wanting, not less than a fearless court, a court daring enough to face, in the cause of justice and right, the ferocious prejudices of a ferocious nation—has been, a learned, independent, fearless bar. The court alone, unaided by the bar, is incapable of administering justice. Points must first be presented, before they can be decided; and how much depends on the manner and the medium of their presentation! Would the English law of treason ever have been stripped of so many of its terrors, and reduced so much within the limits of justice and moderation, but for the earnest struggles of an Erskine and a Curran? Had O'Connell been an ordinary lawyer, or an ordinary culprit, would the English House of Lords ever have seen those flaws in his indictment which the Irish judges had overlooked?

No counsel has ever yet been retained for the slaves; no body of influential friends has ever appeared, to impress upon the judges the necessity of serious investigation, and to assure them of support in sustaining the right. The case has gone by default; rather, it has never yet been entered in court.

We proceed to give a brief statement of the grounds upon which the assumed legality of slavery rests.

Slavery in the Middle Ages existed in England under two forms. *Villeins in gross* were slaves, substantially the same as ours, transferable from master to master, like any other chattel. *Villeins regardant* were serfs, attached to the soil, inseparable from it, and transferable only with it. These same two forms of slavery may still be seen in Hungary and

Russia. Villeinage was hereditary; — the villeins being the descendants of the ancient Britons and Saxons, held in servitude from a time whereof the memory of man ran not to the contrary.

Previous to the discovery of America, or shortly after that period, English villeinage *in gross* had almost ceased to exist. So late as the reign of Elizabeth, there only remained a few villeins *regardant*, in some obscure corners. The lawyers and the clergy, in whom the principal intelligence of that age was vested, had both greatly contributed to this result. The English common law courts refused to recognize the doctrine of the civil law — that favorite doctrine of all slave-holding communities — that the children of female slaves inherit from the mother the condition of slavery. They held, on the contrary, that the child followed the condition of the father, a doctrine which gave freedom to great numbers; for, in all slave-holding communities, the masters esteem it a part of their right to use the slave women as concubines. In all questions touching villeinage, the English common law courts made it a point to lean in favor of freedom. All men were supposed to be free, and the burden of proof lay on the claimant. The clergy had taken up the moral and religious aspects of the case. They denounced it as a scandalous and outrageous thing, for one Christian to hold another in slavery; and their preaching on this point had been so successful, that it had come to be considered a settled matter, not in England only, but throughout western Europe, that no Christian ought to be held as a slave.

With the customary narrowness of that age, this security from slavery was not thought to extend to infidels or pagans. While the emancipation of serfs was going on, black slaves, brought by the Portuguese from the coast of Guinea, became common in the south of Europe, and a few found their way to England. The newly-discovered coasts of America were also visited by kidnappers. Few, if any, of the early voyagers scrupled to seize the natives, and to carry them home as slaves. Sir Ferdinando Gorges, so active and so conspicuous in the early settlement of New England, had a number of these captured natives, whom he claimed as his property, kept under restraint, and employed as guides and pilots. The Mosaic law, then recently made familiar by the English translation of the Bible, and considered high authority on all questions of right, seemed to countenance this distinction between Christians and

infidels. The Jews, according to the Mosaic code, could hold their brethren as servants for a period of seven years only, or at the utmost, till the next Jubilee ; for it is not very easy to reconcile the different provisions on this subject, in Exodus and Leviticus. But of "the heathen round about," they might buy "bondmen, as an inheritance for ever." The practice of the early English settlers in America, and their ideas of the English law on the subject, corresponded exactly with these Jewish provisions. They took with them, or caused to be sent out, a large number of indented Christian servants, whose period of bondage was limited to seven years, and who constituted a distinct class in the community till after the Revolution. But while the servitude of Christians was thus limited, the colonists supposed themselves justified in holding negroes and Indians as slaves for life. When the first cargo of African slaves arrived in James river, they were sold and held under what was supposed to be the English common law. They continued to be imported in small numbers from time to time ; but more than forty years elapsed before we find any mention of slaves in the Virginia statutes. It was not imagined that any local legislation was necessary, to give the masters a life-property in these black servants and their posterity.

Massachusetts was the first colony to legislate upon this subject. The "Body of Liberties," or "Fundamentals," as they were called, — of which a complete copy has lately been brought to light, and published in the Massachusetts Historical Collections, — were first promulgated in 1641. That code contains the following provision : "There shall never be any bond slavery, villeinage, nor captivity among us, *unless it be lawful captives taken in just wars, and such strangers as willingly sell themselves, or are sold, unto us.*" But in thus giving an express sanction to negro and Indian slavery, the freemen of Massachusetts did not suppose themselves to be running at all counter to the law of England, to which, by their charter, they were bound to conform. On the contrary, they supposed themselves to be conforming as well to the law of England, as to "the law of God, established in Israel." This Massachusetts law, it will be perceived, not only sanctions slavery, but also the slave-trade. Bancroft, always too much a panegyrist or an apologist to be implicitly relied on, has undertaken to claim for Massachusetts the honor of having denounced, at that early day, as "malefactors and murderers," those "who sailed to Guinea, to trade for negroes ;" a

claim founded upon misapprehension of a passage in Winthrop's Journal. It appears, on the contrary, from other passages in Winthrop, that "the trade to Guinea for negroes" was recognized as a just and lawful traffic. New England vessels, after carrying cargoes of staves to Madeira, were accustomed to sail to Guinea for slaves, who generally were carried to Barbadoes, or the other English settlements in the West Indies, there being little or no demand for them at Boston. In the particular case on which Bancroft relies, instead of *buying* negroes, in the regular course of the Guinea trade, the Boston crew had joined with some Londoners already on the coast, and, on pretence of some quarrel with the natives, had landed "a murderer," — the expressive name of a small piece of cannon, — attacked a negro village *on a Sunday*, killed many of the inhabitants, and made a few prisoners; of whom two boys fell to the share of the Bostonians. A violent quarrel between the master, mate, and owners, as to the mutual settlement of their accounts, brought out the whole history of the voyage before the magistrates, one of whom presented a petition to the General Court, charging the master and mate, not with having "sailed for Guinea to trade for negroes," as Bancroft represents it, but with the threefold offence of murder, manstealing, and Sabbath-breaking, — the first two capital, by the fundamental laws of the colony, and all three "capital, by the laws of God." It was right enough to *purchase* slaves, but wrong to steal them, especially on a Sunday, and to commit murder in doing so. The kidnapped negroes were ordered to be sent back; but no other punishment was inflicted, the court doubting their authority to punish crimes committed on the coast of Africa.

The honor of having made the first American protest against negro slavery really belongs to those arch-heretics, Roger Williams and Samuel Gorton, and their followers, settled at Providence and Warwick. In 1650, these exiles from Massachusetts had been accused by a Massachusetts spy of crying out against the reality of witchcraft, and of maintaining that most heretical and atheistic doctrine, "that there were no other witches upon earth, nor devils, except the ministers of Massachusetts and such as they." In 1652, these same free thinkers enacted a law, placing "black mankind" on the same level, with regard to limitation of service, as white servants; and absolutely prohibiting perpetual slavery within

their territories. Unfortunately for the honor of Rhode Island, this law presently fell into abeyance. In his old age, even Williams himself became a slave-holder, having received an Indian boy for his share of the spoils of Philip's war, during which contest he held a commission as captain. Perhaps, however, he only claimed to hold the boy as an indentured servant.

It was not till cases arose for which the English common law, as the colonists understood it, made no provisions satisfactory to the slave-holders, that any distinct mention of slavery occurs in the legislation of Virginia. In the course of forty years, by which time the slaves numbered two thousand, in a population of forty thousand, — mulatto children had been born, and grown to manhood. What should be the condition of these children? By the English law, when the fathers were free, the children were free also. But this did not suit the interest of the slave-holders; the mulattoes were few, ignorant, and helpless, and the Virginia legislature, notwithstanding its acknowledged obligation to conform strictly to English law, did not hesitate to disregard a great and well-established principle of that law, and to enact, that children should follow the condition of the mother; and this principle, by statute or usage, was ultimately adopted in all the colonies.

Another question, not less interesting to the slave-holders, presently arose. Of the negroes brought to Virginia, some had been converted and baptized. This was the case to a still greater extent with those born in the colony. By what right were these *Christians* held as slaves? The law of England, even according to the view of it entertained by the colonists, did not allow the slavery of Christians. It was only pagans and infidels who could be enslaved. But the Virginia assembly came to the relief of the masters; and with that audacious disregard of all law and all right except its own good pleasure, by which slave-holding legislation has ever been characterized, that body enacted, in utter defiance of the English law, — even their own version of it, — that negroes converted and baptized should not thereby become free. This act bears date in 1669. Another act, passed the same year, in equal defiance of the English law, provided, that killing slaves by extremity of correction should not be esteemed felony, "since it cannot be presumed that prepense malice should induce any man to destroy his own estate."

These three acts, the legislative basis of slavery in Virginia, were enacted during the government of Sir William Berkeley, well known for his famous apostrophe — "I thank God we have no free schools nor printing, and I hope we shall not have these hundred years; for learning has brought disobedience, and heresy, and sects into the world, and printing has divulged them; and libels against the best government. God keep us from both!" This wish has not been in vain. The establishment of slavery secured its fulfilment. Virginia has no free schools to this day; none, at least, worthy of the name. She has, indeed, a few printing-presses; but they are muzzled, gagged, — effectually restrained from libels against that "best government" — the oligarchy of slave-holders.

The very next year after the enactment of the two last-mentioned statutes, the assembly of Virginia plainly admitted, that no Christian could rightfully be held in slavery. It had been provided, for reasons of policy or humanity, that Indians should not be held as slaves. Whatever the reason, it places the legislation of Virginia, on this point, in honorable contrast to that of New England, where, as we have seen, the contrary practice prevailed. But did this prohibition extend to Indian captives taken in war, elsewhere than in Virginia, and brought to that colony for sale? This question was settled by enacting, that "all servants, *not being Christians*, imported by shipping, shall be slaves for their lives." Servants imported by land were to serve a limited time only. Freedom had just been denied to Christian negroes converted in the colony, or born there; but the assembly did not venture to usurp any such jurisdiction over stranger Christians. All stranger Christians coming into the colony, of whatever origin or color, were to be free. In attempting to give a legislative establishment to the slavery of Christians and mulattoes, the governor and assembly put at defiance what they knew to be the English law. Yet in the preamble to the code of 1662, in which all the laws of the colony were embodied, those laws are expressly declared to be a mere extract from the laws of England, to which the assembly "profess and acknowledge all due obedience and reverence, sometimes, perhaps, from the difference of our and their condition, varying in small things, but far from the presumption of contradicting any thing therein contained." Berkeley, too, in that very paper above quoted, containing his objurgation of free schools and printing-presses, expressly declares, that "contrary to the laws of England,

we never did nor dare make any." He admits, indeed, one exception, namely, requiring deeds to be recorded. Such an exception seems to be one of those that prove the rule.

As a necessary pendant to the slave code, the system of subjecting the free to disabilities now also began. It was enacted in Virginia, in 1670, that negro women, though free, should be rated and taxed as tythables. Free negroes and Indians were also disqualified to purchase or hold white servants.

The virtuous resolution of Virginia on the subject of Indians did not last long; nor did its freedom from schools and printing-presses preserve the colony from rebellion. The immediate cause of Bacon's insurrection was the refusal of Berkeley to authorize expeditions against the Indians, who had lately committed some depredations. Berkeley prepared a scheme of defence by forts, but the colonists alleged that his interest in the fur-trade made him too tender of the Indians. A law enacted in 1676, by Bacon's insurgent assembly, might seem to imply, that the eagerness of the colonists for offensive war was not altogether disinterested. Into an act for the prosecution of the Indian war a provision was inserted, that Indian prisoners might be held as slaves; and this, with some other of Bacon's laws, was continued in force after the suppression of the insurrection.

In 1682, during Culpepper's administration, the slave code of Virginia received some additions. Slaves were forbidden to carry arms offensive or defensive; or to go off their master's plantation, without a written pass; or to lift hand against a Christian, even in self-defence. Runaways, who refused to be apprehended, might be lawfully killed. Already the internal slave-trade was begun,—that trade in which Virginia still bears so unhappy a part. As yet, however, the colony was purchaser, not seller, and facilities for purchasing were extended by a partial repeal of the existing provision in favor of stranger Christians. It was enacted, that all servants, whether negroes, Moors, mulattoes, or Indians, brought into the colony by sea or land, whether converted to Christianity or not, (provided they were not of Christian parentage and country,) and also all Indians bought of the neighbouring or other tribes, might be held as slaves. Yet, with all this eagerness for new purchases, the evils of the slave system were already felt. The colony was suffering severely from an over-production of tobacco; to such a degree, that the poorer people could scarcely purchase clothes for themselves;—an over-

production to which, as Culpepper stated, in an official report, "the buying of blacks had exceedingly contributed."

In 1691, shortly after the breaking out of the first French and Indian war, policy or humanity, or both combined, recovered the mastery. The slavery of Indians, sanctioned by statute since the time of Bacon's rebellion, was now finally abolished. Yet the humane intentions of the legislature were but partially fulfilled, and the practice of enslaving Indians was still continued. The Virginia records were always in the most disorderly state. As it was the judicious custom, in that colony, to codify all the statute law from time to time, the original date of particular enactments was apt to be forgotten. This law, forbidding the enslavement of Indians, was included in the codification of 1705, and was long supposed to have been originally enacted in that year. When, at a period shortly subsequent to the Revolution,—the golden age of Virginia,—an interest began to be felt in emancipation, many of the descendants of Indians were encouraged to bring suits to vindicate their freedom. In all cases in which the servitude of the ancestor appeared to have commenced subsequent to 1705, (the supposed earliest date of the prohibitive act,) the Virginia Court of Appeals held the claimants entitled to their freedom; but many petitions were dismissed, because the petitioners could not bring themselves within that limit. When, at length, the act of 1691 was discovered in manuscript, the Court of Appeals recognized its authority, and decided, in conformity to it, that no Indian, subsequently to the year 1691, could lawfully have been reduced to slavery; and that the descendants of all such Indians were free. This decision, however, availed but few of the unhappy sufferers. They were too ignorant and helpless to vindicate their rights. "Multitudes of the descendants of Indians in Virginia,"—so says Hening, the learned and laborious editor of the Virginia statutes,—"*are still unjustly deprived of their liberty*;" another proof how little the law avails the feeble and defenceless.

This same code of 1705 above referred to, made some additional modifications in the statutes relating to slaves and the mixed race. "All servants imported and brought into this country by sea or land, who were not Christians in their native country, (except Turks and Moors in amity with her Majesty, and others who can make due proof of their being free in England, or any other Christian country, before they

were shipped in order to transportation hither,) shall be accounted and be slaves, and as such be here bought and sold, notwithstanding a conversion to Christianity afterwards." "All children to be bond or free, according to the condition of their mothers."

Such was the final enactment of Virginia, under which near half her population are still held as slaves. But even in this act, the original idea, that no Christian could be reduced to slavery, is still apparent. In the case of servants newly brought into the colony, religion, not color, nor race, is made the sole test of distinction between slavery and indentured service. Whatever may have been the practice, it is plain enough, that under this act no negro who was a Christian in his native country could be brought into Virginia and held there as a slave; and this law remains unrepealed to the present day.

This same code also provided, that persons convict in England of crimes punishable with loss of life or member, and "all negroes, mulattoes, and Indians," should be incapacitated to hold office in the colony. White women having bastard children by negroes or mulattoes were to pay the parish fifteen pounds, or, in default of payment, to be sold for five years, the child to be bound out as a servant for thirty-one years. "And for a further prevention of that abominable mixture and spurious issue, which hereafter may increase in this her Majesty's colony and dominion, as well by English and other white men and women intermarrying with negroes and mulattoes," as by unlawful connection with them, it was enacted, that any man or woman intermarrying with a negro or mulatto, bond or free, should be imprisoned six months and fined ten pounds,—the minister celebrating the marriage to be fined also. Thus early was the bugbear cry of "amalgamation" raised in Virginia. Similar laws enacted in the other colonies operated to degrade and keep down the colored race, and to prevent the institution of slavery from assuming that patriarchal character, by which, in other countries, it is greatly softened, and sometimes has been superseded.

Nothing, indeed, is more striking than the different treatment bestowed by Anglo-American slave-holders, especially those of the United States, upon their own children by slave mothers, and the behaviour of Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, and French slave-holders towards their children similarly begotten. In the slave-holding colonies of these latter nations,

that white man is regarded as unnatural, mean, and cruel, who does not, if his ability permit, secure for his colored children emancipation and some pecuniary provision. Colored children are not less numerous in the United States; but here conventional decorum forbids the white father to recognize his colored offspring at all, or to make any provision for them: they are still held and sold as slaves, among which unfortunate class may be found the descendants of more than one signer of the Declaration of Independence, patriot of the Revolution, and leading politician and presidential candidate of our own day. To what shall we ascribe this strange and most disgraceful difference? To what, if not to that narrow spirit of puritanic asceticism, that insolent Jewish bigotry, derived from the superstitious study of the Old Testament, with which the whole British race is so thoroughly imbued? The careful student of our history will discover this spirit of religious bigotry and asceticism as rampant in the southern colonies as in those of New England. Moses was good authority in all the English colonies for prohibiting intermarriage with negroes and Indians; and for denouncing the intermixture of races as unnatural and wicked. But no law could control the appetite of the planters, or prevent that intermixture which inevitably takes place, whenever two races are brought into contact, especially if one race be held in slavery. That austere morality (pretending to be religious,) for which the United States are distinguished above all nations on the face of the earth, has been obliged, in this case, as in others, to content itself, in defect of conformity to its rules, with cruel grimace, and a lie acted out. Hypocrisy, it is said, is the tribute which vice pays to virtue. Of that sort of tribute the religious treasuries of our country are full. The virtuous man,—southern church-member, or peradventure minister of the gospel,—expiates his peccadilloes with his female slaves, by looking on his own children with cold glances, in which no recognition dwells; as a further proof of his austere morals, occasion offering, he sells them at auction!

We have dwelt thus long on the slave statutes of Virginia, and have carefully traced them from their commencement to their final development, because upon these statutes the practice, and finally the enactments, of all the other southern colonies, were modelled.

Slavery had existed in Maryland from its first settlement;

but no statute appears to have defined its nature or designated the parties subject to it, till 1715, by which time negroes held in bondage composed a fifth part of the population. In that year, upon occasion of the restoration of the government to the Calvert family, the laws of Maryland were revised, and the new code provided, "that all negroes and other slaves, already imported or hereafter to be imported into this province, and all children now born or hereafter to be born of such negroes and slaves, shall be slaves during their natural lives." Upon this statute rest all the claims of the slave-holding system of Maryland to a legal foundation.

The "grand model," the first proprietary constitution of Carolina, the production of the celebrated Locke, contained the following clause: "Every freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves, of what opinion and religion soever." But "the grand model," in compliance with the repeated and earnest requests of the colonists, was abrogated in 1693, and for nineteen years the system of slavery in South Carolina remained without any legal basis but that furnished by the mistaken notions of the colonists as to the English law. The assembly, however, at length thought it necessary to provide some statute authority of their own for holding two thirds of the population in servitude. An act for that purpose, passed in 1712, provided, "that all negroes, mulattoes, mestizos, or Indians, which, at any time heretofore were sold, or now are held or taken to be, or hereafter shall be bought and sold for slaves, are hereby declared slaves, to all intents and purposes;" with exceptions, however, in favor of those who have been or shall be, "for some particular merit, made or declared free," and also of such "as can prove that they ought not to be sold as slaves." This most extraordinary piece of legislation, worthy of a South Carolina assembly, was reenacted in 1722, and again in 1735. By the act of 1740, it was modified as follows: "All negroes, Indians, mulattoes, and mustazoes, (free Indians in amity with this government, and negroes, mulattoes, and mustazoes who are now free, excepted,) who now are or shall hereafter be in this province, and all their issue and offspring, born or to be born, shall be, and they are hereby declared to be and remain for ever hereafter, absolute slaves, and shall follow the condition of the mother and shall be deemed in law chattels personal." In all claims of freedom, the burden of proof was to be on the claimant, and it was to be always presumed that every negro,

Indian, mulatto, and mestizo is a slave, unless the contrary appear. This act, which forms the legal basis, such as it is, of the existing slave-holding system of South Carolina, was preceded and followed by all the customary barbarous enactments of slave codes. Yet the South Carolina assembly seem to have supposed themselves to be legislating within the limits of the English law; for at the very same session at which the slave act of 1712 was enacted, the common law of England was declared to be in force in South Carolina. In North Carolina, the slaves were already a third part of the population; but no act of that colony seems ever to have given a legislative basis to the authority of the master, which rested, and still rests, upon mere custom, and the old imaginary right, under the English common law, to reduce infidels and their descendants to servitude. So far as relates to the slavery of Indians, the Carolinians had been from the beginning notorious sinners. They had an irresistible propensity to kidnap the unhappy natives, and reduce them to slavery. One chief ground of quarrel with the proprietors grew out of efforts made by them to put a stop to this iniquity.

Georgia, it is well known, was originally intended to be a free colony. During the eighteen years that its affairs were administered by the trustees who had planted it, slavery was strictly prohibited. During this whole period, the vagabonds from the streets of London, the principal English settlers in Georgia, had raised a loud outcry against this prohibition, ascribing to it the poverty and slow progress of the colony, the natural result of their own idleness and incapacity.

The famous Whitfield had pleaded with the trustees in favor of slavery, under the old slave-trading pretence of propagating, by that means, the Christian religion. The Moravians settled in Georgia long had scruples; but they were reassured by the heads of their sect in Germany: "If you take slaves in faith, and with the intent of conducting them to Christ, the action will not be a sin, but may prove a benediction." Thus, as usual, the religious sentiment and its most disinterested votaries were made the tools of worldly selfishness, for the enslavement and plunder of mankind.

The amiable Berkeley, afterwards bishop of Cloyne, had already served as a similar cats-paw. In spite of the enactments of the colonial legislatures to the contrary, the idea still remained strongly impressed on the colonial mind, that Christians could not be held in servitude, and many mas-

ters refused to allow their slaves to be instructed or baptized, lest thereby they might become free. During Berkeley's residence in America for the purpose of founding a missionary college in Bermuda, his attention was attracted to the religious condition of the slaves. To get rid of the opposition of the masters to their religious instruction, he applied for aid to Yorke and Talbot, the one attorney-general, the other solicitor-general of England.* These learned lawyers, feed for that purpose by the planters, had already certified that negroes might be held as slaves even in England,—a doctrine afterwards set aside in the famous case of *Somerset*,—and now at Berkeley's request, they "charitably sent an opinion signed by their own hands," that the conversion and baptism of negroes did not make them free. This opinion Berkeley caused to be published in Rhode Island, where he resided, and to be disseminated through the colonies.

The poor settlers of Georgia, with fatal ignorance of their true interests, influenced by some vague hopes of wealth, or the pleasure of seeing beneath them a class more miserable and degraded than themselves, had raised, as we have seen, a clamor for slaves; and one of the first acts of the new government, which succeeded to the authority of the trustees, was, the repeal of the prohibition of slavery. It was not, however, till thirteen years after, that the legislature of Georgia sustained what they supposed to be the common law on this subject, by positive enactment. In 1765, they copied the South Carolina act of 1740, excepting, however, from the stern doom of slavery, not only such negroes, mulattoes, mestizos, and Indians as already were free, but such also as might afterwards become free; thus acknowledging a possibility of future manumissions, which the South Carolina statute seemed to cut off.

Such is the legislation, and all the legislation, by which it can be pretended that slavery, during the colonial times, acquired in our southern states the character and the dignity of a Legal Institution. Was this legislation valid? Could it have the effect to legalize slavery in America?

As our state legislatures are now restricted in their powers by constitutions, state and federal, so the colonial legislatures

* Both afterwards Chancellors; the one as Lord Hardwicke, the other as Lord Talbot.

were restricted in their powers by the law of England. Contrary to the great principles of that law they could not make any acts. This limitation was expressly declared in the colonial charters. Thus, for instance, the charter of Maryland provided, that all laws to be enacted by the provincial legislature "be consonant to reason, and be not repugnant or contrary, but (so far as conveniently may be,) agreeable to the laws, statutes, customs, and rights of this our kingdom of England." Similar provisions are to be found in the charters of Virginia, Carolina, and Georgia. It is true, that these charters, except that of Maryland, were surrendered or taken away, previous to the Revolution. But this proceeding, so far from extending the authority of the colonial legislatures, operated the other way; conformity to the law of England being still more strictly demanded in the royal than in the chartered provinces. This doctrine of the restricted powers of the colonial legislatures was perfectly well established, and has been repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as by the state courts. No lawyer would pretend that any colonial legislature had power, for instance, to abolish trial by jury. The limits of colonial legislative authority may be well exemplified by a transaction in South Carolina. That province was violently distracted by disputes between churchmen and dissenters. In 1704, the churchmen, happening to have a majority of one in the assembly, passed an act, by the help of a good quantity of good liquor, that none but churchmen should vote. This act was approved by the proprietaries; and as the charter of Carolina reserved no negative to the crown, it thus obtained the form of law. The dissenters, indignant at this outrage, sent an agent to England, on whose petition the House of Lords, swayed by the eloquence of Somers, pronounced this disfranchising act unreasonable and contrary to the laws of England; while Queen Anne, by the advice of the attorney and solicitor-generals, issued a proclamation declaring the obnoxious act void, because it violated that clause in the charter which required the laws of the colony not to contradict those of England.

If the colonial legislatures could not abolish trial by jury; if, after the toleration of all Protestant sects had become the law of England, they had no power to enact laws disfranchising any Protestant — had they any power to establish slavery?

Certainly not, if slavery was contrary to the law of England. That it was contrary to the law of England, was fully decided in 1772, after repeated and solemn argument, in the famous case of *Somerset*. In that case, Lord Mansfield held, that since the extinction of the old villeinage of the Middle Ages, no such thing as slavery had legally existed, or could legally exist, in England. Villeinage had been hereditary: the sole way of proving a man a villein, was, to prove that he had been born so. There existed no other way of recruiting the ranks of slavery. The old notion upon which the colonists had acted, that pagans and infidels and their descendants might be bought and held as slaves, was by this case wholly set aside, as a vulgar error. The particular decision in *Somerset's* case was limited to England, beyond which the jurisdiction of the court did not extend. But its principles were equally applicable to the colonies, and struck a fatal blow at all the slave laws; for if slavery was contrary to English law, then the colonial legislatures had no power to legalize it.

Slavery had been carried to a much greater extent in some of the colonies than in England; yet for a hundred and fifty years preceding the decision in *Somerset's* case, West India planters and others had claimed and exercised the right to sell, beat, and control their alleged slaves, as fully in London as in America. The supreme tribunals of England having clearly established it as law, that all persons within the realm of England were free, that great principle became the overruling law of the English colonies, and swept away the only basis upon which the acts of the colonial assemblies legalizing slavery could rest.

It has, however, been attempted to evade this conclusion; and the omnipotence of Parliament has been invoked, as having, at least by way of inference and recognition, legalized slavery in America. For this purpose, several acts of parliament are cited, relating to the African trade; also the act of 1732, for the speedy recovery of debts in the colonies. It is very true, that, in these acts, negroes are spoken of as merchandise. In those relating to the African trade, the fact of the transportation of Africans from the coast of Africa, to be sold in America, is fully recognized. But there is nothing whatever, in any of these acts, to distinguish negroes, in this respect, from the servants regularly exported from England, Ireland, Germany, and elsewhere, and sold and rated as merchandise in the colonies. Negroes are nowhere, in these acts,

spoken of as *slaves*, nor is there any shadow of ground for distinguishing, so far as these acts are concerned, between the servitude of Africans and that of Europeans. The importation into the colonies and sale there of servants, *to be held for a limited period*, to be esteemed during that period the goods and chattels of the purchaser, and to be sold at his pleasure, was undoubtedly legal by the law of England; and there is nothing whatever in the acts above cited, to show that any thing more was intended to be recognized in the case of Africans. Such, indeed, seems to have been the view taken of these acts by Lord Mansfield. If they legalized slavery in the colonies, they just as much legalized it in Great Britain; for the exportation of negroes was not limited to America. But though these acts were cited and relied upon in *Somerset's case*, Lord Mansfield allowed them no weight.

We are led, in this connection, briefly to notice an oft-repeated statement, that slavery was forced upon the colonies by the mother country, against their will, and in spite of their efforts to prevent it. Bancroft has labored, by insinuation at least, to give some color to this charge, which originated with Jefferson, and made its first appearance in the declamatory introduction to the first constitution of Virginia. Jefferson wished to repeat it, in a still more direct and emphatic form, in the Declaration of Independence. But it was rather too much to ask the delegates from the Carolinas and Georgia to denounce the slave-trade as "a cruel war against human nature, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty." Georgia had struggled against, and had finally defeated, the attempt to make her a free state; could she charge the king with forcing upon her that "execrable commerce," the slave-trade? Jefferson hated Britain, he hated slavery, and he wished to bring these hatreds into juxtaposition; but to do so required a very excited imagination. Had any colony ever prohibited the introduction of negroes; had any colony ever enacted that negroes should stand on the same ground as white servants, and be discharged at the end of seven years' service; and had the king vetoed such enactments—he might then have been justly charged with forcing slavery on the colonies. But no colony ever passed any such law, or thought of it. The vetoes on which Jefferson relied were of a very different sort. The colonies, especially those of the South, wished to raise a part of their revenue by duties on imports, with the double object of lightening the burden of direct tax-

ation, and giving protection to domestic manufactures. The English merchants, in whose hands the commerce of those colonies was, were then, as now, advocates of free trade; they complained of those duties as an interference with their commercial rights, and had interest enough with the British government to procure a standing instruction to all the royal governors, not to consent to such sort of taxes. Among the chief imports into the southern colonies, were negroes. But in seeking to impose a tax of a few pounds on each negro imported, the colonial legislatures no more intended to abolish or to restrict slavery or the slave-trade, than Congress, when it agreed to the square yard minimum upon cotton goods, intended to abolish or restrict the use of muslins and calicoes.

It seems, then, to be very plainly made out, that at the commencement of our Revolution, slavery had no *legal* basis in any of the North American states. It *existed*, as many other wrongs existed, in all of them. In many of the colonies, the assemblies, under a mistaken view of the law of England or their own powers, or through wilful disregard of acknowledged restraints, had attempted to give it the sanction of law. But by that same law of England, which the colonists claimed as their birthright, and to which they so loudly appealed against the usurpations of the mother country, such statutes were all void. The negroes were too ignorant to know their rights, and too helpless to vindicate them. They could not appeal to England, like the South Carolina dissenters, nor had they a powerful party there to support their rights; but, legally speaking, they were all free.

It remains, then, to inquire, whether the American Revolution, which we are accustomed to extol as an outburst of liberty, a memorable vindication of the rights of man — did, in fact, give to slavery a legal character. Whether men, entitled by British law to their freedom, became slaves under the state and federal constitutions. Interesting and important subjects of inquiry, these! But we have already exceeded our limits; and this inquiry must be reserved for a future occasion.

ART. II.—*A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive ; being a connected view of the Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation.* By JOHN STUART MILL. 2 vols. pp. 580 and 630. Second Edition. London. 1846.

WE beg the reader not to take fright at the unpromising heading of our article. After all that can be said, Logic, at least in the common sense, it must be confessed, has to do only with the dry bones and dust, as it were, of thought, from whence all interest has fled. But our business with Mr. Mill's book, on the present occasion, is only to illustrate from it and by it the point of view from which, in England especially, the first principles of science in general are approached and treated by a large class of writers, comprising, particularly in the department of Natural Sciences, some of the most famous names in literature. It is not, then, as a treatise on Logic, in the sense above alluded to, that we have to do with it, but as a system of Metaphysics—namely, as the best recent exposition we have met with of the *Inductive System*, or however otherwise the prevailing modifications of Bacon's and Locke's philosophy, according to time and place, may be designated. Of the detail of the work before us, therefore, its merits as a system of practical rules or methods, and the manner in which questions subordinate to the general problem are treated, we shall say nothing.

Logic is usually understood to signify merely an account of the forms and arrangement of propositions in the *sylogism*, and the employment of the syllogism in argument ; without regard to the subject-matter of the propositions, or to the question whence the syllogistic form is derived, or on what its authority depends ; the *art*, therefore, rather than the *science* of Reasoning. Mr. Mill, however, following Whately, declares it to be “the science, as well as the art of reasoning,” and that “a right understanding of the mental process itself, of the conditions it depends upon, and the steps of which it consists, is the only basis on which a system of rules fitted for the direction of the process can possibly be founded.” But though he makes Logic coëxtensive with Reasoning, yet he confines it to the investigation of data furnished *aliunde*, and thus presupposes other faculties, to which the obtaining of these data exclusively belongs. So that Logic with him is

but a *part* of philosophy. It is necessary for us, therefore, in the first place, to justify our procedure in treating his *Logic* as a theory of Knowledge in general.

"Truths," says Mr. Mill, "are known to us in two ways; some are known directly, and of themselves; some through the medium of other truths. The former are the subject of Intuition, or Consciousness; the latter, of Inference. The truths known by intuition are the original premisses from which all others are inferred. Our assent to the conclusion being grounded upon the truth of the premisses, we could never arrive at any knowledge by reasoning, unless something could be known antecedently to all reasoning. Examples of truths known to us by immediate consciousness, are, our own bodily sensations and mental feelings. I know directly, and of my own knowledge, that I was vexed yesterday, or that I am hungry to-day. Examples of truths which we know only by way of inference, are, occurrences which took place while we were absent, the events recorded in history, or the theorems of mathematics." This faculty of Intuition, or Consciousness, is elsewhere called "direct Perception," "a mental or physical seeing," &c. "Whatever is known to us by consciousness, is known beyond possibility of question. What one sees, or feels, whether bodily or mentally, one cannot but be sure that one sees or feels. No science is required for the purpose of establishing such truths; no rules of art can render our knowledge of them more certain than it is in itself. There is no logic for this portion of our knowledge."

The other source, that of mediate or indirect Knowledge, is Inference, or Reasoning. This is the province of Logic, which is "restricted to that portion of our knowledge which consists of inferences from truths previously known. . . . Logic is not the science of Belief, but the science of Proof, or Evidence." "The distinction is, that the science or knowledge of the particular subject-matter furnishes the evidence, while logic furnishes the principles and rules of the estimation of evidence. Logic does not pretend to teach the surgeon what are the symptoms which indicate a violent death. This he must learn from his own experience and observation, or from that of others, his predecessors in his peculiar science."

Logic thus presupposes propositions, to which its rules are to be applied. Every proposition "is formed by putting together two names," and "consists of three parts; the Sub-

ject, the Predicate, and the Copula." Names he divides into several classes, of which the only ones of importance to our purpose are the Connotative and Non-connotative. "A non-connotative term" (I. 37,) "is one which signifies a subject only, or an attribute only. A connotative term is one which denotes a subject, and implies an attribute." "Connotative names have hence been also called *denominative*, because the subject which they denote is denominated by, or receives a name from, the attribute which they connote. . . . James and Robert receive the name man, because they possess the attributes which are considered to constitute humanity." Naming thus presupposes generalization. "Whenever the names given to objects convey any information, that is, whenever they have properly any meaning, the meaning resides not in what they *denote*, but in what they *connote*." So that "the only names of objects which connote nothing, are proper names; and these have, strictly speaking, no signification," but their object is merely distinction. "A proper name is but an unmeaning mark, which we connect in our minds with the idea of the object; and it is even conceivable that I might know every single individual of whom a given name could be with truth affirmed, yet could not be said to know the meaning of the name." Every non-connotative, therefore,—that is, every term which simply denotes something,—must be an unmeaning name. A name, to have any meaning, must include an attribute or quality common to the thing named, with other things, and thus refer the thing to a previously-existing class.

Direct Perception then is possible only of unmeaning names. For Connotation presupposes not merely a simple perception of the thing, but also a knowledge of its attributes; that is, a generalization, which is given, not directly, or by intuition, but by a mental process.

The existence of a connotative name, therefore, presupposes that direct perception is transcended, and that reasoning has taken place.

It may perhaps be objected, that connotatives may be directly known, though unconsciously, inasmuch as the connotation, though existing, might not be at first perceived, but discovered afterwards. This seems to be what Mr. Mill means by what he says about *ascertaining* and *fixing* the connotation. But here the connotation is presupposed, as a foregone process, and the question is, how it came about. Connotation is surely an act or process of the mind, and if so, how can we call that di-

rect knowledge—"antecedent to all Reasoning"—which has been preceded by a connotation? It is difficult to understand Mr. Mill here, unless we suppose, that, as he had laid it down that the meaning is in all cases discovered by connotation, the notion might have floated through his mind that the connotation is the meaning; thus confounding the act or process with the result obtained by it. However this may be, our clear result is this: that wherever we *know* any thing, we find that a mental process, beside that of mere direct perception, has preceded; and that direct Intuition, according to the principles started with, is impossible.

We are very far from supposing that this result is at all contemplated, or would be admitted, by Mr. Mill. On the contrary, as we have seen, he depends upon and refers to direct Perception for the subject-matter and ultimate foundation of all Science. This doctrine, that ultimate truths are directly perceived, is, we believe, under one form or another, common to most English and French metaphysicians. A writer in the *Edinburgh Review* (Vol. L., p. 196) thus states it:—"Our knowledge rests ultimately on certain facts of consciousness, which, as primitive, and consequently incomprehensible, are given less in the form of *cognitions* than of *beliefs*. But if consciousness in its last analysis—in other words, if our *primary experience*, be a faith, the reality of our knowledge turns on the veracity of our generative beliefs. As ultimate, the quality of these beliefs cannot be inferred; their truth, however, is in the first instance to be presumed."

The result of direct perception, therefore,—according to the Inductive Theory,—must be *incomprehensible* and *incognizable*. For as these results, according to the supposition, are altogether independent of, and unmixed with, mental action, they must be purely objective, and given to it from without.

Many perceptions, however, which seem intuitive, all will allow to be in fact either inferences which habit has made rapid and easy; or else in reality included in something already known. Of the first class, namely, conclusions which are commonly mistaken for intuitions, our author (I. 7.) gives as an example our perception of distance, than which, as he remarks, nothing can seem more directly intuitive. An example of the other class of intuitions falsely so called, is given by the truths of Number: thus, that $2 + 2 = 4$. The same is true of all intuitions of which we are conscious;—all Cognition presupposes something more than mere reception from without.

But for the present we will observe only, that if the guaranty of their truth be only an uncomprehended and incomprehensible *feeling*, which we know leads us astray very often, and of which we can have *in no case* any ulterior test—the intuitions would seem to form a very unstable foundation for Science. And here we must notice a great inconsistency in the procedure of the philosophers of the Inductive School: namely, that while they claim in behalf of their own system unhesitating confidence in intuitive beliefs, they will not allow this to others. Now, if these intuitive beliefs are to pass unquestioned, as truths, it is evidently impossible to draw the line between those to be admitted as of scientific validity, and those to be rejected. Whatever we fully believe, then, is true. There is no test but subjective persuasion. Then the visions and prophecies of clairvoyants and seers of various kinds must be allowed as scientific truth. And even if the fact of full belief in their own assertions be denied in these cases; or if the belief of all mankind be required, it will at least be admitted that some undoubted blunders have, in the history of Science, been held with as full and universal belief as any scientific truth at the present day. The believers in the Ptolemaic System no doubt as fully believed that the sun moved round the earth, as we now do the converse. Now the important point is, not that we believe, ever so strongly, but that we have reason to believe.

If passive Belief were the source of knowledge, not only would all men of equal acuteness of sense be on a par in scientific capability, but the brutes also would stand on a level with Man; for they also have feelings and sensations; and what we call Instinct is precisely “incomprehensible” or uncomprehended Knowledge.

Our result, therefore, that this so-called direct Knowledge is no Knowledge at all, though deduced from our author's premises against his intention, justifies itself from the absurdities to which the opposite supposition necessarily leads. It is moreover confirmed by Mr. Mill's subsequent admission, that we cannot in any case know any thing of *objects themselves*, but only the impressions or representations in the mind. This point, he says, (I. 78,) “is one upon which those [idealist] metaphysicians are now very generally considered to have made out their case; namely, that *all we know* of objects is the sensations which they give us, and the order of the occurrence of those sensations.” Now as “sensations are states of the sentient mind, not states of the body, as distinguished from

it," (I. 68,) this would certainly seem equivalent to saying, that of the outward world we know absolutely nothing at all, directly, but only as represented or conceived by the mind. This is not only involved, but openly stated, in the theory of Phenomena; yet we find writers on Metaphysics constantly speaking of Phenomena as if they were *things*; of a more airy and unsubstantial sort, indeed, but things still; having a material existence, though wanting the attributes of Matter: instead of being the results of a mental process. Thus, when it is said that Phenomena have no existence out of the mind, this is taken to be a denial of all objective Reality. Whereas, on the contrary, if the objects of Sensation were Reality, — Sensation being, of itself, cognizant only of abstracts, (as we have already seen,) and not of Reality, — evidently we should be cut off from all objective Knowledge. What we perceive is undoubtedly the thing itself; but the representation is no thing, and what is present in the mind is not the thing, but the representation. So that we are not to fancy things existing in our minds, as *fragments* of truth out of which Science is to be built up by mechanical aggregation. In what we call facts, and in all general names, (provided they stand for any thing, and are not merely repeated by rote,) the outward world is seen metamorphosed; the directness of the sensuous impression being removed by Reflection. It is true that there exists spontaneously in the mind much that resembles the results of Cognition, and may be called immediate Knowledge, but differs from Knowledge properly so called, in this, that it exists unknown to the mind itself, and is manifested only in action. This immediate Knowledge, or Instinct, shows in its results a resemblance to the products of conscious Reason; as, for instance, in the knowledge of geometry shown in the construction of the bee's cell. This knowledge is displayed certainly by the bee, but unconsciously; so that it cannot be said to belong to the bee, but is given to the insect from without.

But when we speak of science and method, and the moment we reflect upon the nature of our Knowledge, that moment it ceases to be instinctive. It is no longer Knowledge, merely, but *our* Knowledge, and thenceforth nothing can properly bear the name, except the results of conscious mental action.

Thus it is to the second of the two sources above mentioned, that which involves a productive action of the mind — namely,

Reasoning or Inference — that we are referred for the origin of all our Knowledge; and Logic, therefore, as the Science of Reasoning, will be synonymous with Philosophy, or the Science of Knowledge.

“Most of the propositions which we believe,” says Mr. Mill, (I. 216,) “are not believed on their own evidence, but on the ground of something previously assented to, and from which they are said to be inferred.” “To infer a proposition from a previous proposition or propositions, . . . is to *reason*, in the most extensive sense of the term.” “Reasoning . . . is popularly said to be of two kinds — reasoning from particulars to generals, and reasoning from generals to particulars; the former being called Induction, the latter Ratiocination, or Syllogism.”

And first, of the syllogism. “To a legitimate syllogism it is essential that there should be three and no more than three propositions; namely, the conclusion, or proposition to be proved, and two other propositions which together prove it, and which are called the premisses. It is essential that there should be three and no more than three terms; namely, the subject and predicate of the conclusion, and another called the middle term, which must be found in both premisses, since it is by means of it that the two terms are to be connected together. The predicate of the conclusion is called the major term of the syllogism; the subject of the conclusion is called the minor term.” “One premiss, the major, is an universal proposition, and according as this is affirmative or negative, the conclusion is so too. All ratiocination, therefore, starts from a general proposition, principle, or assumption.” “The other premiss is always affirmative, and asserts that something belongs to the class respecting which something was affirmed or denied in the major premiss.” That is, the subject of the major premiss always includes that of the minor; so that the minor must always be relatively particular. Thus even where it is universal in its form, as in the syllogism, All men are mortal — all kings are men — therefore, &c., — the minor in fact only specifies something already contained in the major: “all kings” being contained in “all men.” So that what is said (I. 275,) about the minor as affirming a *new case*, must be rejected as inconsistent with the general principle; unless by a new case he means only a case not before thought of. The conclusion must therefore be already contained in the major; being merely *pointed out* by the syllogism. Thus “it must be

granted, that in every syllogism, considered as an argument to prove the conclusion, there is a *petitio principii*." Accordingly he allows, that "no reasoning from generals to particulars can, as such, prove any thing; since from a general principle you cannot infer any particulars but those which the principle itself assumes as foreknown." "But this is in fact to say, that nothing ever was or can be proved by syllogism, which was not known, or assumed to be known, before." All real accession to our knowledge, then, must be contained in the general proposition, the major premiss. But (I. 249,) "whence do we derive our knowledge of the general truth? No supernatural aid being supposed, the answer must be, by observation." "Now all which man can observe are individual cases. From these all general truths must be drawn, and into them they may be again resolved; for a general truth is but an aggregate of particular truths; a comprehensive expression, by which an indefinite number of individual facts are affirmed or denied at once." Thus "general propositions are merely registers of such inferences already made, and short formulæ for making more. The major premiss of a syllogism, consequently, is a formula of this description; and the conclusion is not an inference drawn *from* the formula, but an inference drawn *according to* the formula; the real logical antecedent, or premisses, being the particular facts from which the general proposition was collected by induction." But if the syllogism be only an explication of what already exists in the premisses, or a test of such an explication, its office must be an altogether dependent and secondary one, and it cannot take any part in the original investigation of truth. For if Truth consists of an aggregate of facts, and if the syllogism neither collects nor aggregates the facts, clearly nothing is left for it beyond examination of the bearings and consequences of truths already elsewhere obtained. Mr. Mill accordingly assigns to the syllogism altogether a subordinate place in the system. "Its function," says he, (I. 261,) "is interpretation," and its chief use is, that it affords "a set of precautions for correctly reading the general propositions or records of facts."

To *obtain* general propositions, therefore, as well as particular facts, we must resort to the other branch of Inference; namely, Induction. "What Induction is, therefore, and what conditions render it legitimate, cannot but be deemed the main question of the science of logic — the question which includes all others."

It is this operation (I. 352,) "by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects. In other words, Induction is the process by which we conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class, is true of the whole class; or that what is true at certain times, will be true under similar circumstances at all times."

At first sight, it might seem as if Mr. Mill's own criticism on the *dictum de omni et nullo*, would apply to this definition: "What," says he, (I. 235,) "do we learn by being told, that whatever can be affirmed of a class, may be affirmed of every object contained in the class? The class is nothing, but the objects contained in it; and the *dictum de omni* merely amounts to the identical proposition, that whatever is true of certain objects, is true of each of those objects. If all ratiocination were no more than the application of this maxim to particular cases, the syllogism would indeed be, what it has so often been declared to be, solemn trifling." Now, as the *dictum de omni et nullo* is evidently only an inversion of Induction, as above defined, all this would seem to be true of the definition. But in order to understand what is really meant here, we must bear in mind the position above quoted, that a general truth is a mere *aggregate* of particular truths, whence it will follow, that a class is an aggregate of particular individuals. And as Particularity is here taken abstractly, as mere Diversity, there results from this postulate a principle of classification, founded not on affinity, but on diversity; for an aggregate of particulars contains no relation of affinity, but only of difference.

It is true, that where we find certain facts associated, we are inclined to suppose an affinity among them; — but this is because we (instinctively at least) suppose their being associated to *depend* on some internal affinity. But the Inductive Theory consistently avoids any such suppositions, as hypothetical.

Accordingly, "every class is a real kind, which is distinguished from all other classes by an indeterminate multitude of properties not derivable from another;" "while, on the contrary, differences that are merely finite and determinate, like those designated by the words white, black, or red, may be disregarded if the purpose for which the classification is made does not require attention to those particular properties." (I. 171, 167.) But a distinction in class, which we

may make or not, at our pleasure, we may acknowledge or not, when made by another; and thus where the diversity is definite, no valid distinction, according to these principles, can be made. This, however, it is unnecessary to consider, until it be shown that a definite diversity can be found in nature; — that is, that in any case, the differences between two things can be exhausted. Unless we draw a line somewhere, and declare that certain differences may be disregarded, as unimportant, (a proceeding utterly unwarrantable on the principles of this system,) it is evidently impossible to come to the end of the differences between any two acorns, or oak-leaves, or any other two things in nature. The most minute examination would only widen the field and complicate the problem. All difference, then, must be difference of class; and, as (I. 93,) no two things are the *same*, every object in the universe must form a class by itself: that is, Classification is impossible, except as a matter of arbitrary convention, — “a relation,” (I. 162,) “grounded not upon what the predicate con-notes, but upon the class which it *denotes*,” that is, upon the *proper name*, or what we have agreed it shall stand for, “and upon the place which, in some given classification, that class occupies relatively to the particular subject.”

If, then, from certain apparent resemblances between a number of things, we form them into a class; and if, then, it be proposed to conclude from these resemblances, that a given attribute belonging to a certain individual among them, but not known to belong to the rest, does in fact belong to them, — the proposition would be so far from identical, that, on the contrary, it would be altogether unfounded.

The problem of Induction, therefore, instead of a triviality, seems to be a hopeless puzzle. That we do infer general truths from particular experience, all will allow; but how this is even possible, on the principles here laid down, (much more the ground of it,) it is difficult to perceive. For any thing that appears, it may be a groundless prejudice.

It is of the utmost necessity, therefore, to discover some test, or evidence *a posteriori*, by which the wanting foundation may be supplied to generalization, and until this be done, the whole fabric of science must swing in air.

Some of the practical difficulties growing out of this defect in his principle Mr. Mill notices, though not the defect itself. The popular induction, he says, (I. 377,) “consists in ascrib-

ing the character of general truths to all propositions which are true in every instance that we happen to know of ; " — it is " simply a habit of expecting that what has been found true once or several times, and never yet found false, will be found true again." But this by no means follows. Thus, " from the earliest records, the testimony of all the inhabitants of the known world was unanimous on the point, that all swans are white." Yet this " cannot have been a good induction, since the conclusion has turned out erroneous." " The uniform experience, therefore, of the inhabitants of the known world, agreeing in a common result, without one known instance of deviation from that result, is not always sufficient to establish a general conclusion." And, we may add, if not *always* sufficient, in the absence of any test as to when it may be relied upon and when not, it can *never* be sufficient. Mr. Mill accordingly makes a distinction (I. 359, 369,) between a mere aggregation of cases, and a real induction : namely, that the facts must not only be brought together, but, moreover, that " the connecting link must be some character which *really exists* in the facts themselves, and which would manifest itself therein if the conditions could be realized which our organs of sense require."

But this is saying, in other words, that our classification must not be conventional or accidental, but founded in the nature of things : — a direct contradiction to the notion of Classification before mentioned. This contradiction is necessarily inherent in the system ; for the problem of Science is to generalize particulars, and this the Inductive theory renders impossible. But let us see what the " connecting link " must be. As it is to be a character " really existing " in the facts, it must be something common to all of them. All community of attributes and all identity in principle being abstracted, (as the exclusion of prejudice and hypothesis demands,) we have nothing left whereby to group objects, except their position in Time and Space. Avoiding the question, whether even these relations do not presuppose an ulterior principle of affinity among particulars so related, it is true, that in all our experience we find things and events occurring in a certain order, in Time and Space ; — every object occupies a certain space, and every event happens in a certain time, whilst other characters may be abstracted without destroying them. One or both of these characters, then, must be the link which we seek. Kant takes both : — Mr.

Mill selects position in Time ; that is, Succession. For this selection he gives no reason ; but evidently he is restricted to it by his postulate, and his negative principle of classification. Extent in Space is present and continuous ; — extent in Time, on the contrary, implies diversity and succession. " We take no note of Time, but by its loss," for Time is the abstract form of Change. Things are connected, then, as being transient and successive, and this is their only general and common character : the only one which we can say *really exists* in all things.

" Of all truths relating to phenomena, the most valuable to us are those which relate to the order of their succession ;" but " among all those uniformities in the succession of phenomena, which common observation is sufficient to bring to light, there are very few which have any, even apparent, pretension to this rigorous indefeasibility ; and of those few, one only has been found capable of completely sustaining it." This is succession in Time, or, as he calls it, Causation. " Between the phenomena which exist at any instant, and the phenomena which exist at the succeeding instant, there is an invariable order of succession ;" " to certain facts, certain facts always do, and, as we believe, always will, succeed. The invariable antecedent is termed the cause ; the invariable consequent, the effect." " Upon the universality of this truth depends the possibility of reducing the inductive process to rules ;" and this notion of Cause is " the root of the whole theory of Induction." (I. 395.) Now, as we are in search of " rigorous universality," and as the theory of Cause is introduced to give such universality to the results of Induction, it is above all necessary, as our author (I. 411,) remarks — that the succession itself should be universal and unconditional, and unless it is so, it cannot have any title to the name of Cause. Uniform experience, therefore, he says, is not sufficient to establish the fact of Causation. But if so, it is clearly incapable of being established at all, on the Inductive theory. No conceivable method, no variation nor comparison of experiments, can ever establish the unconditionality of a succession in Time ; for to do so, the experience must be coextensive with all Time. It does not follow, because a particular succession has hitherto been invariable, that it will henceforth continue to be so. Even that we suppose or guess that it will be, is not accounted for. At all events it is a mere hypothesis.

Whether such a succession is a causation or not, must then always be doubtful; and the doubt must be, from the nature of things, incapable of solution. So that to select from the endless maze of successive phenomena certain of them as Cause and Effect, must be mere guess-work, without the slightest scientific value. We know beforehand that an immense mass of phenomena precede any given one, (and many of them invariably precede it,) — which must either all be causes of it, or else some of them not causes. But if all are causes, the principle will be useless to Science; and if some only are causes, we cannot distinguish them. "In making chemical experiments, we do not think it necessary to note the position of the planets; because experience has shown, as a very superficial experience is sufficient to show, that in such cases that circumstance is not material to the result." On the contrary, by his own showing, nothing less than an experience coextensive with the existence of the planets, and reaching beyond them, could be sufficient. Or by what process are their possible influences to be eliminated? Nor if we forsake the principle, and trust to invariable experience merely, is the difficulty lessened. Many phenomena — as the fixed stars — are constant, and have *assisted*, in the French sense, throughout History; — are we, therefore, to conclude that they have assisted also in the sense of Causation? The confusion of *post hoc* with *propter hoc* is, indeed, a matter of daily experience, but will hardly be maintained as a scientific principle.

And it cannot be allowed, even as a matter of common experience or opinion, that Cause and Effect are always related as antecedent and consequent. On the contrary, Mr. Mill's own definition of Cause implies coexistence. He says, (I. 404,) "The cause, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative, taken together; the whole of the contingencies of every description, which being realized, the consequence invariably follows." The cause, then, does not exist until all the conditions are assembled. But what interval can there be between the assemblage of all the conditions and the existence of the effect? Clearly only an imaginary one. Not merely will the interval of time be too small to be appreciated by the senses, but more than this, there will be an absolute coincidence. You cannot assemble the conditions of water, without at the same instant producing it. The chemical combination of oxygen and hydrogen, is equally a description of the cause and of the effect. If the

effect is not produced, it is because some of the positive conditions are wanting, or some of the negative present. This, indeed, Mr. Mill (I. 413,) seems to admit, but thinks it unimportant. "Whether the cause and its effect be necessarily successive or not, causation is still the law of the succession of phenomena. Every thing which begins to exist must have a cause." That is, all that the common notion of Causation demands, is *some* necessary connection between the phenomena,—in which it is undoubtedly right. Only there is not the slightest ground for attributing any weight to Succession,—which, instead of giving, receives all its importance from the ulterior fact of a real connection.

What this connection is, then, or how it is to be known, is left undecided. This principle of Causation, therefore, will not accomplish what it is brought forward to do. As before, its application shows its deficiencies. Thus, (I. 506,) "In the first place, it is not true that the same phenomenon is always produced by the same cause; the effect *a* may sometimes arise from A, sometimes from B. And, secondly, the effects of different causes are often not dissimilar, but homogeneous, and marked out by no assignable boundaries from one another." "One fact may be the consequent in several invariable sequences; it may follow, with equal uniformity, any one of several antecedents, or collections of antecedents." So that, (I. 543,) "Where, in every single instance, a multitude, often an unknown multitude of agencies are clashing and combining, what security have we that in our computation *a priori* we have taken all these into one reckoning? How many must we not generally be ignorant of? Among those we know, how probable that some have been overlooked; and even were all included, how vain the pretence of summing up the effects of many causes, unless we know accurately the numerical law of each,—a condition in most cases not to be fulfilled; and even when fulfilled, to make the calculation transcends, in any but very simple cases, the utmost power of mathematical science with its most modern improvements." These difficulties Mr. Mill supposes confined to certain classes of investigations; but, as remarked on a former occasion, even allowing this, the trouble is that we can never be sure whether or not any given case belongs to one of these classes. This uncertainty, therefore, must extend to all our results.

As a remedy for these deficiencies of Induction, Mr. Mill

proposes the Deductive Method. (I. 534.) "The mode of investigation which, from the proved inapplicability of direct methods of observation and experiment, remains to us as the main source of the knowledge we possess . . . of the more complex phenomena, is called . . . the Deductive Method; and consists of three operations: the first, one of direct induction; the second, of ratiocination; and the third, of verification." "The problem of the Deductive Method is, to find the law of an effect from the laws of the different tendencies of which it is the joint result. The first requisite, therefore, is to know the laws of these tendencies; the law of each of the concurrent causes; and this supposes a previous process of observation or experiment upon each cause separately; or else a previous deduction, which also must depend for its ultimate premisses upon observation or experiment." This being accomplished, "the second part follows; that of determining, from the laws of the causes, what effect any given combination of those causes will produce." Thus far there is nothing peculiar in the method; its essential characteristic is the third process, Verification, whereby the general conclusions formed by deduction are compared with the results of direct observation. Without Verification it is acknowledged (I. 544,) that all the results of the Deductive Method "have little other value than that of guess-work." It is upon Verification, therefore, that the validity of all scientific results must at last depend. "That the advances henceforth to be expected even in physical, and still more in mental and social science, will be chiefly the result of deduction, is evident from the general considerations already adduced."

But it is not a sufficient verification, that the supposed cause "accounts for all the known phenomena, since this is a condition often fulfilled equally well by two conflicting hypotheses." It is sufficient only "provided the case be such that a false law cannot lead to a true result;—provided no law, except the very one we have assumed, can lead deductively to the same conclusions which that leads to."

Here the whole difficulty is provided for in advance, in a summary manner. The uncertainty whether our investigation has been sufficiently ample to exclude all possibility of influence from unsuspected causes, is disposed of, but by a postulate, for the admissibility of which we can see no grounds. Previously to Verification we have no means of obtaining such knowledge concerning the law in question, except through In-

duction, and reasoning founded thereon. Unless by attributing some additional efficacy to Induction on account of its forming part of the deductive process, we see no chance that the proviso can ever be complied with. Mr. Mill, however, is of a different opinion. He thinks it may "often be realized," and gives as an instance Newton's demonstration that the law governing the motion of the planets is Gravitation. But in all mathematical demonstrations, as our author himself remarks, (I. 297, 300,) the result is already implied in the premisses, and the premisses (II. 112, 162,) empirically derived from simple enumeration. That the proviso can ever be complied with in cases other than mathematical, he does not show. And he is obliged to admit that in order that Verification shall be proof, it is necessary that "the supposed cause should not only be a real phenomenon, . . . but should be already known to have some influence upon the supposed effect; the precise degree and manner of the influence being the only point undetermined." And "that what is an hypothesis at the beginning of the inquiry becomes a proved law of nature before its close . . . can only happen when the inquiry has for its object, not to detect an unknown cause, but to determine the precise law of a cause already ascertained." (II. 17, 14.)

Verification, therefore, is a subordinate matter, and does not help us at all in the main point; namely, the discovery of Cause. For this we are referred back to Induction. Observation and Experiment (II. 18,) furnish the independent evidence *aliunde* on which Verification depends. "The hypothesis, by suggesting observations and experiments, puts us upon the road to that independent evidence, if it be really attainable; and until it be attained, the hypothesis ought not to count for more than a suspicion."

In this account of Verification, it may be observed we have throughout assumed that the preliminary induction is in all cases an hypothesis; since, from what has already been shown, it must always answer to Mr. Mill's definition of an hypothesis; namely, a supposition made upon insufficient evidence. If it is not an hypothesis, there is no need of Verification; if it is, Verification is no more possible than before. Deduction is thus only an inverted Induction;—Verification, with which it ends, being nothing more than Experience, with which Induction begins.

It results, therefore, that the "connecting link" of phenomena cannot be discovered; the passage from the Particular to

the General remains unexplained and inexplicable. We must remain content with particulars; and not only this, but also, as the particular testifies only of itself and not of other particulars, we must be content with a partial or empirical Knowledge. "Experimental philosophers" (II. 41, 46, 93,) "usually give the name of Empirical Laws to those uniformities which observation or experiment has shown to exist, but upon which they hesitate to rely in cases varying much from those which have been actually observed, for want of seeing any reason *why* such a law should exist. It is implied, therefore, in the notion of an empirical law, that it is not an ultimate law; that if true at all, its truth is capable of being, and requires to be, accounted for. It is a derivative law, the derivation of which is not yet known." "Empirical laws, therefore, can only be held true within the limits of time and place in which they have been found true by observation; and not merely the limits of time and place, but of time, place, and circumstance; for since it is the very meaning of an empirical law that we do not know the ultimate laws of causation upon which it is dependent, we cannot foresee, without actual trial, in what manner or to what extent the introduction of any new circumstance may affect it." "In proportion, therefore, to our ignorance of the causes on which the empirical law depends, we can be less assured that it will continue to hold good; and the further we look into futurity, the less improbable is it that some one of the causes whose existence gives rise to the derivative uniformity, may be destroyed or counteracted."

The nearest that the Inductive Philosophy can come to Truth, therefore, is Probability. Universal experience being impossible, Knowledge must be so also. Its first principles must be assumptions. "The whole problem of the investigation of nature is, What are the fewest assumptions, which, being granted, the order of nature as it exists would be the result." (I. 560.) It cannot aspire to know the nature or the reason of any thing, but must content itself with the bare fact. It divides the universe into two mysteries—the mystery of Existence and the mystery of Knowledge. Body is the "unknown exciting cause of sensations;" the "mysterious something which excites the mind to feel;" and mind "the unknown recipient or percipient" of sensations; "the mysterious something which feels and thinks." "On the inmost nature of the thinking principle, as well as on the inmost nature of matter, we are, and with our human faculties must

always remain, entirely in the dark." (I. 81.) Thus it is often said, that, from the general limitedness of human faculties, we ought not, *a priori*, to require or expect human knowledge to attain to any thing more than probability. To demand for Science absolute and necessary truth, seems to many persons a kind of sacrilege;—at least the extreme of presumption. For if we regard Truth as an aggregate, the largest conceivable aggregate will still be a finite quantity, distinct from the infinite not in degree, but in kind.

But, in the first place, it ought to be distinctly understood and confessed, that Probability, of itself, can have no scientific value. We do, it is true, often attribute high scientific importance to what are only probabilities, but this is on the supposition that they are not to *remain* probabilities, but to become truths. Their importance consists in the prospect of Knowledge; and if this be absolutely cut off, as in the Inductive Theory, their value is at an end.

In the second place, we maintain that this whole theory of Probability is founded on an inadmissible postulate; namely, that Cognition is nothing higher than Sensation, (I. 78);—that there is nothing in Knowledge which our senses could not perceive, provided they were perfect of their kind, (I. 361,) and thus nothing but a mechanical aggregation of particulars.

That the material world is such an aggregate of particulars, we admit. But at the same time it is allowed that we have no communication with objects, except through the senses, and that "sensations are states of the sentient *mind*, not states of the body." Cognition, therefore, is based, at all events, not directly on any thing material, but on something mental. As appeared at the beginning of our examination, we have no direct cognition of objects, but all our knowledge presupposes a mental process; namely, Connotation. Connotation, however, is Generalization. To connote, is to attach to the particular an attribute; that is, a general character. A particular attribute, an attribute which does not attach the particular to a class, is a contradiction in terms. Mr. Mill himself says, (II. 211,) "In every act of what is called observation, there is at least one inference—from the sensations to the presence of the object; from the marks or diagnostics, to the entire phenomenon;" that is, we infer the general character indicated by the particular sensations. And again, (212,) "We cannot describe a fact, without implying more than the fact. The perception is only of one individual thing; but to describe it is

to affirm a connection between it and every other thing which is either denoted or connoted by any of the terms used." Or rather, we should say, *what we perceive* is an individual thing; but the thing, as an *object* or phenomenon, is generalized. This is what is meant by the distinction between *phenomena* and *things in themselves*. "There is not the slightest reason," says Mr. Mill, (I. 78,) "for believing that what we call the sensible qualities of the object are a type of any thing inherent in itself, or bear any affinity to its own nature. A cause does not, as such, resemble its effects; an east wind is not like the steam of boiling water; why, then, should matter resemble our sensations? Why should the inmost nature of fire or water resemble the impressions made by these objects upon our senses? And if not on the principle of resemblance, on what other principle can the manner in which objects affect us through our senses afford us any insight into the inherent nature of those objects? It may therefore safely be laid down as a truth both obvious in itself, and admitted by all whom it is at present necessary to take into consideration, that, of the outward world, we know, and can know absolutely nothing, except the sensations which we experience from it." That is to say, our thoughts, and even the representations we make to ourselves of outward things, are not material things, but of a nature altogether distinct from Matter; and Sensation, considered as mere passivity to outward impulses, is an abstraction, and not a fact of experience.

In this statement of Mr. Mill's, however, as in Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena, the notion seems to remain, that the reason we perceive only phenomena lies in a weakness of our powers; that phenomena are still *things*, but as it were the shadows or ghosts of the things, and that if our faculties were more perfect we should perceive the things themselves lying behind. Of the same sort is the notion elsewhere alluded to, that conceptions are "*copies* of the things," or "*impressions from without*." (I. 361, II. 223.) These and the like views all flow out from the primary assumption that Reality is equivalent to Matter. Now that "Matter is the test of all things under the sun," we are ready to allow. Whatever does not manifest itself we are at liberty to conclude does not exist: *de non apparentibus et de non existentibus eadem est ratio*. But that material existence is not Reality, we think sufficiently appears from the principles of the Inductive Philosophy itself. According to it, the only character common

to all the material world, (its essence therefore) — is Succession. Every natural event tends to destroy itself, and bring something else in its place. The bud makes way for the flower, and the flower for the fruit. The growth of the tree is a hastening to decay. Every chemical and every mechanical force aims at being neutralized or spent. The spring strives to uncoil: the acid seeks the alkali. There is throughout nature a perpetual reference of each thing to something else; each by itself is incomplete, and partly in another. Material existence is thus an incomplete, insufficient existence; the idea of the thing is not realized in the thing itself, but partly in another thing, and this again in another, and so on to infinity. Reality, therefore, or the existence of the Idea, manifests itself *in* the phenomenon: but as Negation; namely, a negation of the form of existence (Particularity): and affirmation of the form is negation of the reality manifested in it. This is shown, for instance, in the effect of poisons on animal organization, alluded to by Mr. Mill, (I. 481.) Their effect, he says, is “the conversion of the animal substance (by combination with the poison) into a chemical compound, held together by so powerful a force as to resist the subsequent action of the ordinary causes of decomposition. Now, organic life . . . consisting in a continual state of decomposition and recombination of the different organs and tissues, whatever incapacitates them for the decomposition destroys life.” So soon as the form is made permanent, life, which is the reality manifested in it, is destroyed.

Material existence, or particularity, accordingly, is an embodied self-contradiction; a contradiction between the form and the substance, and thus a prolonged annihilation, the form of which is Change, or abstractly, Time, and the assertion that we know only particulars, must be coupled with the admission that these particulars, or “facts,” are nothing more than phenomena; to know which is to know their unreality.

Another prevailing notion is, that Matter is a *temporary* reality; that though it does not endure for ever, yet it contains a certain amount of Being. But Time, as is shown by the old puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise, cannot be divided into independent moments; that is, cannot be really divided. Otherwise, each moment would be an eternity. Every force, say the mathematicians, will act for ever, unless impeded. Not that we have any experience of a force acting for ever; but if we isolate a force, it necessarily becomes eternal, since the

notion of Existence does not include, but excludes, non-existence. A temporary reality, therefore, is a false reality; a reality which is partly unreal. The succession of Time is the development of this unreality.

That we sensuously perceive only Phenomena, as already remarked, is so far from being incompatible with a knowledge of objective reality, that, on the contrary, it simply declares the superficial nature of the unreality that we see in things. That which changes is not the reality but the unreality; and to annihilate this is to affirm its opposite. So that to reduce Matter to a superficial and transient form, is not to deny, but to affirm the Reality it contains; and Change, though apparently a mere negation, or destruction of Matter, is in truth affirmative, being a negation of the negative. Though on the other hand it is not to be imagined that the reality is something existing apart, *behind* the phenomenon; for the phenomenon is nothing else than the reality, appearing, or existing, though in an inadequate form. It is no degradation, therefore, to spiritual things, that they exist materially. Man, for instance, exists as body, and we may say that his body is a complete incarnation of his soul; provided we keep in mind that this is an inadequate or partially false, (and thus transitory,) existence, and do not confine the spirit to its temporary manifestations.

As we have already seen, all Knowledge is Generalization. But to generalize the particular is to destroy its particularity. Knowledge of particulars, therefore, is a knowledge of their connection with and dependence upon a general principle. And here we see the root of the inability of the Inductive theory to form a satisfactory generalization. Each particular refers to some other, and this again to another, and so on. When we come to examine one, therefore, we are necessarily referred to the next, and thus the problem is prolonged to infinity, or rather to indefinitude. Thus it is that Mr. Mill makes the term *general* equivalent to *indefinite*; whereas it properly denotes what is universal, and therefore definite, in opposition to what is accidental, and thus indefinable. Were each object in Nature a definite fact, it would be necessary to study each separate thing by itself; each grain of sand on the sea-shore would require as special and careful examination as any other fact. The problem proposed by the Inductive philosophy—to construct knowledge out of particular facts—is the wildest of chimeras; the nearest approach that an aggre-

gate of finites can make to the universal, is the Indefinite; — that which requires to be, but is not, finished. There is no reason, therefore, to attribute the failure to the weakness of human faculties, when the task proposed is an absurdity. It would derogate nothing from Omnipotence to say that two hills cannot be made without a valley between. The talk about the finite nature of Man, and his consequent inability to grasp universal Truth, betrays an entire misconception of the whole process of Knowing. The whole argument is this: a finite, that is, a thing, must have definite dimensions, and thus cannot contain the Infinite. But *a thing* can no more contain a sensation than it can the Infinite. The difficulty, then, would be not how we can have absolute Knowledge, but how we can have any knowledge, or even sensation.

If, then, it be allowed that we mentally perceive (are conscious) at all, there is no reason why Knowledge should be limited. Knowledge, as we have seen, is Generalization. Now what grounds have we for supposing that the generalization must be imperfect? For on this ground alone can Knowledge be partial. That our Knowledge of the Universe is in point of fact *incomplete*, no one will question. New objects and new facilities for observation are presented to us every day. And if by Knowledge we understand an aggregate of empirical facts and observations, this incompleteness is a defect in kind as well as degree. We cannot generalize safely until we have gathered the Universe into a heap, and weighed, measured, and sifted the whole of it. This, however, being impossible, either Knowledge is so too, or else the theory is wrong. It will not help us at all to call our present Knowledge an *approximation*, as if it were defective only in degree. There is not the slightest hope that all mankind, in any imaginable lapse of ages, could exhaustively analyze even a single grain of sand; — for this reason — that Matter is divisible indefinitely, and can be stretched to match any extent of time. This, however, is at least as fatal to empirical Knowledge as to any other. Of what use is it to talk about a *partial* generalization, when the *part* must be an infinitely (or rather indefinitely) small quantity, — and thus a merely abstract or imaginary amount? Degree and kind are here one. We either know *nothing*, or else the argument against absolute Knowledge falls to the ground. Here again the Inductive Theory is beaten by its own weapons. It refers for its authority to Consciousness, Experience, or Common-sense. But Common-

sense claims to *know*, and moreover to know *the things themselves*. The distinction between the knowable appearance and the unknowable "inmost essence," is altogether foreign to it. The contradiction implied in the supposition that Reality (the Universal) can be contained in a particular; in other words, that particular things are real — exists therefore, in its whole strength, in the Inductive Theory itself.

As we have already shown, the perception even of phenomena presupposes Generalization. Things, then, ought not even to *seem* to be, for this equally involves the contradiction. It is not enough to say that objects make *impressions* on our senses; — for they make impressions also on other objects, — one stone, for instance, on another, — but there being no generalization, no sensation is caused.

The confounding of Aggregation with Generalization does not, indeed, seem to satisfy even our author, in its practical working. "Why," says he, "is a single instance, in some cases, sufficient for a complete induction, while in others, myriads of concurring instances, without a single exception, known or presumed, go such a very little way toward establishing an universal proposition? Whoever can answer this question knows more of the philosophy of logic than the wisest of the ancients, and has solved the great problem of induction." That this difficulty should occur is, indeed, most natural: for, were the theory sound, Generalization ought to proceed in exact proportion to the amount of facts collected. The force of Evidence ought to be calculable with mathematical precision: — a certain number of instances being given, we must know; — the number being less, believe or conjecture accordingly. But without having the slightest intention of measuring ourselves with even the less wise among the ancients, we think the answer to the problem a very plain one — simply this: that in some cases we apprehend the idea at once; and at other times grope a long time for it. The difficulty is confined to the Inductive System, and our business in this examination has been only to show this, and thereby to answer the arguments founded upon it. As to the ulterior question, what is the true theory of knowledge, we do not propose to go much into it at present.

All empirical or materialistic systems of philosophy are necessarily self-contradictory, since the problem proposed is incompatible with the means employed for its solution. To know is to generalize, but Generalization cannot be accomplish-

ed by Sensation, nor by any aggregation of sensations ; for the reason that Sensation requires Particularity, and has to do only with particulars, whereas to generalize is to perceive the secondary and dependent nature of particulars, and thus implies that the faculty corresponding to particulars — namely, Sensation — is a subordinate one. Of this, indeed, the Inductive theory is partly conscious, for Induction implies that less weight is given to particulars, as such, and a more or less distinct feeling that the important point is what is common to all of them ? But its error consists in this : that instead of seeing that the common principle must be the one *reality* manifesting itself under these various forms, it sees in it only an (accidental) coincidence of certain attributes, to be got at by abstracting the other attributes. Instead of a common principle, therefore, we have as many coincidences as there are attributes distinguishable by the Understanding. It is thus a system of abstractions. We hear various philosophies, that of Kant, for instance, or Aristotle, blamed for their *abstractness*, by writers of this school. But the abstractest of all philosophies is the Inductive ; for its great principle is Abstraction, and its results are abstract attributes, which it seeks again to embody by attaching them to fancied substrata, — the existence of which it does not always even pretend to believe, and can in no instance show. Where do we find such a string of abstractions as in the modern English Physics — their “ philosophy ” *par excellence* ? — Caloric, Electricity, Galvanism, Magnetism, and the rest. Has any one ever seen these things ? So far from it, that it is not pretended that they are things at all. Yet a separate existence is given to them, and they are supposed to be induced upon or imparted to Matter. Now, to the Inductive Philosophy, if consistent, whatever is no *thing*, that is, has not material existence — is *nothing*. Hence the hypotheses of *fluids*, *vapors*, *latency*, &c., — in which qualities are supposed to exist, yet unattached to Matter : that is, to exist and not exist, at the same time. Thus, for instance, it was formerly fancied by physiologists, that nervous communication must take place by means of a fluid, and accordingly they conjured up for the occasion, not only the fluid, but canals through the nerves for it to run in. But the nerves being found to be solid, and Galvanism meanwhile offering itself as a yet more convenient hypothesis, was proposed instead. So the great category of Force, which is nothing else but abstract motion or action.

It would be easy to point out inconsistencies in this system, in pretending to derive all knowledge from observation, and yet building theories upon assumptions, where observations are confessedly impossible, or at least have never been made. But the point of interest is, that these errors are not accidental or at random, but show a progress of the system itself beyond its own principles ; — that it transcends, and thereby refutes itself. The term *transcendental* is often used by persons of this way of thinking, as equivalent to Utopian or mystical, — (or *misty*, which is supposed to be the same thing,) — and as denoting a pretence of human faculties to accomplish what is beyond their sphere. But this again can apply nowhere so well as to the Inductive System itself. For this is precisely its position. It has got so far as to feel that the reality it seeks is *not* the phenomenon ; — but recognizing no concrete reality except Matter, it does not get beyond this negative conception of unphenomenal matter ; matter, that is, from which all attributes are abstracted ; thus it makes Reality an abstraction, and at the same time speaks of it as concrete and present to experience. It may be worth while shortly to describe the process gone through by the Inductive Theory.

Were phenomena pure realities, one fact would be as conclusive in Science as a thousand ; all that we can learn at all we could learn at once, and there would be no need of Induction. But every one feels that in every fact there is much that is accidental, and belongs to the particular circumstances of its appearance. If every fact were a pure reality, then a five-legged calf would be a new species. This, however, was never imagined, unless by a child or a savage. Men, with very little aid of Science, come unconsciously to the notion of a *type*, that is, a universal form, to which phenomena ought, but sometimes do not, conform. An ideal standard is established ; — that is, the reality of the thing is declared to be outside of it, and not attained in any one thing, though all aim and tend towards it, — but each hits more or less wide of the mark. This is the true sense of Induction, which is nothing else than the attempt to discover the reality in phenomena. But this establishing of a *type* is, nevertheless, directly contrary to the assumption with which the theory begins — namely, that Reality is equivalent to Matter ; for here a distinction is made between the thing and its reality.

Common-sense knows nothing of these distinctions. To it the world is a solid and unmixed reality; a calf with a leg or two more or less does not puzzle the farmer; he is used, indeed, to see them with four legs, and is thus at first struck with the novelty. But he knows no reason why, if it pleased God, they should not have twenty legs as well as four; and if the birth of a five-legged calf should happen half a dozen times, would be quite reconciled to it, and think no more of the matter; — that is, his conceptions are undefined; he is content with his immediate experience, and his generalization being merely instinctive, and not a matter of reflection, is readily modified. Instinctively he makes a distinction between phenomenon and reality; Matter and Form; so that different degrees of connection between them (and thus different degrees of reality) are recognized and acted upon in practice, though not in theory. As the mind is further developed it becomes by degrees conscious of this distinction, and reasons upon it. The *laws* of the material world become the object of interest, and the question arises whether these laws are invariable. The answer is, that the law invariably acts, but, from various hindrances, the effect does not always follow. Greater importance is thus given to the law, the general form, and less to the particular case, the subject-matter in which the law is manifested. Thus the distinction before instinctively made, is now recognized theoretically, also; Matter and Law are separate, as Form and Substance, and come together only in the *typical cases*, in which the law is completely embodied, and the body completely obedient to the law. This is a great step, for here Reality is placed in the coincidence of Matter and Law; that is, they are declared to be *really* identical, and where they do not completely coincide there must be proportionate unreality. Here, however, the Inductive Theory becomes transcendental, or rather, (to adopt Kant's distinction,) *transcendent*.

The notion of *type* presupposes that Matter is not equivalent to Reality; that is, that the fundamental assumption is unfounded. Mr. Mill accordingly consistently rejects this notion; others, as Mr. Whewell, (*Philosophy of Inductive Sciences*,) admit it. But the main point is admitted by all, since otherwise Induction could not go on. But though they hold fast to the new view, they do not let go the old one; a contradiction thus arises. Reality is outside of Matter; and yet is identical with it. It is, therefore, both identical and not identical; that is, it is *partly* identical. Material objects, then, are

partly real and partly unreal. These sides are to be separated; the phenomenon is to be split in halves, and the one half retained, the other thrown away. This is the actual position of the Inductive Theory.

Here, however, it is to be remarked, that the two sides are merely antithesized, declared opposites; so that if we fix A to be Reality, B must be Unreality—but it does not appear by what authority one is preferred to the other; that is, why B should not as well be Reality, and A Unreality. In whatever way we establish it, some one else may choose to reverse their relative positions—to declare our abnormal cases typical, and vice versa. All classification, then, must be subjective, conventional; we cannot affirm any identity between things, but only diversity.* It is necessary, therefore, to find some principle of connection between these opposites. But as they are of themselves mere opposites, there is either no such principle, or it is something distinct from and including both. Mr. Mill, as we have seen, does not distinctly show any such principle; others, as Berkeley, have sought it in *God*: and perhaps this is involved in the stress which he also lays on the *finiteness* or *human* character of our cognitive faculties. This reference to God, however, though satisfactory to some minds, and convenient for putting an end to discussions and replying to arguments which we know not otherwise how to answer—is in fact a mere subterfuge, and, as Spinoza says, “the asylum of ignorance.” It means only that we suppose a final principle to exist somewhere, but are at a loss where to look for it. The name, therefore, is indifferent, it being a mere category of the Unknowable; and various writers have designated the same thing by various terms; Cousin, for instance, calls it “Reason;” Mr. Whewell, “Ideas;” Reid, “Common-sense,” &c. In either case it is merely a reference to an ultimate authority, about which no questions are to be asked, and amounts only to saying that the reason of the thing, its reality, is not only unattained, but unattainable.

The occasion for the introduction of a third principle is this: On the one hand the original instinctive feeling that Matter and Reality are identical, is gone; Reflection has revealed to us the chasm that exists between the mind and its object; Matter is outward, unideal, rude; it does not always conform

* Ante, p. 177.

to its laws; indeed, we are obliged to begin our study of phenomena with avoiding any hypothesis as to their law, in order that we may learn the law from a series of observations, and not be led astray by an abnormal instance. The material world is to the understanding a chaos, on which a foreign and opposite principle has impressed itself from without, and arranged the originally lawless Matter into order and forms belonging to itself, and not to Matter. On the other hand, Law, whencesoever it may come, is certainly found in intimate connection with Matter. To explain this, a higher, combining principle of some sort is required, and this higher principle *of some sort*, this indefinite *something above*, is that already mentioned. This, however, after all explains nothing; for the point to be explained is not how Matter and Law coexist in themselves, but how we come to *know* of their coexistence. That God created the Universe according to his infinite wisdom, and ordained a certain order among things, does not prove that we know this order, or that our notions in any way correspond with reality. On the contrary, Berkeley was driven to his theory precisely by this difficulty, (to him an impossibility,) of conceiving how a finite subject can have any objective knowledge. And he very consistently declares, that our ideas, as well as the order of things, are the immediate creations of God. This, indeed, is the only logical conclusion from these premises; — only, in that case, the knowledge and the ideas are God's, and not ours, and therefore Philosophy is an empty word.

Metaphysics being nothing else than the first principles of all thought, of all intellectual and spiritual interests, wherever the views of the Inductive System have prevailed among metaphysicians, we shall recognize them also in the prevailing forms of Religion, Morals, and Government.

In Religion this is the position of the Catholic Church, (the term Catholic being used as the opposite of Protestant, as denoting that sect of Christians who rest Religion on an outward *authority*.) If the Highest, the object of worship, is of a different nature from the mind, and therefore inaccessible to its unassisted efforts — that is, something outward, it follows necessarily that it can be manifested to us only outwardly, as Law, or outward authority, which we have only to obey, and not to reason about. And if, then, following these principles, we admit that the Catholic Church ever *was* a Church, and its faith ever *was* Religion, that is, that it ever was a divine in-

strument, its claims must now also be admitted as valid, to their full extent. For it never could have been a religion unless divinely ordained; religion being something which man of himself could never create. Its creed and its forms, then, must be divinely authenticated, and its claim of infallibility just. Then those who have separated from it must have set up human reason against the Divine Will, and from the first to the last be all heretics.

Of the same sort are those theories of government and ethics which deny that the standard of Right is an inward principle. If the foundation of absolute Right is something outward, it must be unintelligible and unknown to us, and any pretence at making it a matter of conscience and free inquiry is mere rebellion, and if allowed, shows a state of anarchy and universal license. The only form of government consistent with this view is despotism, which, we are told, would be the best form of government, provided we could have always a good man for despot—the difficulty of which is urged as an answer to objections that despotisms do not work well in practice, and are found only where the people are degraded. But the organization of the universe is not such a blunder that what is true in principle can never be true in practice.

Even in Ethics, where the very nature of the problem seems to imply that the standard is inward, the system of Utilitarianism has been invented, with the sole aim, as it would seem, to contrive, as a substitute, an outward one, the adaptation of actions to ends foreign to the mind; so obedient are men to a theory, fancying themselves all the while unbiassed and practical.

As man's instincts always outrun his conscious perceptions, so here the religious and moral instincts have long since rebelled against the views upheld theoretically by the understanding;—the religious instinct, as the deepest, leading the way—in Protestantism. Protestantism is the declaration that the authority in Religion, the mediator between God and man, is not without, merely, but also within us; and what Protestantism requires is not an outward persuasion, or belief, but Faith, or inward sight. So in Morals; virtue is no longer obedience to a decree of fate, a command of the Church, nor (in spite of the theory,) to a calculation of profit or use; but to Conscience. Man is a law unto himself. On this ground, also, rests the right of self-government.

These principles, it is true, are as yet mostly matters of

instinct, and not of consciousness ;—felt and acted upon, but not understood. Thus, few Protestants comprehend or would acknowledge the truths their Faith presupposes and rests upon. So in the theory of government, the opponents of self-government have the argument mostly on their side. In England and Germany, for example, there is no end to triumphant demonstrations that this country is irretrievably sunk in anarchy and license ; the newspapers, from month to month, ever since we had a separate political existence, have reëchoed the announcement—we, on the spot, however, failing to be convinced.

Theory, also, must sooner or later come to the same level, and meanwhile must show itself to be behind the age, in not being able to comprehend or explain historical phenomena which are no longer to be overlooked or denied. "History," says Hegel, "is progress in the consciousness of Freedom." Freedom, however, is the unity of the outward law with the inward, or the idea ; thus a free man is not coerced from without, but obeys the law of conscience. The first awakenings of this consciousness we see in the revolutions in religion and government. Philosophy, having no merely instinctive side, but requiring throughout the clearest consciousness, must be reached last. Thus the Inductive System, as we have seen, recognizes, more or less distinctly, that Reality or Truth can exist only in the unity of Matter and Law. These, however, are not of themselves united, but opposed, and we cannot discover any bond of union between them. If we resort to a third principle, by way of postulate, this is not only an unauthorized proceeding, but moreover does not at all remove the difficulty, since, the union being outward merely, the opposition (apart from the temporary effect of the uniting principle,) continues as before. Knowledge requires not only connection, but fundamental unity of these opposites. It is not enough that Matter should obey a law—it must be *its* law : else we could not generalize ; for it would not follow, that because any thing is true to-day it will therefore be true to-morrow. As we have not the third principle within our power, in other words, as we do not know through God's mind, but through our own, we know at most only single instances of its action, and not its law ; nor can we predict how it will act in future. Either the knowledge is impossible, or else these opposites are only superficially opposed, but in reality united of themselves, without the intervention of any other principle.

Law is not, then, an outward form, impressed upon Matter, but its Idea.

The same reform is thus necessary in Philosophy which we have seen making its appearance in Religion, Morals, and Government; and the demands made on the science from without coincide with the inward requirements which it is driven to make of itself.

ART. III.—1. *City Document No. 40.—Reports of the Annual Visiting Committees of the Public Schools of the City of Boston, 1847.* Boston: 1847. 8vo. pp. 124 and 92.

2. *Eleventh Annual Report of the Board of Education; together with the Eleventh Annual Report of the Secretary of the Board.* Boston: 1848. 8vo. pp. 136 and ix.

EDUCATION, in the wide sense of the word, is the harmonious development of all the natural powers of man,—of the Body, of the Mind, Conscience, Affections, Will, and Religious Sentiment. The general means to that end are twofold—the World of Matter, and the World of Men. Leaving the former out of account, the latter may be considered under four several forms, as constituting so many educational forces, which influence the development of the rising generation in this country. There is—

I. The Political action of the People, represented by the State;

II. The Material action of the People, represented by Business;

III. The Literary and Scientific action of the People, represented by the Press;

IV. The Ecclesiastical action of the People, represented by the Churches.

Now these four, the State, Business, the Press, and the Churches, are the great Educational Forces which most powerfully affect the intellectual and moral development of the People, modifying the original tendency of each generation as it rises. This is so from the very nature of man and the constitution of society.

But subordinate to these general educational forces, there are likewise Special Institutions, whose design is to prepare the child, and put him in communication with these general influences. The more completely they do that, the more completely are they commonly thought to do their work ; and for this purpose schools and colleges have mainly been established — to put the youth in connection with these forces, and thus enable him to do the duties and receive the instruction which the State, Business, the Press, and the Churches may demand or afford him. He who has learned to read, to write, and to calculate, has got possession of the three most important educational tools or helps ; and by the use thereof receives the aid of these great general educators. He who learns, also, a foreign language, letting alone other advantages of that study, may thereby receive the instruction which the State, Business, Press, and Churches of another land have likewise to offer him.

Were these great and general educational forces of a higher or a lower character than now with us, their influence would be modified accordingly. It is the duty of a wise educator to appreciate the kind and degree of influence which these forces actually exert on the young, and act with or against it, as the case may require. The State, by its actions, may teach men to reverence the eternal Right, or only the power of armies and commerce. The Business of the nation may teach respect for honesty and manly usefulness, or only the omnipotence of the dollar. The Press may direct men to honor justice, truth, and manliness, may fill them with noble ideas and sentiments, or teach them to be mean and little, taking Public Opinion as their standard. The Churches may instruct men to love God and to love man, as the supreme objects of ideal or practical affection, or they may teach men to comply with public sins, to believe a lie, and for a pretence make long prayers, hypocritically affecting a belief in all manner of absurdities and contradictions. It is the duty of such as direct the public education of the people to understand the character and influence of all these. It will be hard work for the teacher to make his pupil ascend, though by their proper motion, while these forces are contending to drive him down. But when these forces act in the right direction, it is difficult for the youth to go wrong. However, it is not our task at present to criticize these educational forces, and inquire what they actually teach in America at this day, — what good they promise, what ill they threaten,

for the future ;— we wish rather to look at the Subordinate Institutions for the public education of the people, whose aim is to furnish the youth of our land with the rudiments of learning.

After a nation has provided for the common material wants of protection, food, shelter, clothing, and the like, the most important work is to educate the rising generation. To do this is not merely a duty which the father owes to his own child, but which Society, in virtue of its Eminent Paternity, owes to every child born in its bosom. The Right of the State to control alike person and property, is continually set forth, till it often comes to be considered as superior to Reason and Conscience ; but the Duty of the State to watch over the culture of its children is too often forgot. But this Duty is coextensive with the Right, and both grow out of the relation of sovereignty which the State holds over the individuals that compose it.

It has always been acknowledged that Society owes something to each person subject to its power. In the rudest ages of social existence it is felt to be the duty of the State to protect, as far as possible, the Lives of its citizens from the violence of a public enemy from abroad, or a private enemy at home. Next it becomes recognized as a natural duty to protect also the Property of each man, as well as his Person : then the State admits its obligation to aid all its citizens or subjects in their Religious Culture, and so, in some form or other, provides for the Public Worship of the God of the State. There is no government in Europe which does not admit all these obligations. All have established Armies, Jails, and Churches, with their appropriate furniture, to protect the Persons and Property of their subjects, and do something to advance their Religious Culture. At a period of social progress considerably more advanced, the State first admits it is a public duty of the sovereign power to defend a man from Want, and save him from starvation, not only in times of famine and war, but in the ordinary state of things. At a period of progress still more recent, it is also recognized as a public duty to look after the Education of all the children of the State. This duty rests on the same foundation with the others. At this day it is admitted by all civilians, that each citizen has a right to claim of his State protection for Property and Person ; Food enough, likewise, to keep him from perishing— on condition that he

does what he can to protect himself. In New England and most of the enlightened states of the world, it is also admitted that each child has a Right, likewise, to claim of the State an opportunity of acquiring the rudiments of Education. But how far ought the State to carry this Education, which is to be placed within the reach of all? The answer to this question we will attempt to give in another part of this article, only premising here, that in a progressive people the zero-point of Education is continually rising; what was once the Maximum of hope, one day becomes the Minimum of sufferance.

In New England it has long been admitted in practice, though not proclaimed in our political theories, that the State owes each child in it a chance to obtain the average education, so far as schools can secure that attainment. Our scheme of Public Education of the People is one of the most original things in America. In Literature and Science America has hitherto shown little invention, and has achieved little worth mentioning. In Business the nation is eminently creative, and in Politics we are the most original of nations, both in respect of Ideas and the forms in which they become actual. With these exceptions, the New England scheme of Public Education, now extended over most of the free states, is the most original thing which America has produced. Take New England as a whole, with the states which have descended from her—her public free schools are the noblest monument of the character of the people; of their industry, their foresight, their vigorous and thrifty manhood. New England has been complimented for her ships, her roads—of earth and iron—her factories, her towns, and her shops; she has often looked with pride on her churches, once the dwelling-place of such piety, and long the bulwark of civil freedom in the new world: but she has far more reason to be proud—if aught human may be proud—of her Common Schools. These are more honorable to her head and heart, than even the great political and legal institutions which have grown around them, and above them, often, but always out of the same soil.

Democracy is the government of all the citizens for the sake of all the citizens, and by means of them all. Of course, it is only possible on condition that it is itself conducted by the eternal laws of Justice, which man has not made, but only found made; otherwise it will not be for the sake of ALL, but hostile to the welfare of some. Such a Democracy is of course

only an Ideal as yet. But the prevalent Sentiments of America, especially of New England and her descendant states, are democratic; her Ideas are democratic; her Institutions, in the main, democratic,—all progressively tending towards that Ideal. The Public Schools of New England have grown out of these democratic sentiments and ideas,—their growth as unavoidable as that of lichens and mosses on Monadnock.

Democracy is the Ideal of America. But it is an Ideal which can never be realized except on the condition that the People, the whole People, are well educated, in the large sense of that word. There may be a Monarchy—despotic or constitutional, or an Aristocracy, without any considerable culture on the part of the mass of the People; but a Democracy under such circumstances cannot be. A nation of ignorant savages may be governed: it is only a wise People that can govern themselves. The very political constitution of New England, therefore, demands a degree of culture in the People hitherto unknown in the most advanced nations of the world. Thus in America there is not only the general duty of Society to educate all its members, but also the special duty of a democratic government—which thereby is fulfilling the most imperative conditions of its existence.

At the first settlement of America, it was not possible for the infant state, struggling for existence, to spend much time in the education of the children; yet, considering all things, the ideal set up in New England, in the seventeenth century, was exceedingly high, and the achievement, likewise, greater than a sanguine man would have dared predict. At this day, the intelligence of the mass is much enhanced, and the wealth thereof is prodigiously increased. The zero-point of Public Education has also risen.

This may be laid down as a maxim—that it is the duty of Society to afford every child born in it a chance of obtaining the best education which the genius of the child is capable of receiving, and the wealth and intelligence of Society are capable of bestowing. It seems to us, from the very nature of man and of Society, that each child has just as good a claim for this as for protection from violence or starvation. Much, doubtless, will be possible in the way of education, a hundred years hence, not thought of now; but *now* much is possible which is not attempted—much not even hoped for. When the opportunity for obtaining even a liberal culture is afforded to all, is there danger that men will leave the laborious call-

ings of life, and rush to what are called the educated professions? Quite the contrary. There will always be five hundred good carpenters to one good philosopher or poet. There are but few men who have an innate preference for being lawyers, ministers, and doctors, rather than farmers, shoemakers, and blacksmiths. Many are now in the professions solely because these offered a chance for some liberal culture which the trade did not afford, though otherwise far more attractive. When education is thought equally necessary for the Farmer and the Lawyer, and all honest and useful callings equally honorable, there is more danger that the office be neglected than the field; we may safely count on more corn and less litigation.

The process of education at this day consists of three distinct things.

I. The Acquisition of certain Positive Knowledge, namely, of the Facts of Science and the Facts of History, — including also the Ideas of Science and History.

II. The development of the Faculties of the Learner, so that he may also effectually possess all his natural powers, and act originally for himself. At present the Common Schools do a little of both; the High Schools and Colleges a little more. But in the Common Schools, taken as a whole, so far as we know — far too little is attempted in the way of an original development of the faculties themselves. Memory and Imitation are the chief faculties which are cultivated. The reason of this is too plain to need showing.

Now the foundation of the Public Education of the People must be laid in the Common Schools. Take the whole population of any northern state, perhaps not more than an eighth part of the people receive any instruction from any private school. The faults, then, of the Common Schools will show themselves in the character of the people, and that in a single generation.

The Common Schools, therefore, are the most important institutions of New England. If there had been none such for two hundred years past, the mass of men would have been unable to read, and write, and calculate; those attainments would be the monopoly of a few men of superior wealth or superior natural ability. As the natural consequence, Agriculture would have been in a poor state; Commerce in a poor state; Manufactures a hundred years behind their present condition. There would not be the signs of life, activity, thrift, of contin-

ual progress, visible all over the New England states. The crowds which in Boston now attend the lectures of the Lowell Institute, and other means of instructive or refined amusement, would seek their entertainment in a Bull-fight, or a Bear-baiting; perhaps in a Man-fight of Bruisers in a ring, or a Soldier-baiting on the Common. Public lectures would be as rare in Boston, as in Montreal, Halifax, or even New Orleans and Naples. The government would not be a Democracy, getting more and more democratic, but a Despotism in the form of a Monarchy or Aristocracy; a government over all, but by a few, and against the interest of the many. The Few and the Strong would own the bodies of the Weak and the Many in New England, as well as in South Carolina and Morocco. There would not be a hundred churches in Boston, filled by intelligent men of more than a hundred different ways of thinking on religious matters — each claiming freedom of conscience; but three or four magnificent and costly temples, in which the ignorant and squalid people, agape for miracles, ridden by their rulers, and worse ridden by their priests, met to adore some relic of a Saint — the pocket-handkerchief of the Mother of God, and the nail from the cross, or from the horse the Queen of Sheba did not ride, a hair from Saint Joseph's beard, or perhaps the seamless coat of Christ! The city would swarm with monks dedicated to ignorance and filthiness, and religiously fulfilling at least that part of their vow. There would be slaves in New England, not black slaves alone, but white; Freedom would be in few hands; Land in few hands; Education in few hands; Power in few hands; Comfort and Virtue in few hands. New England might then be the Heaven of the Rich and the Noble, the Purgatory of the Wise and the Good, but the Hell of the Poor and the Weak.

If there had never been any public schools for girls in New England, then the majority of women would have had the monopoly of ignorance. They would be the slaves of the men; not their companions. The hardest and most revolting work, in the streets, the scows, and the drains, would be performed by the hands of sisters, wives, mothers. Woman would be the victim of Lust, of Intemperance, of every crime — trod down into the dust, but poisoning still the oppressive foot.

On the other hand, if the Public Schools could have been better — could have been as good and well attended in 1748 as now, New England would have gained, perhaps, at the least, fifty years. Where would have been the Intemperance, the Pau-

perism, the Crime—which now prey on Society? We should not need so many jails, and five thousand magistrates of the Police in Massachusetts. We should not have a Nation with so little shame and so much to be ashamed of; a Press so corrupt and debasing. Business would be marked by an activity wiser and yet greater, and by its purer morals; the Churches would be far other than what now they are; the amount of intelligent activity might be tenfold what it is now, and that tenfold activity would show itself in all departments of human concern—in a tenfold morality, comfort, order, and welfare in general.

There are several causes which prevent the Common Schools from doing the service which is needed of them; we will mention only the two chief. All the children from five to sixteen do not attend regularly. From a fourth to a third part are always absent. Mr. Mann complains of this as “an enormous loss.” “The most frugal and thrifty community in the world here plays the spendthrift and prodigal.” The State can do little directly to repair this evil. To make attendance compulsory would be inconsistent with the spirit of American institutions, and perhaps productive of little good. Teachers, School Committees, and the Clergy, can doubtless do much to check this evil.

The next cause is found in the inferior character of the teachers employed. Far be it from us to find fault with these persons;—there is no class in the community for whom we feel a more profound respect, or regard with a deeper sympathy. “Madam,” said Dr. Johnson to a lady who grumbled about her servants, “Madam, you cannot expect all the celestial virtues for three shillings a week.” Eminent ability does not naturally flow towards the master’s desk in the Common Schools. Take two thousand five hundred of the men of Massachusetts most marked for general ability, and probably not ten of them would be found among the teachers of public schools in that state; certainly not seeking there a permanent resting-place. There is no honor connected with the calling; the pay is miserably little. Massachusetts rewards her teachers better, we think, than any other state; but on the average, after deducting the expense of board, pays the male teacher less than twenty-five dollars a month, and the female but eight dollars and seven cents! In Vermont it is but twelve dollars a month for males, and four dollars and seventy-five cents for females.

The celestial virtues are seldom to be had so cheap. Such a stipend is not likely to attract men of superior energy; they will flee from a calling which can offer no inducement but the vow of poverty. Men of inferior ability have hitherto had little encouragement to fit themselves for the duties of a teacher. Indeed, there have been no means hitherto placed within their reach. There have long been establishments for the training of Lawyers, Physicians, Clergymen, and Soldiers,—until lately none for the education of Teachers. There are even now few good works treating either of the art or the science of teaching. There is no college, we think, in the United States, in which lectures are given on this art or science, though it is necessary for every parent to practise the art, and to understand it belongs to the very profession of the teacher. The Normal Schools have already done something to remedy this evil. Teachers' institutes, lectures by accomplished men, the production of books treating of the art and science of teaching, will also do good.

But all this will not reach the root of the evil. Martyrs may always be found to go on the forlorn hope of Humanity, but no State ever relied on a whole army of martyrs—to man its forts and its fleets, to form the rank and file of the very militia! A more mundane argument must be resorted to than the hope of eternal rewards in heaven. Superior talent will always be attracted towards Wealth and social Rank—in no country more certainly than in America. A Christian minister was once sure of a competent support for his natural life; sure, also, of a high social rank. Then men of masculine ability and superior culture came to that calling and did it honor, representing the superior thought of the nation. Circumstances changing, the minister's salary becoming uncertain in its continuance, or comparatively small, his social rank in reality far less—that masculine ability and superior culture seek other channels of usefulness, and only by exception flow through the pulpit, then to the amazement and consternation of the church, long wonted to the drowsy tinkle of an humbler stream.

Now it is entirely in the power of the people to command superior talent, cultivation, and skill, solely by paying its price. Some men are born with a genius for teaching; many with a talent for it. Offer a sufficient pay, and they will come, and the results will appear in the character of the next generation. It is not difficult for Colleges to obtain men of fine ability and culture for their service, because, though the salary is not large

compared with the income of a thrifty grocer or a master mason in a large town—yet a certain honor and respectability, as well as permanency, is connected with the post of Professor. Give the same reward to the teacher of the Common Schools, and a similar result will follow.

Now the State demands its ablest men for Judges, Senators, and the like, and easily obtains them. The business of educating the whole generation of youth in the land between four and sixteen is one of the first importance; on which the destinies of the nation depend. Common-sense demands, then, a class of men with superior powers, with a generous development of all their faculties, and especially masters of the science and art of Education. Soon as the people are satisfied of this, they can have such a body of men at their disposal. Until this is done, the State must suffer. It is easy to be penny-wise and pound-foolish, and it seems to us that the system of small salaries for schoolmasters hitherto pursued, even in New England, is like sacrificing a whole cloak of velvet to save the end of a farthing candle.

Compare the attainments of a child of fourteen, trained in one of the Common Schools, say of Boston, and another of equal age and capacity trained under the care of the most judicious and skilful teachers of that city, and what a difference; a difference not only in the amount of positive knowledge acquired, but still more in the actual development of faculties. The one is ten times better educated than the other; the difference arising solely from the fact that one has had the discipline of a superior person, and the other not. Yet it is possible to make every public school in the land better than the best private school now in it; the people have never done their duty until this is attained. It were a bad thing that the children of the rich should grow up with little knowledge, little possession of their faculties: but it is worse still that the children of the poor grow up in this state, for in adult years they cannot command for themselves the educational resources so easy of access to the man who has enough of both time and money, which commands also the time of other men.

The services of women cost less than men; educational ability, also, is more common amongst women, and therefore it is easier to obtain for the Common Schools eminent educational talent in the female teacher than in the male. The community is wisely availing itself of this advantage, and the number of female teachers advances more rapidly than the males. But

here, too, is a difficulty. The idea has commonly prevailed, that woman was inferior to man—not deserving of superior culture. Her business was

“To suckle fools and chronicle small beer.”

Her education, therefore, need not go beyond the merest rudiments, to qualify her for these functions. Like father like son—the rude boy inheriting this traditional notion of woman, refuses to submit to female government at school, and the father thinks he is more than half right. Besides, woman has not counted herself the equivalent of man, but tamely accepted the place assigned her; and now, too, it is difficult to find women of competent culture to assume their natural position, and educate the aspiring youth of the land, and so the country school is poorly taught, by men of little natural or acquired fitness for the work, and taught, likewise, but few months; while the same money would better pay the services of a competent woman for the whole year.

But the Common Schools must be occupied mainly with the rudiments of education. Some scholars will wish to obtain more than these offer. The number of such is continually increasing. To meet their wants there is needed a class of High Schools, to take boys and girls where the Common Schools leave them, and advance them yet further. The law provides for the establishment of such schools in large towns; but even there the want is but ill supplied, and in the small towns it is still severely felt. If several small towns would unite and establish such a High School in some convenient place, the evil would be remedied in part; at any rate, such a scheme would work better than any thing which is now offered to the public. In such a school, ancient and modern languages might be taught; mathematics, the natural sciences, ethics, and metaphysics. At present, for their higher culture, children must repair to the numerous private academies which testify to the want of such public institutions, rather than supply it. The money now paid to the private academies for the education of a few would be more than sufficient to establish such public schools as might better teach all the hopeful youth who would avail themselves thereof. At present, these private academies, with a few honorable exceptions, do their work but poorly, as we think. They are not under the vigilant supervision of a committee appointed by the public, and responsible

to them; there is seldom a regular and systematic course of studies prescribed; still more rarely a wise and vigorous method of education pursued, by which the pupil's mind is well disciplined. Much of the quackery of education, we fear, takes refuge in the private schools. Besides, the private academies are often so sectarian in their character that much of the good they might do is prevented, and much time is wasted in teaching the child what he will slowly and painfully unlearn in later years, or else be blighted all his life by a barbarous theology, forced upon him when he was too feeble to resist the baneful imposition.

We will not pretend to mention all the details which ought to be considered in establishing such High Schools as are hinted at above, but this, at least, seems possible—for two or three small towns to unite, or, if it were needful, all the small towns in a county, and establish such an institution. We see not why it would not work as well as the Normal Schools, which already have done so much to advance the education of the People. Such schools should provide for the youth of both sexes. Originally, the Public Schools of New England were open only to the boys. The Hebrew notion has long prevailed, that man was created for his own sake, woman only for man's sake, because it was “not good that the man should be alone.” She has been considered as inferior to man, and, therefore, not entitled to any considerable culture. This barbarous notion still prevails; as proof of which we need only look at the one hundred and nine colleges in the United States, and ask what analogous provision has been made for the superior education of young women. Boston has done much for the public education of her children, and thereby been honorably distinguished above the other cities of the western or the eastern world. Her Latin and English High Schools would be an ornament and honor to any city in the world. But, even in Boston, there are no public schools for girls at all corresponding to those excellent institutions for boys. Why not?

Perhaps nothing would give so direct and powerful an impulse to popular education in New England, as the establishment of free schools for girls in Boston, analogous to the Latin and English High Schools for boys. Rich men can give their daughters a superior culture; some of them will do it, at any cost. But nine tenths of the girls must depend on the public schools alone. There is no reason in the nature of

things, or the duty of the State to its citizens, why superior education should be confined to the rougher sex. In the higher seminaries and the first class of the grammar schools, few boys are found from the humblest ranks of the People; — their services are so valuable that their needy parents will not allow the boy to attend school. Now, to the man of small means the daughter's time is not worth so much as the son's. She, therefore, could attend school much longer were there any superior school for her to attend. Such, too, is the demand for active young men, and the general hurry of the times, that young men rush from the schools and colleges into active life long before they are prepared. Young women, less needed in active life — finding, indeed, few callings to fill — could remain longer at school, and would gain a superior culture. In such schools there would come many Daughters out of the humblest portion of the People, and, getting well educated, they would become the mothers of men of no humble class; would diffuse an ennobling influence wherever they were, and elevate that class which is now a burthen and a reproach to the young Democracy.

Further still, the presence of a body of highly educated young women would stimulate the other sex more than any amount of appeals from the Press or the Pulpit. A coarse and ignorant young man — foppish and conceited, his head filled with nothing better than the newspapers and play-bills, who abhors thought as Nature a vacuum — he hates nothing so much as to be found inferior to the women he constantly meets. While the majority of women have a very inferior culture, their heads even more scantily furnished than the young men's; while they are illiterate, ignorant, incapable of all serious thought, even of attention enough to understand a common lecture and report it faithfully — it is no wonder that men, who have a better culture, though still coarse and ignorant, conceited and foppish, should think woman their inferior. When such men meet a woman of really superior culture, they only mock and call names, looking on her as a curiosity, almost as a monster. Were there many such women, were the majority of women of such a character, our ignorant young man, finding himself in a minority, would become seasonably ashamed, would give over calling names, and, finding that his boasted superiority of nature only made him ridiculous, would betake himself to diligent culture of his better faculties, and would end by becoming something of a man.

It need not be said the expense of such establishments could not be afforded, for all experience of public education shows that it costs less to educate the whole at public charge than to educate the select portions who now occupy the private seminaries. We think it could soon be shown, that the sums now paid for the education of two or three hundred young women at private schools in Boston, would more than suffice for the superior education of the thousand who would avail themselves of such an education, were it possible. Were there a thousand young women furnished with the best culture which this age could afford, scattered about in society, as wives and mothers, it is easy to see the change which they would soon effect in a single generation. Nay, it is not easy to see ALL the change they would effect. Their influence would soon appear in the churches, in the newspapers, the theatres, in all our literature,—yes, in the State itself,—and produce effects by no means anticipated now. The establishment of such an institution would in a very few years double the number of persons who have a superior education, and every such woman is not only an ornament, but a blessing, to Society.

To crown the whole system of Public Education, a Public College would seem necessary, founded by the State, watched over by the State, and by the State preserved from all sectarian and partisan influence; a college with libraries and lectures open to all who were able to understand their use. Our scheme of public education is exceedingly incomplete until this, also, is established. At present, many young men of superior talent are debarred from a generous education solely by their inability to meet the expenses of a college course. They suffer for lack of culture, and Society suffers for lack of their services. Inferior men, but born of parents thrifter or more fortunate, obtain the culture and occupy the more elevated posts of society, which can only be *filled* by men born with superior gifts not less than well-bred.

Everywhere we see signs that a free Public College is needed and desired. Amongst them are the rise of cheap colleges, which only express the want which they cannot satisfy; the numerous lyceums and courses of lectures; the Mercantile Library Association, the Association of Mechanics' Apprentices, and the like, in Boston. It would be easy for any one of the free states to establish such a Public College in one of its principal cities, offering gratuitous instruction to all

who could pass such an examination as would show they were capable of appreciating the instruction offered. We will not go into the details of such a scheme, wishing only to invite public attention to the subject. Such institutions would soon furnish a large body of men with a superior education, and free us from one of the troubles of American society—professional men ignorant of their profession; lawyers, doctors, ministers, whom it would be flattery to call half-educated, but who are yet not to be blamed, having all the culture they could get. Still more, it would diffuse a liberal education amongst all classes of society, and the advantages of that we have not time to point out. It is no mean reproach to us that the Prussians, the Saxons, and the French have done far more for the *superior* education of the people than we have thought proper even to attempt. Massachusetts has taken the lead in many important movements of the nation. We wish she would set the example of a Public College; for surely, no state is so competent, for various reasons, to make the experiment, and perhaps none so much feels the need of it. Every man of superior education, so far as that goes, is a blessing to Society, not less than an ornament. He gives dignity and honor to his calling, not it to him. He may sit on the bench of a Judge, or on the bench of a Shoemaker, be an Upholsterer or a Clergyman, that is of small account; his thought, his wisdom, his character, do their work in Society. As things now go, we get rich faster than we get intelligent, and as a nation deserve the reproach of being material and vulgar. Aristotle said in his day, the mass of laboring people should not be “of a character too elevated.” A democratic government demands for all the best education which it is possible for all to receive; the superior education of as many as possible.

In all the large towns of Massachusetts, men and women have associated together, established lyceums, and secured to themselves courses of lectures every winter. This movement shows the want of something more than schools, colleges, and churches have hitherto afforded. The effect of these lyceums with their lectures is excellent in many ways, intellectual, moral, and social. But as yet little is accomplished by them in comparison with what may easily be done. No system is pursued by such institutions; lectures come pell-mell after one another, without order. There is no sufficient body of men well trained for the business of popular lecturing. Brilliant

and showy men serve for an hour's amusement, but fail of accomplishing the great work which waits to be done. It seems to us that the lyceums of several towns might combine together, and have regular and systematic courses of lectures delivered in each by the same person. In this manner men of ability and suitable education might easily be well paid for the labor of preparing valuable lectures, and the People receive the advantage of instruction from the best minds in the land. The business of a popular lecturer might soon become as important as that of a judge; his social rank as high, and his salary still more. In this manner some of the best talent of the State might be applied to its most appropriate work—the Education of the People. Lectures might be delivered treating of the Facts of Nature, or Science in its various departments; the Facts of Man, his history, literature, laws, and the like;—lectures on Facts, and lectures, also, on Ideas.

A few years ago, in Boston, one of her sons founded an Institute for the better education of the people, by means of lectures, and thereby did a greater service to that town, as we think, than any American has ever done to his native place. Education, in its large sense, is the greatest charity which can be bestowed on a town or a city. We refer to the Lowell Institute. Its usefulness is now only beginning. There the services of some of the most able men of America and of Europe have been wisely obtained for the purpose of instructing the People. The experience of that Institute shows that superior talent and culture can easily be commanded for this great work whenever the pecuniary means are provided. A combination of numerous lyceums, though individually poor, can also secure the services of men of superior ability for their purpose, as soon as they will. The apparatus most important in education is men,—able men. The influence of lectures like those of Agassiz and Walker at the Lowell Institute, of Emerson at the various lyceums and elsewhere, it is not easy to calculate. Not only do those men give positive information, but they stimulate all their ingenuous hearers to desire a yet nobler culture, and suggest the intellectual and other methods by which it may be won.

In New England there is no public or even social Amusement—recognized as such. The old and barbarous sport of military exhibitions has long been unpopular, and is now ridiculous. The amusement of getting drunk is rather old-fashioned, and though still the only pastime of the wretched, is not

likely to revive amongst intelligent or even merely respectable men. Politics and Theology may serve for awhile in place of amusement — this for the men, that for the women; but they will not do the work. This absence of amusement, and the somewhat unsocial character with which America has been reproached, render it the more desirable that lyceums and public lectures should be provided, to meet numerous wants, and, while they cultivate the mind, cultivate, also, social feelings amongst all.

Public libraries, also, will powerfully aid this work. We think there is not a public library in any large town in the United States, — a library to which all persons have access. The land is full of books; valuable books, even, are now becoming more and more common. True, the "yellow literature," the literary trash that is hawked about at the railways, indicates a low taste in the manufacturers and consumers of such miserable productions. The school-books in most common use, we regret to say, are poor and low; such as relate to Science often poorly constructed, and devoid alike of scientific principles and scientific method. It is commonly thought that an ignorant man may write for the ignorant; if he wishes to keep them so, he had better. But the most skilful physicians are needed by the sickest men. Still, spite of the increase of these ephemeral works, and the spread of that yellow-fever of literature, the taste for really valuable books has increased with astonishing rapidity. The want of public libraries in most of our large towns is beginning to be felt. The establishment of social libraries, which are not so often merely domestic as heretofore, — of District School libraries, the libraries of the various institutes, associations, athenæums, lyceums, and the like, is only an indication of the want, not adequate provision to meet it. It is a remarkable fact, that in the city of Paris there are more books thrown open to the public every day, than are contained in all the college and state libraries of this country. There we have seen, with republican and Christian delight, a Professor from the Sorbonne and a Teamster in his blouse of blue cotton, sitting at the same table, diligently studying works which neither of them, perhaps, could afford to own. We are glad to learn, while writing these pages, that attempts are seriously making in Boston to found such a library. The generosity of the wealthy men of that city is well known, and seems to have almost no limit; but we think

their wealth has seldom been directed to a nobler object than this work of educating the People.

The Lawrence Scientific School in the University at Cambridge, recently established, will doubtless afford valuable aid in promoting the solid education of the People. A want has long been felt of some institution which should afford a culture somewhat different from that of our better colleges, not less severe and scientific, but more so, if possible, only less monastic and mediæval. We see it suggested by the distinguished President of Harvard University, that something is perhaps to be done "with a view to the formation of accomplished teachers for classical schools and colleges;" and hope that some provision may soon be made there or elsewhere for instruction in the Science of Education—what the Germans call *Pädagogik*. Apart from the art of teaching there is a Science of Education, as distinct from the practical business of instruction as Geometry is from the art of surveying land or making an almanac. This, also, is a liberal science, to be cultivated in part for itself, as an end, and therefore should have a place in every liberal scheme of education, as well as Ethics and Metaphysics; but is a means, also, and will prove useful in practice, as most men come, at length, to have the charge of forming and developing the characters of others, at the most tender age, committed to their care. The English language is singularly deficient in works which treat of this subject, though the German is sufficiently rich, at least so far as quantity is concerned.*

We come now to speak, though briefly, of the works named at the head of our article. No. 1 contains the Reports of two sub-committees of the Boston School Committee. The first is the Report of the "annual examination of the Grammar department of the Grammar and Writing Schools." The second, of the "annual examination of the Writing department of the Grammar Schools." The first is a plain statement of the results of the examination of each particular school. The reading in the upper divisions of the first class is pronounced admirable, as that class is under the direction of the head masters. But the three lower classes, including more than four fifths of all the children in the schools, are under the care

* See Von Raumer, *Geschichte der Pädagogik*, &c. 2te Ausgabe. Stuttgart. 1843. 2 vols., 8vo.

of subordinate teachers, with much smaller salaries, and probably with inferior qualifications. The author, Mr. G. B. Emerson, thinks a considerable majority of all the children never reach the first class, and therefore do not partake directly in the advantages of the best instruction provided for the schools. Some children have been two years in the grammar schools, who yet have not advanced at all since they entered them. Something ought to be done to remedy this injustice. There is a considerable deficiency in the furniture of the schools, but in special there is a great want of libraries. There are not two thousand volumes in all the grammar schools in the city! The author thinks libraries should be provided; that the study of Physiology should be introduced into all the schools as soon as possible, and recommends, also, that the art of Drawing should likewise be taught in all, and Geometry in the schools for boys. The Report also mentions the want of schools for ignorant adults; a want deeply felt, and now but imperfectly supplied by the benevolence of a few private persons. Many ignorant foreigners come yearly amongst us; many, also, from "woodsy" places in New Hampshire and Vermont, where there are no schools accessible — who cannot even read. It is hard to leave these men to the irregular care of private benevolence, which already finds more than enough to do; it is unjust to neglect them, leaving them in their ignorance. The little which would be required to establish such schools would perhaps be a gain to the city in the end.

The Report of the other committee is a literary curiosity. A document so ill-written we have seldom seen, and know not which is the more remarkable, the confusion of thought or of speech. Speaking of the Hawes School, the author says, "The teacher has had no *Philosophical apparatus* to illustrate or interest the pupils in." In the Winthrop School, he says, "No *permitted* books are used." The tenth question in Natural Philosophy laid before the pupils at the examination was as follows: "*Is the North Pole of the Earth and the North Magnetic Pole in the same part of the Earth's surface.*" But we forbear from giving any more specimens of the *style* of the Report. The committee recommend, as it seems to us very justly, that *plain sewing* should be taught in all the girls' schools. To some this will doubtless seem a trifling matter, while in reality it is one of great importance. But the committee also recommend that Algebra and Geometry should be discontinued in the Writing Schools, that "Boys should be

educated only by men," and that medals should be distributed to the most excellent scholars. We trust the city will not take three steps backward in compliance with these suggestions.

We wish the Boston Examining Committee had recommended the appointment of a general superintendent of all the schools in the city, to look after teachers and pupils both. The School Committees, from their very nature, can at best do their work but imperfectly, as their reports show. It would be easy for each town with ten thousand inhabitants to appoint a superintendent of public schools, who should make it his whole business to look after their welfare; and we think that in a few years most beautiful results would follow. The School Committees have seldom much time to devote to their work; they are yet more rarely men who understand the science or the art of education so well as the teachers themselves. The result is, that the teachers become substantially irresponsible, adopt inferior methods of instruction, or attempt to teach with no method at all; and much of the time of the children and the money of the people is thereby wasted.

No. 2 contains a large amount of valuable information and important suggestions offered by the indefatigable Secretary of the Board of Education. His report will doubtless be extensively circulated, and therefore we say but little of its contents. The most important part is the section which treats of "the power of common schools to redeem the State from social vices and crimes." He thinks that more than half of the bodily debility and disease, of the pains and expenditures of sickness, of all cases of death before the age of seventy years, are the consequence of sheer ignorance, and therefore can easily be avoided. He gives the testimony of eight distinguished friends of popular education, all of them believing in the natural depravity of the human heart, to show that the Common Schools may be made to "expel ninety-nine hundredths of all the vices and crimes under which Society now mourns and agonizes." "The crowning beauty of the whole is," he continues, "that Christian men of every faith may cordially unite in carrying forward the work of reform, however various may be their opinions as to the cause which has made that work necessary; just as all good citizens may unite in extinguishing a conflagration, though there may be a hundred conflicting opinions as to the means or the men that kindled it."

He thinks the most generous public education is the best economy for the State. "What is engulfed in the vortex of

crime, in each generation, would build a palace of more than Oriental splendor in every school district in the land; would endow it with a library beyond the ability of a lifetime to read; would supply it with apparatus and laboratories for the illustration of every study, and the exemplification of every art, and munificently requite the services of a teacher worthy to preside in such a sanctuary of intelligence and virtue."

He contrasts the cost of war and its preparations with the cost of education.

"Since the organization of the Federal government, in 1789, the expense of our military and naval establishments and equipments, in round numbers, is \$700,000,000. Two of our ships of the line have cost more than \$2,000,000. The value of the arms accumulated, at one time, at the arsenal in Springfield, in this State, was \$2,000,000. The Military Academy at West Point has cost more than \$4,000,000. In our town meetings, and in our school district meetings, wealthy and substantial men oppose the grant of \$15 for a school library, and of \$30 for both library and apparatus; while, at West Point, they spend \$50 in a single lesson at target-firing, and the government keeps a hundred horses, and grooms and blacksmiths to take care of them, as an indispensable part of the *apparatus* of the Academy. The pupils at our Normal Schools, who are preparing to become teachers, must maintain themselves; the cadets at the Academy receive \$28 a month, during their entire term, as a compensation for being educated at the public expense. Adding bounties and pensions to wages and rations, I suppose the cost of a common foot-soldier in the army cannot be less than \$250 a year. The average cost of female teachers for the Public Schools of Massachusetts, last year, was only \$13 60 a month, inclusive of board; or, at a rate which would give \$163 20 for the year; but the average length of the schools was but eight months, so that the cost of *two* common soldiers is nearly that of *five* female teachers. The annual salary of a colonel of dragoons in the United States army is \$2,206; of a brigadier-general, \$2,958; of a major-general, \$4,512; that of a captain of a ship of the line, when in service, \$4,500; and even when off duty, it is \$2,500!! There are but seven towns in Massachusetts where any teacher of a Public School receives so high a salary as \$1,000; and, in four of these towns, one teacher only receives this sum."

He might have added, that the annual cost of a single regiment of dragoons in the United States service is \$700,000, more than \$30,000 greater than the annual cost of the public education of the People of Massachusetts. There are now in

service three such regiments, costing yearly \$2,100,000; a sum greater than the cost of all the colleges of New England. No boy can waste his cake and have it too.

"It being proved, if all our children were to be brought under the benignant influences of such teachers as the State can supply, from the age of four years to that of sixteen, and for ten months in each year, that ninety-nine in every hundred of them can be rescued from uncharitableness, from falsehood, from intemperance, from cupidity, licentiousness, violence, and fraud, and reared to the performance of all the duties, and to the practice of all the kindnesses and courtesies, of domestic and social life,—made promoters of the common weal instead of subtractors from it;—this being proved, I respectfully and with deference submit to the Board, and through them to the Legislature, and to my fellow-citizens at large, that *every man is POOR, in an educational sense, who cannot both spare and equip his children for school, for the entire period above specified*; and that while he remains thus poor, it is not only the dictate of generosity and Christianity, but it is the wisest policy, and profoundest statesmanship, too, to supply from the public treasury,—municipal or state, or both,—whatever means may be wanted to make certain so glorious an end. These principles and this practice, the divine doctrines of Christianity have always pointed at, and a progressive civilization has now brought us into proximity to them. How is it, that we can call a man *poor* because his body is cold, and not because his highest sympathies and affections have been frozen up within him, in one polar and perpetual winter, from his birth. Hunger does not stint the growth of the body half so much as ignorance dwarfs the capacities of the mind. No wound upon the limbs, or gangrene of vital organs, is a thousandth part so terrible as those maladies of the soul that jeopard its highest happiness, and defeat the end for which it was created."

We should not perform our duty did we omit all mention of the movements recently made in this state for the improvement of popular education. The condition of our public schools in 1836 and for some years previous, is well known. The state raised annually less than \$400,000 for educational purposes. There were no public seminaries for teachers; many of the teachers themselves were incompetent to a degree almost exceeding belief. Little interest was felt in the public education of the People, either by the mass of men or the classes most favored with culture and with wealth—the natural guardians of Society. A few noble men, generously feeling for the common good of mankind, formed the brilliant exception to the

general and melancholy rule. By the efforts of a few men, the Board of Education was established, in 1837. At that time Horace Mann was President of the Massachusetts Senate, with a fair prospect of advancing in his political career. He had abundant talents; good men of all parties gave him their confidence. He was also a lawyer, with a reputation rapidly increasing, and a professional income of about \$3,000 a year. Some one was needed to take the office of Secretary of the Board of Education, and toil for the common good of the people of Massachusetts. Mr. Mann accepted that arduous post. He gave up his chance of political preferment—so dazzling to the greedy aspirant for noisy fame; gave up his profession, with the certainty of wealth which it offered. He became Secretary of the Board of Education, with a pitiful salary of fifteen hundred dollars a year, and the chance that even that would be reduced one half by a vote of the legislature in a year or two. He knew he must toil far harder than ever before, and that, too, with the certainty of being abused by each lazy and incompetent schoolmaster coveting a sleepy supervision of his work; by every demagogue who could get up the insane cry of “expense,” and talk of the folly of Massachusetts paying fifteen hundred dollars for a man to look after the Common Schools; yes, by every sectarian bigot from Provincetown to Williamstown, who feared nothing so much as education wide spread amongst the people. Such was the prospect. Many thought him a fool for taking the office, and some said so. But one good man, soaring far above the heads of his contemporaries, thanked him for his heroism, and bade him God speed. That man long since ceased to be mortal, and needs no praise of ours. A single guess would solve the mystery,—it was Dr. Channing.

The ends which could so easily have been foreseen soon came to pass. The penny-wisdom of the state was appealed to by the pound-foolishness thereof, and the talk was of the expense—the great cost of the Board of Education; fifteen hundred dollars in one year actually paid to the Secretary! Truly, the commonwealth was in danger. The demagogues, also, took their turn, attacking the Board and its Secretary, not with success, but not without effect. Sectarrians were true to their ruthless craft, and raised the old cry of “Infidelity,” and “church in danger,” till the land rung again. But if the ears of the People tingled at that cry, we think other ears, also, smarted at the retort, and its echo loud and long. “Sus-

pitions, political and denominational, were excited and widely diffused ;" "dark insinuations, imputing sinister and ulterior designs, were clandestinely circulated, and they worked longer and more efficiently for working beneath the surface." Even the schoolmasters, or a part of them, joined, also, in the battle, excited we know not whence or how, and fought with fierceness if not with science and with skill. Even now we fear the battle is not over.

The Normal Schools got established, a single man thereby doing much for education, that greatest charity ; much in public, though as green a growth still marks the unseen windings of that same stream of private bounty flowing towards the same end.

By means of this movement — by the Board of Education, by the Normal Schools, and still more, as we think, by the able efforts of the Secretary, matters are rapidly getting mended ; the Education of the People goes forward rapidly, and yet more certainly. Bigots are losing their influence ; demagogues their power. But it is getting light. When the day dawns wild beasts lie down in their dens, and bats and owls are not seen nor heard. If we were asked for the man who in the last ten years has done the greatest service to his state, we should not hesitate to name the Secretary of the Board of Education, who will doubtless blame us for writing of him who hides himself behind his work. He has had the reward always given to such services, — not riches and not rank, not honor, — but a Crown. Not a crown of gold or of laurel, by grateful men pressed upon an honored brow, but a CROWN OF THORNS, put there by quite other hands and for purposes somewhat unlike.

We cannot forbear saying a word on the causes which impede the public Education of the People amongst us. One is the Effect of Habit. It has never been the habit of any State to demand a wide culture of its citizens, or to use the public wealth for the public education. Said the present emperor of Austria, a few years ago, to the assembled students of the University of Vienna — "Austria wants not so much accomplished students as obedient subjects." The money which built Versailles and the Tuileries — what colleges and common schools might it not have founded. What sums are squandered by England, France, Prussia, the United States, on armies, navies, fortifications, which would easily educate those nations ! True, a cannon speaks with a loud voice, yet a school-

master can be heard the furthest. The hundred million dollars already spent, it is said, in the Mexican war, would found one hundred and twenty-five free colleges, each as costly as Harvard University, — Library, Professorships, Scientific School, and all. Yet nobody thinks it very strange that the public book-money and school-fund are taken to buy powder and ball! Even the Churches, which certainly have played an important part in the general education of the human race, are doing little directly to advance the intellectual culture of mankind. They have favored that by God's Providence, not their own design; — unconscious ministers of a good they knew not. At this day, in many instances, the clergy actually retard the education of the People — counting Reason as *carnal*, forbidding thought, mocking at Science, "now hawking at Geology and Schism," now justifying ignorance, pauperism, slavery, war — out of the Bible itself taking pains to establish unity of belief in some miserable tradition, rather than that independent wisdom which takes old things if good, and new ones, likewise, if also true. We wish such men may be found the exceptions; — yet we blame not the Church or the State, doubting not that the leaders of both walk by such light as they have. We only take their walking as the index of their light.

It has not been the habit of the people to look on Church and State as two keepers of a Dame's school for mankind, and therefore the nation has not held them to that work. Yet it is, if thoughtfully looked at, their highest function. Pope Pius IX. and Louis Philippe are but larger schoolmasters. The People themselves think little of education; make it consist of a very few things, a poor use of these three educational tools; a knowledge of their calling, so as to get along without many blunders — of a few good rules, but not in a generous culture of Mind, Conscience, Affection, and the Religious Sentiments.

In every community there is a class called educated. Their knowledge is their power; "the one-eyed man is lord among the blind." But the educated class even here have taken far too little pains to educate the multitude; have rather laughed at the toiling mass, as incapable of culture, and often made the matter worse than they found it. Certainly they are not doing what Christianity, or even Patriotism, demands of them. With the exception of that small but ambidextrous class, hard-headed, hard-bodied, who support themselves at

school and college, every man, rich or poor, who gets a superior education, is a charity-scholar of Society, for others earned his bread while he was at school. He owes, therefore, for his schooling; the least he can do in payment is to help the education of all. When such a man sneers at the ignorance of the public, calling them incapable and unwashed, it reminds us of a beggar abusing the man who fed, clad, and gave him a house. The staple literature of the nations has seldom been written in the interest of mankind—only of a class. One great excellence of the New Testament is, that it is written in the interest of the Human Race; that is one reason why it is the Book of the People, and will long continue such; one reason, also, why, in Catholic countries, it has been withheld from them. An eloquent writer, Rev. H. W. Beecher, says, "Men become scholars that they may become benefactors." "The body of educated men should stand so far above the level of society as shall give them scope to exert their greatest attractive force. If privileged at all, it is as the clouds are privileged to rain in gracious showers that they have gathered up; as the sun's satellites are, to reflect light."

Then from our very circumstances there is an excessive demand for practical men. It is not merely Brain that is wanted, but Brain in the Hand. We turn all things to some immediate and economic use; would put Homer to lead the singing in some village church; set Raphael to paint the faces of silly women and sillier men, or, that failing, to daub sign-boards and make arabesques for calicoes: Michael Angelo and Da Vinci we should employ on a railroad, or place them with the sappers and miners in the army, and put Newton at the head of some annuity office. High intellect, accomplished with high culture, goes to the Church, the Forum, or the Bar, and finds itself above the market. Superior ability, therefore, in America, finds its most fitting sphere in common Business, where superior talent provokes no jealousy while it wins its gold.

Such being the case, the general aim in education is not to get the most and the best, but the least one can get along with. It is counted the means, not the end, and is taken as a maid servant, as HELP, its demands granted with a grudge; not taken as a wife, for itself. Education is valued, as it helps make men able to serve as tools in the great workshop of Society. This man is an agricultural implement; that a tool of the court-house; another a piece of ecclesiastical furniture.

The farmer must have a little culture for his special work on the soil, less for his general work as a man; the merchant a little more, special and general; the lawyer, minister, and doctor, a little more yet. But even in the learned professions it is rare to find men of large general culture; the special absorbs the general; the Whale of the profession swallows down the prophetic man, and makes way with him for ever. The title of Doctor of Law, Medicine, and Divinity has sometimes seemed to us a misnomer, for which it would be well to substitute Mechanic at Law, Medicine, and Divinity. Many professional men seem not educated, but wonted to their profession, as the mill-horse to his narrow beat, and have scarcely more saliency of intellect than the beast. How many lawyers and ministers are there who are only parts of their profession! You look for a man in the calling of the attorney or minister, and find only a limb of the law, or a slip of divinity. We have few scholars ripe and good; each man gets a taste of education, some a mouthful, but nobody a meal. Such being the case, then, how much less can we expect a good and general education to be sought after and won by the laboring mass of mankind. Yet one fact is encouraging and prophetic: each man, as a general rule, is better educated than his father.

The reason of this neglect of the higher education in the educated class, of all but the rudiments in the humbler class, lies deep. We take mean views of life, of Man and his possibility, thinking the Future can never be better than the Past. We think the end a man is to live for is this: Wealth, Fame, Social Rank. Genius, Wisdom, Power of Mind, of Heart and Soul, are counted only as means to such an end. So in the hot haste to be rich, famous, respectable, many let manhood slip through their fingers, retaining only the riches, fame, and respectability. Never till manliness is thought the end of Man; never till education is valued for itself, can we have a wide, generous culture, even among the wealthiest class. Not till then in the mass of men shall we find a scheme of education worthy of the American people and the great ideas given them to unfold in life. But day teaches day, and Experience offers wisdom if she does not give it.

[On page 199, sixth line from the bottom, for *their* read *his*. On page 203, thirteenth line from the top, for *three* read *two*.]

ART. IV.—*A History of the Hebrew Monarchy from the Administration of Samuel to the Babylonish Captivity.* London. 1847. 1 vol. 8vo. pp XII. and 372.

THE Hebrew nation seems never to have had a genuine historical spirit. It is certain they have left us no pure historical compositions in the scanty records of their national literature. Perhaps none of their historical books preserved in the Old Testament are wholly authentic and free from fiction. In the early ages of the world it was natural that Mythology should take the place subsequently occupied by Philosophy, and that events should be referred directly to God which come only by the usual mediation of finite causes. An intelligent reader would be surprised to find Mr. Bancroft referring the war against King Philip to the direct counsel of God miraculously given to the governor of Massachusetts, but he will not be at all surprised to find similar events referred directly to the counsels of God miraculously given to Moses, or to Agamemnon, in the poetic writings of an earlier day. He would be surprised at the absence of such phenomena. We should be astonished if we did not find a mythology among the Hebrews in their earlier history, as well as among the Greeks and Hindoos. The earliest historical works of the Greeks which have come down to us are poems, not histories, and are of course mythological and not philosophical. At length we find a genuine historical literature in which the attempt is seriously made to relate historical facts in their natural historical order, referring human events to human and obvious causes; to tell a round, unvarnished tale. But such a genuine historical literature is scarcely found in the Hebrew records; all are more or less tinged by this mythological character. The books which treat of the earliest periods are, as it is natural, most strongly tinged with it.

Let any impartial man undertake to study the rise and progress of the nations of western Asia by the help of the Hebrew literature alone, and he would arrive at very remarkable results if he treated his documents as purely historical, and placed implicit confidence in their authority. Let us take the first work—Genesis. We shall not speak of the omissions, nor of ordinary mistakes, which are natural and unavoidable, but of the fact that an attempt seems studiously made to blacken the characters of the numerous nations hostile to

the Hebrews, by pointing out some bend sinister on their escutcheon, or some enormous fault in their early progenitors — thus ascribing to them an infamous descent. At the same time an attempt equally studious seems made to dignify and elevate the original stock of the Hebrews, referring that nation to ancestors the most celebrated and unimpeachable.

Abraham is regarded as the common father of many nations in western Asia who speak substantially the same language, and have many customs and traditions in common. The curious traditions respecting him may easily be seen in D'Herbelot and elsewhere. The book of Genesis traces the descent of the Hebrews directly to Abraham. He is descended from Shem, the oldest son of Noah, and is but the tenth removed from that patriarch, deriving his lineage through nine generations of oldest sons. Abraham marries a wife, Sarah, of the same stock, she being his half-sister. They dwell in Ur, the land of the Chasdim, or Chaldees, but emigrate thence at the command of Jehovah. Now, the patriarch has also other wives of an inferior rank, but the Hebrews are descended from Sarah, the first wife, who is of superior rank, and also of the same illustrious birth with Abraham himself.

That is not all. Isaac, the son of Abraham, from whom the Hebrews originate, is born under peculiar circumstances ; in the old age of his mother, born, too, miraculously, in fulfilment of a promise made directly to Abraham and by Jehovah himself — a promise which seemed ridiculous even to the mother, and notwithstanding the dignity of the Being who made the promise. Other promises likewise are made ; his posterity are to possess the territory of ten distinct tribes or nations, — all the land from the Euphrates to Egypt. When the miraculous child is born, God commands the father to sacrifice the new-born son, but the offering is miraculously prevented. The son grows up to manhood ; a wife must be found for him. But she must not be a woman of ordinary descent, coming from the nations of his own neighbourhood. She must come from the classic and distant land whence Abraham himself had emigrated ; must be of the same lineage as her husband. So Rebekah, the daughter of a wealthy and conspicuous man, is found, and becomes the wife of Isaac. Jehovah takes a special care of the son, not less than of the sire. Rebekah bears two sons, twins, — Esau and Jacob. One of these, Jacob, is the ancestor of the Hebrew race. He is the younger of the two, but for a trifle buys the rights of the first-born

from his elder brother, and gains in consequence a blessing from his father, which for ever entails upon him and his posterity all the favors that Jehovah had promised to bestow upon the children of Abraham. Jacob is thus represented as born of most illustrious ancestry, having a lineage spotless and august, and is heir of the promises formerly made by God.

When he also grows up to manhood, a wife must be sought for him, but not among the women of the neighbourhood. To keep the race pure and unmixed, he must return to the native land of his grandparents, and take a partner from the celebrated family which had already given to the world an Abraham, a Sarah, and a Rebekah. Jehovah watches over Jacob with the same speciality of affection he had formerly bestowed on Isaac and Abraham. He visits Jacob by night, gives counsel by day—instructing him in the art of overreaching his wives' father, and cautioning that father against interfering. To Jacob are born twelve sons and two daughters. The family are the special objects of Jehovah's care.

In this way a genealogy is made out which no ancient herald would find fault with. The Hebrews are the noblest of the noble, descended from the prime nobility of the earth. It is true, the character of Jacob is base and treacherous, when measured by the Christian standard of modern times; but in the estimation of the author of the narrative, the characteristic vices of the Supplanter were doubtless virtues, and seem to be related as if in themselves deserving praise. Had it seemed otherwise to him, he probably would have represented Jehovah as interposing to punish Jacob, or to prevent the birthright from descending to his posterity.

Now, as if this illustrious descent were not enough to dignify the Hebrew nation withal, a corresponding and parallel effort is made to cast a cloud over the origin of the other races most immediately in contact with them. Many of them, it is said, are descended from Ham, the second son of Noah, a mythological person held in high veneration by many of the Oriental races. But it is said that Ham committed an infamous offence which demanded the severest chastisement on the part of his father. Accordingly Noah curses Canaan, the youngest son of Ham. The Canaanites were the special objects of hatred to the Hebrews, in the early part of their history. The latter conquered and gradually "absorbed" the territory of the former, expelling the inhabitants or reducing them to bondage. So the author of Genesis, after relating

the crime of Ham twice in a single paragraph, mentions the fact that Canaan is the son of Ham. The patriarch curses Canaan for his father's fault, and the curse is repeated three times in a single paragraph.

Thus, according to the ethnography of Genesis, one third of the human race are disgraced by the act of their great progenitor, Ham. His descendants are the numerous nations of Caucasian descent in the south and west of Asia, and the north of Africa,—the Ethiopians, Philistines, and the Egyptians. But though the disgrace must be shared equally by all the children of Ham, yet the curse falls specially upon Canaan. His posterity—taking the names from the common version of the Old Testament—are the Sidonians, the Hittites, the Jebusites, the Amorites, Girgasites, Hivites, Arkites, Sinites, Arvadites, Hamathites, the Phœnicians, and the Syrians, with many others. These are the nations with whom the Hebrews are so often at war, and who were unworthy to furnish wives for Isaac and Jacob.

In language, manners, and institutions, some of the Arabian tribes were more closely allied to the Hebrews than the Canaanites, as it appears. This fact must be accounted for in the Hebrew history and ethnology. Accordingly they are derived from Abraham. But they also are polluted in their origin. They are not allowed to be descended from Sarah, the honorable and well-born wife of the great patriarch, but from Hagar, a secondary wife, or concubine, and also a slave in Abraham's family, whom Sarah once drove out of doors on account of her insubordination. In addition to this reproach, Hagar is herself an Egyptian woman, and therefore disgraced by her descent from the infamous family of Ham. However, after her expulsion from Abraham's household she returns, bears a son called Ishmael, and remains there until after the birth of Isaac, till Ishmael has nearly attained the age of manhood, as it appears. Then, at the instigation of Sarah, the slave-mother is turned out of doors and her son with her. God himself approving of the expulsion, Ishmael must not be a joint-heir with Isaac, nor inherit the land or the promises. Still, as he also is Abraham's son, he must have a blessing and become a nation; but when Ishmael's posterity are enumerated, pains are taken to add that he was the son of a female slave and she an Egyptian, a daughter, therefore, of the race of Ham.

Other kindred nations are also said to have been descended from Abraham, but having for their mother only an obscure

woman, Keturah, whom the author of the Chronicles seeks to degrade still more, calling her by a bad name, — calumniating Abraham while he blackens the origin of a hostile neighbour.

The Edomites, or Idumeans, had likewise a strong national resemblance to the Hebrews in many respects; they therefore must be referred to the same original. Accordingly they are descended from Esau, the twin-brother of Jacob. But Esau had shown himself unworthy of his privilege of primogeniture, and had shamefully sold the promises entailed upon the first-born. Thus the ancestry of the Idumeans is disgraced at an early period of the family history. But that is not enough; Esau marries against his parents' consent, makes a shameful *mésalliance*, taking two wives, both of them Hittites, descendants, therefore, of the infamous family of Ham, and still more, of Canaan, the most infamous of that family, and inheritor of a special curse. Pains are taken to enumerate the descendants of this unfortunate marriage; but we need not follow the children of Esau further than to show that the Edomites and Amalekites, powerful enemies of the Hebrews, were traced back to that original.

There remain yet two other nations often at war with the Hebrews, the Ammonites and the Moabites. The most intense national hatred appears to have existed between them and the descendants of Jacob, which continued long after the establishment of the monarchy. To these nations so formidable and detested, an origin yet more disgraceful is assigned: they are the children of Lot and his own daughters — the sons of incest and drunkenness at the very beginning. When the birth of Moab and Ben-ammi is recorded, the author diligently adds that they are the parents of the Ammonites and Moabites. Thus the early and most important enemies of the Hebrews are disposed of, and referred to some disgraceful original. An ingenious man might put all these things together, and, considering also what nations are not thus traduced, might give a shrewd guess at the date of the book of Genesis itself.

The other four books of Moses, as they are called, are not more precisely historical than the first, equally legendary and mythical in the portions which relate to history, and marked by the same intense nationality, which is at times ferocious. Of the historical inaccuracies of Deuteronomy, the last of these, and of the apparent mode in which it was composed, we shall speak in a subsequent part of this article.*

* See also De Wette, *Introduction to the Old Testament*, Vol. II. pp. 144 – 164.

The book of Joshua is in many respects like its predecessors. It is mythical, full of historical inaccuracies and contradictions.

The book of Judges is less artificially constructed than Deuteronomy, and free from the peculiarly sacerdotal spirit which pervades that book; but it is also legendary, mythological, and by no means a historical document on which any certain reliance can be placed.*

The books of Samuel and Kings have a more authentic and historical character. All the outlines of the period they treat of are sketched by the hand of contemporary prose writers. State records seem to have been kept from the time of David downwards. The originals seem often to have been in the hands of the authors of Samuel, Kings, and even Chronicles. The mythological spirit is much diminished in its intensity. But the author of the work named at the beginning of this article treats of their character, and we will presently give his opinion upon the subject. His aim is to write a political history of the Hebrews, but he treats, also, of their religious affairs, for "the whole value of Hebrew history to us turns upon the Hebrew religion." To this end he uses the Hebrew documents with the same critical freedom that Niebuhr and Dr. Arnold show in their treatment of the Roman documents. He does not scruple to point out the inconsistencies between the books of Kings and Chronicles, nor to reject a statement which is absurd, nor to set down a fiction under its appropriate name. "As we have to deal with human fortunes, guaranteed to us by the evidence of documents which bear plentiful marks of the human mind and hand, we cannot dispense with a free and full criticism of these. And in criticizing, we have no choice but to proceed by those laws of thought and of reasoning which in all the sciences have now received currency. We advance from the known towards the unknown. We assume that human nature is like itself; and interpret the men of early ages by our more intimate knowledge of contemporary and recent times, yet making allowance for the difference of circumstances. Much more do we believe that God is always like himself, and that whatever are his moral attributes now and his consequent judgment of human conduct, such were they then and at all times. Nor ought we to question that the relations between the divine and the human mind are still

* See De Wette, *ubi supra*, pp. 166-174.

substantially the same as ever, until we find this obvious presumption utterly to fail in accounting for the facts presented to our examination. We explain all the phenomena by known causes, in preference to inventing unknown ones; and when one anomaly after another is found gradually to be cleared up by patient research, and a world of reality to evolve itself before the mind, fresh confirmation is added to the grand principles of modern philosophy, which experience proves alone to lead to self-consistent, harmonious results."

The author has not the common superstitious reverence for the Bible, and does not take the Jewish letter to strangle the Christian spirit with. He shows everywhere a large, humane, and Christian spirit. He is aware that his way of treating the Hebrew documents is not usual with his countrymen, and says,

"A thoughtful and conscientious reader will probably meet here many things which have before passed across his mind, but have been rejected under the idea that if they were true, they would surely be well known to professed divines. But let him be assured there is not the same apathy and ignorance concerning the Old Testament, in the German, as in the English Universities. If the Hebrew history has hitherto been nearly as a sealed book to us, it is because all the academical and clerical teachers of it are compelled to sign thirty-nine Articles of Religion before assuming their office. It is *not* easy to conceive how little we might know of Greek history, if, from the revival of Greek studies, test-articles had been imposed with a view to perpetuate the ideas of it current in the fifteenth century; but it is *very* easy to assure ourselves that neither Thirlwall nor Grote could have produced their valuable works under such a restriction. Until the laity strike off these fetters from the clergy, it is mere hypocrisy in them to defer to a clergyman's authority in any theological question of first-rate importance. We dictate to the clergy from their early youth what they are to believe, and thereby deprive them of the power of bearing independent testimony to it in their mature years. True religion consists in elevated notions of God, right affections and a pure conscience towards Him, but certainly *not* in prostrating the mind to a system of dogmatic history. Those who call *this* religion are (in the writer's belief) as much in the dark as those who place it in magical sacraments and outward purifications. But while utterly renouncing both these false and injurious representations, he desires his book to carry on its front his most intense conviction, that pure and undefiled religion is the noblest, the most blessed, the most valuable of all God's countless gifts; that a heart to fear and love Him is a possession sweeter

than dignities and loftier than talents; and that although the outward Form of truths held sacred by good men is destined to be remodelled by the progress of knowledge, yet in their deeper essence there is a Spirit which will live more energetically with the development of all that is most precious and glorious in man." — pp. v–vii.

This book must be regarded, we think, as the most valuable contribution ever made in the English language to our means of understanding that portion of Hebrew history and the biblical books which relate to it. Only two writers in the English tongue, Dr. Geddes and Dr. Palfrey, so far as we know, have ever treated the historical books of the Old Testament with the same freedom and courage. Mr. Norton has made a highly valuable contribution to the study of the Old Testament, but as he starts with the gratuitous assumption that "Christianity has made itself responsible for the fact that the Jewish religion, like itself, proceeded immediately from God," his critical and philosophical progress is impeded by a foregone conclusion.*

The work before us is sufficiently learned, but a little more copious reference to other writers would enhance its value. The author appears to be familiar with the works of the best German writers who have treated the subject—even the most recent. In writing a history he has written at the same time a good historical commentary on the books of Kings and Chronicles, and sheds light, also, on contemporary passages in the prophetic works. He agrees with the most profound of modern critics, that "the five books of Moses" were written long after the time of David; that the Hebrew code of laws, like all others, was formed part by part during a considerable period of time, and that the establishment of the Levitical priesthood is of later date than the monarchy itself. He thinks the books of Kings were compiled during the Babylonian exile, and those of Samuel a little earlier.

We will not give an analysis of the whole work, but only of parts which appear of most value. The political aim of the Hebrew institutions was to constitute a people of small independent land-owners; the most remarkable law was that which forbade the sale of land beyond the year of Jubilee. This was the Mosaic law of entail, which aimed directly to keep land in each family, and therefore, indirectly, to prevent accumulation of large masses of landed property. The prac-

* *Evidences of the Genuineness, &c.*, Vol. II., Note D, p. xlviii., et seq.

tical result was, that no permanent aristocracy could exist. But he admits that the law of Jubilee rested on usage and traditional feeling rather than on any statute or positive enactment.

He thinks that Samuel may be called a second Moses ; that the results of his ministry were greater and his instructions more permanent than those of Moses himself. But we see not how this can be, unless he assign to Samuel and not to Moses the first introduction of the worship of ONE GOD to the Hebrew nation. The Hebrew creed, he thinks, "was not monotheistic, in the sense of denying the *existence* of other gods. It rather degraded them into devils." Samuel preached against idolatry as John Huss and John Knox in Bohemia and Scotland preached against "Popish idolatry and foreign tyranny." The brief dissertation on the prophets (pp. 31-37,) is perhaps the best account of those remarkable men in the language. With all their excellences they were not free from various tinges of fanaticism ; they often worked themselves into a religious frenzy. In the administration of Samuel, and during the reigns of the early kings, there were two great parties in the land ; one favored the exclusive worship of Jehovah, the other allowed also that of Baal and other deities. A sign or monument of each of their tendencies may be noticed in the proper names of persons and places. Some are compounded with *El*, some with *Baal*, others with *Jah* or *Je*, for *Jehovah*. In the family of Saul there is a singular mingling of these names ; but after his time the names derived from Jehovah predominate. Samuel and the prophets favored the Jehovistic party. Saul's policy was to foster the worshippers of foreign deities as a counterpoise to the influence of the prophets.

A parallel to the barbarity of David's treatment of the Philistines is found in the conduct of the North American Indians and other savage tribes. His "ecclesiastical proceedings were not modelled according to the Pentateuch." His public cruelties and his private sins are not excused by this author, but looked at with a clear, cool, human eye. He says,

"The complicated baseness involved in his murder of Uriah so casts his honor in the dust, that thenceforth we rather pity and excuse than admire him. All the brilliancy, alike of his chivalry and of his piety, is sullied, and cold minds suspect his religious raptures of hypocrisy. If Nathan had been wise and bold enough to slash open the monarch's conscience, before the wen of wickedness had swelled into a carbuncle, most happy might it have been ; but

we cannot wonder that it was so very hard to rebuke a despotic and victorious prince. David was not indeed an Antoninus, an Alfred, or a Saint Louis; yet neither was he one of the vulgar herd of kings. The polygamy in which he indulged so injuriously must in part be laid to his personal weakness, when we observe how restrained (in comparison) was his predecessor Saul. Nevertheless, as a man, he was affectionate and generous, sympathetic and constitutionally pious: as a king, his patronage of religious persons was highly judicious, and his whole devotional character of permanent importance to the best interests of his people and of mankind; as a warrior, he taught Israel a mutual confidence and common pride in Jehovah their God; and first elevated his countrymen into a ruling and leading race, whose high place it was to legislate for and teach the heathen around. His career may serve to warn all who are wanting in depth of passion or enlarged knowledge of human nature, that those on whose conduct society has relaxed its wholesome grasp are not to be judged of by their partial outbreaks of evil, but by the amount of positive good which they habitually exhibit. Compared with the great statesmen of the educated nations of Europe, David's virtues and vices appear alike puerile; but among Asiatics he was a truly great man; and of his own posterity, though several, who were happily subjected to greater restraints, were far more consistent in goodness, there is none who more attracts our interest and our love than the heroic and royal Psalmist." — pp. 112, 113.

Solomon built the temple from mingled motives of policy, ostentation, and piety. The splendor of the building, the gorgeousness of the ceremonies performed there three times a year, led the people to assemble there partly from curiosity, partly for business, and in part for religious purposes. Thus a custom was established which helped consolidate the nation. To this circumstance the author attributes a good deal of the superiority which Judah had over Israel in later times. In Solomon's time "the strange awe of the dangerous Ark appears to have evaporated. . . . The Ark was opened, and in it were found neither the rod of Aaron which budded, nor the golden pot of manna, but only two tables of stone." Yet it is not certain that the successive high-priests dared examine them and compare the inscription with the copy in their books.

The author finds a remarkable disagreement between the two copies of the Decalogue, "which is uniformly overlooked by divines." We give his version of the Decalogue as found in Exodus, xxxiv., only remarking, that he has abridged the first, third, and sixth commandments.

“[FIRST TABLE?]”

- I. Thou shalt worship no other god than Jehovah; for Jehovah, whose name is Jealous, is a jealous God.
- II. Thou shalt make thee no molten gods.
- III. The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep, and dedicate all firstlings unto me: but the firstborn of thy sons thou shalt redeem. None shall appear before me empty.
- IV. Six days shalt thou work, but on the seventh day thou shalt rest: in ploughing time and in harvest thou shalt rest.

[SECOND TABLE?]

- V. Thou shalt observe the feast of Weeks, the Firstfruits of Wheat-harvest, and the feast of Ingathering at the year's end.
- VI. Thrice in the year shall all your males appear before the Lord Jehovah, the God of Israel.
- VII. Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven.
- VIII. The sacrifice of the feast of the Passover shall not be left to the morning.
- IX. The first of the firstfruits of the land shalt thou bring into the house of Jehovah thy God.
- X. Thou shalt not seethe a kid in his mother's milk.”

During the latter part of Solomon's reign, through the influence of his seraglio, the party opposed to the worship of Jehovah came again into favor, and Abijah, a popular prophet, appealed to Jeroboam, an eminent man, for redress of the wrongs which the nation was suffering. This was the beginning of the revolution which finally separated the kingdom. But the pious design of the prophet was by no means accomplished. Jeroboam is painted in black colors by the Hebrew writers, and, as our author thinks, mainly because he did not favor the Levitical priesthood. “The grand quarrel was a ceremonial one.” But the prophets made no real opposition until the reign of Ahab.

The author relates the counter-revolution which took place in favor of the monotheistic party, in which the descendants of Ahab were so cruelly slaughtered by Jehu, “a tiger of a man.”

“Such is the train of atrocities which Elisha's message entailed on both the Hebrew kingdoms. A third time was the royal house of Israel extirpated, and now likewise that of Judah. That Jewish writers can gloat over such funeral events, so deadly to their own people, is sufficiently wonderful. That men called Christians can read them with calm approbation, is still more melancholy; for this is the training of mind which steeled all Europe to cruelty

under the name of religion. This has lit up hell-fires in Christendom; this has perpetrated perfidious massacres unknown to Paganism; this has bequeathed, even to the present age, a confusion of mind which too often leads those who are naturally mild and equitable, to inflict hardship, vexation, degradation, and loss on the professors of a rival creed. Until men learn that Jehovah neither does, nor ever did, sanction such enormities as Elisha commanded and Jehu executed, they will never have a true insight into the heart of Him who is the God of the Pagan as well as of the Jew." — p. 210.

The account of the development of the priesthood is ingenious and valuable. The *priestly* system was complete, while that of the Levites was in its infancy; the sacerdotal caste included the Professional or Learned men. By frequent intermarriages they became almost an hereditary caste, and thus the idea of a tribe of priests, descendants of Levi, gradually grew up. Then the regular priests became exclusive. Books were written by them, or under their influence; facts were suppressed or distorted to suit their purposes, and insertions made. Some books are thus strangely marked by a Levitical spirit. This appears eminently in Deuteronomy, and in the Chronicles, not to mention other books. Sometimes the priests furnished an important check to the fanaticism of the prophets. This was particularly the case in Judah and Jerusalem.

"It is undeniable, that in the Israelitish prophets, as in the Scotch Reformers, the pugnacious principle was too much in the ascendant. There was earnestness and deep conviction, noble ends proposed, and unshrinking self-devotion to them; but nothing of the meekness of wisdom; no gentleness and sensitiveness as to other men's equal rights, and far too little scruple to combine with bad men and commit their good cause to wicked means. . . . The forty days' fast of Elijah, his journey to the solitary Horeb, the stormy wind, the earthquake, and the fire, in which Jehovah was not; with the still small voice in which Jehovah was found; are a noble poem. But Elisha, sitting in Samaria, and miraculously revealing the plans of Benhadad's campaign and the words which he speaks in his bedchamber, is far less dignified, and reminds us of tales of magic. When Elijah twice calls down fire from heaven, and slays two bands of fifty soldiers sent to arrest him, he is severe and terrible; but when Elisha curses a troop of young children in the name of Jehovah, and brings two bears out of the wood who devour forty-two of them, because they mocked at his bald head, he is ludicrous as well as savage. Elijah, who assembles the prophets of Baal, and after vanquishing them in a public

trial of miracles, incites the spectators to slay them all, commits a semi-heroic crime; but Elisha, who by proxy incites a captain with an army at his back to kill his wounded and confiding master, and make away with Ahab's children and little grandchildren, besides being barbarous, is cowardly and deceitful. Elijah appears before Ahab face to face, to threaten him bitterly for the murder of Naboth; but Elisha, when the king is angry with him, and seeks his life, has supernatural intimation of it, and gives orders to shut the door in the messenger's face, while others arrest him outside. Elijah predicts a drought to Ahab, and again predicts rain, in simple words; but Elisha, when about to spell warlike successes to king Jehoash, makes them depend on a piece of luck. He bids him to take his arrows and shoot upon the ground. The youth (who lavishes appellations of honor on the aged prophet) intends to obey, and shoots three times. But Elisha is enraged that he has not shot five or six times, because (as he now reveals) Jehovah had decreed to give him as many victories over the Syrians as the times he should shoot. Finally, when Elijah's hour of removal is come, he is carried up to heaven in a chariot of fire; but when Elisha dies and is buried as other men, his bones have a like virtue to those of a dark-age Saint:—they raise to life a strange corpse, which by accident touches them."—pp. 281, 282.

Our author thinks the Pentateuch was produced about the time of Josiah; that is, about six hundred and fifty years before Christ, or nearly nine hundred after Moses. The first four books of the Pentateuch he regards as a growth and not a composition. They received their final shape and public recognition at that time. We will not repeat his arguments, which have been often given before, but make a single extract.

"The high pretensions made for the Pentateuch are disproved by a topic which cannot be plainly stated without extreme offence, yet which it would be cowardice on that account to suppress. Its prophecies indicate a marked acquaintance with events which preceded Josiah, but nothing at all clear which needs to be referred to later times. The book is familiar with the tribes of Israel and their distribution; with the qualities which characterized Judah and Ephraim, Reuben or Zebulun. It knows well the extent of David and Solomon's empire; the conquest of Edom and its final liberation; the fortunes of the Ishmaelites, and the desert over which they roved. It knows even the numerous wives of Solomon, his wealth, and his importing of horses from Egypt. It foresees the horrible fact of a woman devouring her child in a siege, as in that of Samaria by Benhadad; also the scattering of Israel by piracy and by invasion into many distant lands. It predicts not only the vanishing of Amalek from among the names of na-

tions, but the wide-spread power of *Assyria*, which shall carry the Kenites into captivity. Nay, it is acquainted with the Cyprian force which attacked Esarhaddon from the Cilician coast, and perhaps also declares the final ruin of Assyria. But the *Chaldees* are not named as a conquering nation; nor had they yet become formidable to Judea when the book at length came out. Knowledge thus limited to the era which preceded its publication, cannot be imputed to a divine prescience, nor yet to accident."—p. 336.

He traces in the prophets the growth of a wide and expansive spirit which, extending beyond the Hebrews, embraces the whole world. He finds this especially in Isaiah, and yet more eminently in the anonymous author of the last twenty-six chapters of the book of Isaiah, whom he calls the younger Isaiah.

"More important is it to observe the softened tone towards the *Gentiles* here pervading. Indeed the tenderness and sweetness of this prophet is far more uniformly evangelical than that of any other. His very rhythm and parallelisms generally tell of the more recent polish and smoothness. He retains, moreover, all the spirituality of the older school: ceremonial observances are in no respect elevated by him. The *Sabbath* alone is named, and that in a tone the very reverse of formalism, although indicating the same high reverence for that institution which Christians in general have retained. With the exception of the fall of Babylon, which was the immediate means of release to his people, he does not concern himself with Gentile politics; but dilates on the trials, sorrows, and hopes of Zion, and the promises of divine aid to her, in general terms, to which the heart of spiritualized man in all ages and countries has responded."—pp. 366, 367.

After the return from captivity the nation was changed. Those who returned were chiefly persons "over whose minds sacerdotal principles had a commanding influence." The nation became enslaved by the letter of their old law; reverence for the Levitical priesthood became more profound; the exposition of the law became the most important profession.

"It is not intended here to pursue the later fortunes of the Jewish nation. We have seen its monarchy rise and fall. In its progress, the prophetic and the sacerdotal elements were developed side by side; the former flourished in its native soil for a brief period, but was transplanted over all the world, to impart a lasting glory to Jewish monotheism. The latter, while in union with and subservient to the free spirit of prophecy, had struck its roots into the national heart and grown up as a constitutional pil-

lar to the monarchy: but when unchecked by prophet or by king, and invested with the supreme temporal and spiritual control of the restored nation, it dwindled to a mere scrubby plant, whose fruit was dry and thorny learning, or apples of Sodom which are as ashes in the mouth. Such was the unexpansive and literal materialism of the later Rabbi, out of which has proceeded nearly all that is unamiable in the Jewish character: but the Roman writers who saw this side only of the nation, little knew how high a value the retrospect of the world's history would set on the agency of this scattered and despised people. For if Greece was born to teach art and philosophy, and Rome to diffuse the processes of law and government, surely Judea has been the wellspring of religious wisdom to a world besotted by frivolous or impure fancies. To these three nations it has been given to cultivate and develop principles characteristic of themselves: to the Greeks, Beauty and Science; to the Romans, Jurisprudence and Municipal Rule; but to the Jews, the Holiness of God and his Sympathy with his chosen servants. That this was the true calling of the nation, the prophets were inwardly conscious at an early period. They discerned that Jerusalem was as a centre of bright light to a dark world; and while groaning over the monstrous fictions which imposed on the nations under the name of religion, they announced that out of Zion should go forth the Law and the word of Jehovah. When they did not see, yet they believed, that the proud and spiteful heathen should at length gladly learn of their wisdom, and rejoice to honor them."—pp. 369, 370.

We thank the anonymous writer for his valuable book, and would gladly see it reprinted here, but as its publication would not favor any Sect, we have no reason to expect to see it in an American form, and accordingly have been thus copious in our extracts from its pages. A few works written with the industry, learning, and philosophical discernment so perceptible in this, and above all marked by the same humane spirit of religion, would do much to relieve the Christian world from the incubus of superstition now resting on its bosom, disturbing its sleep with ugly dreams, yet at the same time forbidding it to awake. So long as Christianity is thought responsible for Judaism, so long will the letter of the Old Testament strangle the spirit of the New. The Bible will be appealed to for sanction of slavery, war, formalism, and a thousand abominations; and so long, likewise, will the real spiritual beauty, the hearty piety, the manly faith which fills so many a page of Psalmist and Prophet, be lost to the world. The modern Christian may say, with the ancient Greek, Give us light: in the darkness only are we afraid.

ART. V.—*The Pictorial Book of Ballads, Traditional and Romantic: with Introductory Notices, Glossary, and Notes.* Edited by J. S. MOORE, Esq., &c. London. 1847-8. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. vi and 424, vi and 428.

THE origin of Ballads and Ballad-singers we shall for the present leave to the philosophical antiquaries, and for ourselves confess that we know not whether they claim their descent from Shem, Ham, or Japhet. Neither will we undertake to observe the nice distinctions that have been made between Ballads, Romances, and Legends; and the many other distinctions which have not yet been made, but might easily be if any one would show a difference sufficient to afford a basis for such a distinction—or even without that difference. We take a ballad to be a lyrical narration of some human event real or pretended. It may be a ballad of love, or a ballad of war; it may set forth the feelings of the author, and so far be mainly subjective in its character,—or only the feelings of the persons described in the poem, and so be mainly objective in its character. It may be long or short, good or bad, old or new. To us in either case it may be a ballad. We say all this, lest it should be supposed from what follows that we are not aware of the distinctions above hinted at, and which have been made by critics and criticasters, who, if not very wise, were at least very nice. On the contrary, we are painfully aware of such distinctions, and respectfully would notice such differences,—but at present we bid farewell to both, and address us to the ballads themselves—understanding the word in the wide sense we have given to it. However, let us narrow the signification a little, so as not to include all the narrative poetry in the world, ecclesiastical and secular. As a general rule, the ballad is simple in the structure both of the plot and the language, which has but a slight rhythmical movement; and in this particular, as well as others, it is distinguished specifically from odes, songs, and yet other kinds of lyric poetry. Nobody doubts that the poem called Chevy-Chase is a ballad, and we give the same name to those beautiful lyrical productions which Mr. Macaulay has wrought out of the Roman materials. Indeed, he found the materials in Livy almost in the form of ballads, though certainly rude in form and moving with prosaic foot.

We find ballads, in one form or another, in almost every

nation which has attained any considerable degree of social development. They differ widely in form, and not less widely in spirit. Taken as a whole they are valuable indications of the spirit of the nations amongst whom they have been produced. Some ballads have been made by regular artists, and are pieces of literary sculpture ; others have grown up amongst the people, and are not so much the statues as they are children of the people. The latter are of course the most valuable of all as indications of national thought and feeling, even though they have but inferior poetic merit. They are the field-flowers of poetry, — not so rare and exquisitely beautiful as the briefer songs, of love, of religion, which spring up in a poetic people as the water-lily and the fringed gentian, and by no means so nicely framed and finished off as the artistic creations of well-bred poets, the choice garden-flowers and exotics of the greenhouse, — but yet, like the violets, the dandelions, and the wild roses, breaking the monotony of the landscape, and lending a certain charm to the common places of the world.

A collection of all the popular poems which are in the mouth of the people would pretty truly represent the character of that people ; at least, at the time when they were collected. The old Greek spirit of the heroic age is reflected in the ballads of the Homeric cycle of poets, as sharp and clear as the mountains and their clouds in the Lake of Geneva, of a still summer day. In the sombre ballads of Spain we find the superstitions, the gloom, and the fire of that nation. Their love, their patriotism, and their jealous sense of personal honor obtain here, perhaps, the fullest expression they have anywhere found in the national literature. The ballads of the Teutonic race express not less fully the peculiar character of the Danes, the Germans, and the English. Had we space, we would gladly pause awhile over the popular poetry — the *Volkslieder* — of the continental portion of the race, and give some specimens thereof, from Volker Babbulus in the tenth century down to "The Song of the Three Kings of Cologne" in the seventeenth, not neglecting the artistic ballads of Bürger, Uhland, Schiller, and Goethe.

The ballads of the English partake of the characteristic homeliness of the nation ; of their manly good sense, their humanity not without a certain admiration of rough strength, of coarse pastimes, of gross eating and drinking. There appears likewise that strong tendency to individual freedom

which marks all the movements of the Anglo-Saxon people. Their ballads delight in representing the man of nature as superior to the man of circumstances. All distinction of rank is occasionally broken through, sometimes in the most absurd and impossible manner. This characteristic appears eminently in "The Blind Beggar of Bednal Green," in "King Cophetua and the Beggar-maid," which under the title of "A Song of a Beggar and a King" was old in Shakspeare's time, for Moth, in the play, says, "the world was very guilty of such a ballad some three ages ago." Then there is a strong moral sense running through the English ballads, as indeed it appears in most songs of the people everywhere. The popular minstrel loves to show how cunning is baffled by simple wisdom, and innocence proves too strong for crime; thus "the unnatural father" in the well-known ballad, falls into trouble, and is delivered by the son whom formerly he had spurned. Poetical justice must be done on the unworthy guardian of "the Children in the Wood:"

"And now the heavy wrath of God
Upon their uncle fell;
Yea fearful fiends did haunt his house,
His conscience felt an hell:

"His barnes were fired, his goods consumed,
His landes were barren made,
His cattle dyed within the field,
And nothing with him stayed."

If a man is unjustly treated by the powerful, and especially by the government, the bard of the English people loves to tell how the innocent was rescued by force or stealth. The Story of Robin Hood "rescuing the squires three" is of this character.

"Bold Robin Hood ranging the forest all round,
The forest all round ranged he;
O then did he meet with a gay ladye,
She came weeping along the highway.

"'Why weep you, why weep you?' bold Robin he said."

She answers that she weeps for her three sons, for "they are all condemned to die," — who, it seems, have not committed the most ordinary offences.

“ ‘What have they done then?’ said jolly Robin,
‘Come tell me most speedily.’

‘O! it is for killing the king’s fallow deer,
That they are all condemned to die.’

“ ‘Get you home, get you home,’ said jolly Robin,
‘Get you home most speedily,
And I will unto fair Nottingham go,
For the sake of the ’squires all three.’

“Then bold Robin Hood for Nottingham goes,
For Nottingham town goes he,
O there did he meet with a poor beggar-man,
He came creeping along the highway.

“ ‘What news, what news, thou old beggar-man?
What news, come tell unto me.’
‘O there’s weeping and wailing in Nottingham town,
For the death of the ’squires all three.’

“This beggar-man had a coat on his back,
’Twas neither green, yellow, nor red;
Bold Robin Hood thought ’twas no disgrace
To be in the beggar-man’s stead.

“ ‘Come, pull off thy coat, thou old beggar-man,
And thou shalt put on mine;
And forty good shillings I’ll give thee to boot,
Besides brandy, good beer, ale, and wine.’

“Bold Robin Hood then unto Nottingham came,
Unto Nottingham town came he;
O there did he meet with great master sheriff,
And likewise the ’squires all three.

“ ‘One boon, one boon,’ says jolly Robin,
‘One boon I beg on my knee;
That, as for the death of these three ’squires,
Their hangman I may be.’

“ ‘Soon granted, soon granted,’ says master sheriff,
‘Soon granted unto thee;
And thou shalt have all their gay cloathing,
Aye, and all their white money.’

“ ‘Oh I will have none of their gay cloathing,
Nor none of their white money,
But I’ll have three blasts on my bugle-horn,
That their souls to heaven may flee.’

"Then Robin Hood mounted the gallows so high,
Where he blew loud and shrill,
"Till an hundred and ten of Robin Hood's men
Came marching down the green hill.

"'Whose men are these?' says master sheriff,
'Whose men are they?' tell unto me.
'O they are mine, but none of thine,
And are come for the 'squires all three.'

"'O take them, O take them,' says great master sheriff,
'O take them along with thee ;
For there's never a man in fair Nottingham
Can do the like of thee.'"

Sometimes, indeed, this moral feeling, which is cosmopolitan, sinks down into patriotism and is limited to the country of the bard ; sometimes it is bounded by men of his own humble rank in life. But this seldom happens in such poetry, except when war or oppression has made wise men mad, bringing out passions which are narrow and hateful. Notwithstanding the English ballads so commonly scorn the authority of circumstances, they yet betray the purely empirical character of the English nation. With the exception of these overleapings of the conventions of life, they contain scarce any thing which has not its parallel in actual experience. We look in vain for the signs of that more elevated spirituality so noticeable in the popular poetry of some other nations.

The Americans have produced but little poetry in the simple form of ballads ; little which circulates among the people, and that little is destined to a speedy and unlamented burial, as we think. Hitherto circumstances have not favored the production of original literature. With the perpetual exception of speeches and sermons, — which grow out of the daily wants of state and church, — they from their nature must ever be ephemeral. New England has always been the most literary part of America ; but the fathers of New England had a form of religion — or rather of theology — perhaps the most unpoetic that was ever developed on a scale so extensive. Calvin was no poet : he dwelt years long on the Lake of Geneva, preaching within sight of Jura and Mont Blanc, with the most beautiful scenery in the world spread out before him, and yet, so far as we remember, there is not in sermon or letter a single allusion to that wondrous beauty wasted on his cold eye, — not a single

figure of speech ever is drawn from the scene before him — the lake, the mountain, or the sky. His followers in America had scarce more inclination to poetry than he. Men who are reflecting on the “five points,” discoursing of election, reprobation, and the kindred themes, or inwardly digesting the Assembly’s Catechism, would not be likely to write war-songs, or to make ballads. They did well in allowing “the nursery rhymes” to be sung to children; in not suffering “unworthy Barbara Allen” to be wholly forgotten. Still further, their outward circumstances were most unfavorable to the production of popular poetry, songs, and ballads amongst the people. They were struggling against poverty, against the wilderness, the wild beasts, and savage men, — not to mention the difficulties which came from the other side of the water. Thus stood the fathers of New England. On the one side was Starvation, and Destruction on the other; and the Indians laying in wait and ready to hasten the advance of both. Under such circumstances few men would incline to sing any thing very secular, or æsthetic. Besides, to the Puritan “common things” had a certain savor of uncleanness about them, and were thought scarce worthy of being sung. Would a man be merry, he might indeed sing, for there was a scriptural argument for his singing; but it must be — psalms. New England psalmody is a proverb amongst nations. We speak not of the melodies, so long-drawn and so nasal, but of the substantial words which endure while the volatile melodies have long ago been hushed into expressive silence. We give a verse from an old American version of “the Psalms of David,” assuring our readers that it is no invention of ours, but an undoubted original.

“The race is not to them that do the swiftest run,
Nor the battell,
To the peopel,
That carries the longest gun.”

Of psalm-singing there was no lack in New England. But that was not quite enough even for the Puritans. The natural heart of man wanted something a little more epic — some narrative of heroic events in a form slightly poetical, with a tinge of moral feeling, and a minute specification of time, place, person, and all particulars thereto belonging. This want was supplied — so far as we can learn — by the public prayers so abundantly made by the Puritans. They were as narrative as

the popular ballads, about as long-winded, equally garrulous, it is said; only the rhythmic element was wanting; and that was supplied, we suppose, by the intonation of the orator, or by the repetition of particular phrases—as a sort of refrain, or “burden.” Few men esteem the founders of New England more than we, but we honor them for what they were, not for what they were not—not so much for their poetry as for their masculine character and unshrinking faith in God.

We have seen many of the early American ballads, but few of any merit. New England ran to theology, politics, and practical life; not to lyric poetry. Even war, which forced such music from the Greeks and the Spaniards, extorted but little song from the stern men of America,—and that little poor. Of the ballads which belong to the Revolutionary period, there are few which are worth perusing. We insert a portion of one, which seems to us the best. Its date is obvious.

“While I relate my story, Americans give ear;
Of Britain’s fading glory you presently shall hear,
I’ll give you a true relation, attend to what I say,
Concerning the taxation of North America.

“The cruel lords of Britain, who glory in their shame,
The project they have lit on they joyfully proclaim;
’T is what they’re striving after, our rights to take away,
And rob us of our charter in North America.

“There are two mighty speakers, who rule in Parliament,
Who always have been seeking some mischief to invent,
’T was North, and Bute, his father, this horrid plan did lay,
A mighty tax to gather in North America.

“He search’d the gloomy regions of the infernal pit,
To find among those legions one who excell’d in wit,
To ask of him assistance, or tell them how they may
Subdue without assistance this North America.

“Old Satan, the arch traitor, resolved a voyage to take,
Who rules sole navigator upon the burning lake;
For the Britannic ocean he launches far away,
To land he had no notion in North America.

“He takes his seat in Britain, it was his soul’s intent,
Great George’s throne to sit on, and rule the Parliament,
His comrades were pursuing a diabolic way,
For to complete the ruin of North America.

"He tried the art of magic to bring his schemes about,
At length the gloomy project he artfully found out ;
The plan was long indulged in a clandestine way,
But lately was divulged in North America.

"These subtle arch-combiners address'd the British court,
All three were undersigners of this obscene report —
There is a pleasant landscape that lieth far away,
Beyond the wide Atlantic in North America.

"There is a wealthy people, who sojourn in that land ;
Their churches all with steeples, most delicately stand ;
Their houses, like the gilly, are painted red and gay ;
They flourish like the lily in North America.

"Their land with milk and honey continually doth flow,
The want of food or money they seldom ever know :
They heap up golden treasure, they have no debts to pay,
They spend their time in pleasure in North America.

"On turkeys, fowls, and fishes most frequently they dine,
With gold and silver dishes their tables always shine,
They crown their feasts with butter, they eat and rise to play,
In silks their ladies flutter in North America.

"With gold and silver laces, they do themselves adorn,
The rubies deck their faces, refulgent as the morn !
Wine sparkles in their glasses, they spend each happy day
In merriment and dances, in North America.

"Let not our suit affront you, when we address your throne,
O king, this wealthy country and subjects are your own,
And you their rightful sovereign, they truly must obey,
You have a right to govern this North America.

"O king, you've heard the sequel of what we now subscribe,
Is it not just and equal to tax this wealthy tribe ?
The question being asked, his majesty did say,
My subjects shall be taxed in North America.

"Invested with a warrant, my publicans shall go,
The tenth of all their current they surely shall bestow,
If they indulge rebellion, or from my precepts stray,
I'll send my war battalion to North America.

"I'll rally all my forces by water and by land,
My light dragoons and horses shall go at my command,
I'll burn both town and city, with smoke becloud the day,
I'll show no human pity for North America.

"Go on, my hearty soldiers, you need not fear of ill —
There's Hutchinson and Rogers, their functions will fulfil —
They tell such ample stories, believe them sure we may,
That one half of them are tories in North America.

"My gallant ships are ready to hoist you o'er the flood,
And in my cause be steady, which is supremely good;
Go ravage, steal, and plunder, and you shall have the prey;
They quickly will knock under in North America.

"The laws I have enacted, I never will revoke,
Although they are neglected, my fury to provoke,
I will forbear to flatter, I'll rule with mighty sway;
I'll take away the charter from North America.

"O George! you are distracted, by sad experience find
The laws you have enacted are of the blackest kind.
I'll make a short digression, and tell you by the way,
We fear not your oppression in North America.

"Our fathers were distressed, while in their native land;
By tyrants were oppressed, as I do understand;
For freedom and religion they were resolved to stray,
And try the desert regions of North America.

"Heaven was their protector while on the roaring tide,
Kind fortune their director, and Providence their guide;
If I am not mistaken, about the first of May,
This voyage was undertaken for North America.

"To sail they were commanded, about the hour of noon,
At Plymouth shore they landed, the twenty-first of June;
The savages were nettled, with fear they fled away,
And peaceably they settled in North America.

"We are their bold descendants, for liberty we'll fight,
The claim to independence we challenge as our right,
'T is what kind Heaven gave us, who can take away?
Kind Heaven, too, will save us in North America.

"We never will knock under, O George, we do not fear
The rattling of your thunder, nor lightning of your spear:
Though rebels you declare us, we're strangers to dismay;
Therefore you can't scare us in North America.

"To what you have commanded, we never will consent;
Although your troops are landed upon the continent;
We'll take our swords and muskets, and march in bright array,
And drive the British rustics from North America.

"We have a bold commander who fears not sword nor gun,
The second Alexander, his name is Washington,
His men are all collected, and ready for the fray,
To fight they are directed for North America."

The "whig songs" of 1840 are still fresh in the recollection of their authors, no doubt, and are pretty fair samples of what America has produced in the form of poetry for the people, and were besides valuable as specific signs of that period.

The work of Mr. Moore named at the beginning of this article is intended to supply the want of a book containing all the good, or at least all of the best, ballads in the language. Certainly the want has long been felt, and remains still unsupplied. These volumes contain some pieces unworthy of a place in such a collection,—as it seems to us,—such as the "Story of John Gilpin," Kirk White's "Gondoline," and "The Rime of the Auncient Waggonere." Valuable ballads are omitted to make way for them. We miss, and who would have thought it, "the grand old ballad of Sir Patrick Spence," the "Friar of Orders Grey," the ballads relating to "sweet William" and "fair Margaret," and even those about King Arthur. "Auld Robin Gray" is likewise omitted. The most valuable that he has inserted which are not in the hands of lovers of ballad lore, are "The Luck of Muncaster," "Robin Conscience," "The King and a poore Northerne Man." The last—which seems to be the original of a popular song, "A Farmer there was in the west countrie,"—is supposed to have been written by one Martin Parker, a celebrated author of ballads. We give some extracts from it.

"Come hearken to me all around,
And I will tell you a merry tale
Of a Northumberland man that held some ground,
Which was the King's land, in a dale.

"He was borne and bred thereupon,
And his father had dwelt there long before,
Who kept a good house in that country,
And staved the wolfe from off his doore.

"Now for this farm the good old man
Just twenty shillings a-year did pay.
At length came cruell death with his dart,
And this old farmer he soone did slay ;

"Who left behind him an aulde wife then,
That troubled was with mickle paine,
And with her cruches she walkt about,
For she was likewise blinde and lame.

"When that his corpes were laid in the grave,
His eldest sonne possesse did the farme,
At the same rent as the father before :
He took great paines and thought no harme.

"By him there dwelt a Lawyer false,
That with his farme was not content,
But over the poore man still hang'd his nose,
Because he did gather the King's rent.

"This farme layd by the Lawyer's land,
Which this vild kerne had a mind unto :
The deelee a good conscience had he in his bulke,
That sought this poore man for to undoe.

"He told him he his lease had forfite,
And that he must there no longer abide :
The King by such lownes hath mickle wrong done,
And for you the world is broad and wide.

"The poore man pray'd him for to cease,
And content himselfe, if he would be willing ;
And picke no vantage in my lease,
And I will give thee forty shilling.

"Its neither forty shillings, no forty pound,
Ise warrant thee, so can agree thee and me,
Unlesse thou yield me thy farme so round,
And stand unto my curtesie."

The tenant sets off to carry the matter before the King.

"He had a humble staffe [stuffe] on his backe,
A jerkin, I wat, that was of gray,
With a good blue bonnet, he thought it no lacke ;
To the King he is ganging as fast as he may."

So he goes to London, and thence to Windsor. He gives the porter a penny and a nobleman a groat to introduce him to the King, who is playing at bowls.

"Loe, yonder's the king, said the Nobleman,
Behold, fellow, loe, where he goes.

Beleevet hee's some unthrift, sayes the poore man,
That has lost his money and pawnd his cloathes.

"How hapt he hath gat neere a coate to his backe?
This bowling I like not; it hath him undone.
Ise warrant that fellow in those gay cloathes,
He hath his coyne and his doublet won.

"But when he came before the King,
The Nobleman did his curtesie:
The poore man followed after him,
And gave a nod with his head and a becke with his knee.

"If you be Sir King, then said the poore man,
As I can hardly thinke you be,
Here is a gude fellow that brought me hither,
Is liker to be the King than ye.

"I am the King, his Grace now sayd,
Fellow, let me thy cause understand.
If you be Sir King, Ime a tenant of yours,
That was borne and upbrought within your owne lande.

"There dwels a Lawyer hard by me,
And a fault in my lease he sayes he hath found:
And all was for felling five poore ashes,
To build a house upon my owne ground.

"Hast thou a lease here? said the King,
Or canst thou shew to me the deed?
He put it into the King's owne hand,
And said, Sir, 't is here, if that you can read.

"Why, what if I cannot? said our King,
That which I cannot, another may.
I have a boy of mine owne not seven yeares old,
A will read you as swift as yould run i' th' highway.

"Lets see thy lease, then said our King.
Then from his blacke boxe he puld it out.
He gave it into the King's owne hand,
With four or five knots ty'd fast in a clout.

.

"When the King had gotten these letters to read,
And found the truth was very so;
I warrant thee, thou hast not forfeit thy lease,
If that thou hadst felld five ashes moe.

.

"Thoust have an injunction, said our King ;
From troubling of thee he will cease :
Heele either shew thee a good cause why,
Or else heele let thee live in peace.
.

"Thoust have an attachment, said our King ;
Charge all thou seest to take thy part.
Till he pay thee an hundred pound,
Be sure thou never let him start.

"A, waise me ! the poore man saide then ;
You ken no whit what you now do say,
A won undoe me a thousand times,
Ere he such a mickle of money will pay.
.

"Thou art hard a beleefe, then said our King :
To please him with letters he was right willing.
I see you have taken great paines in writing,
With all my heart Ile give you a shilling.

"Ile have none of thy shilling, said our King ;
Man, with thy money God give thee win.
He threw it into the King's bosome ;
The money lay cold next to his skin.

"Beshrew thy heart, then said our King ;
Thou art a carle something too bold :
Dost thou not see I am hot with bowling ?
The money next to my skin lies cold.
.

"The King called up his Treasurer,
And bad him fetch him twenty pound.
If ever thy errant lye here away,
Ile beare thy charges up and downe.

"When the poore man saw the gold tendred,
For to receive it he was willing.
If I had thought the King had so mickle gold,
Beshrew my heart, Ide a kept my shilling.
.

"The poore man got home next Sunday ;
The Lawyer soone did him espy.
Oh, Sir, you have been a stranger long,
I thinke from me you have kept you by.

"It was for you indeed, said the poore man,
The matter to the King as I have tell.

I did as neighbours put it in my head,
And made a submission to the King mysel.

“What a deel didst thou with the King? said the Lawyer;
Could not neighbours and friends agree thee and me?
The deel a neighbour or friend that I had,
That would a bin sike a daies man as he.

“He has gin me a letter, but I know not what they cal’t;
But if the King’s words be true to me,
When you have read and perused it over,
I hope you will leave and let me be.

“He has gin me another, but I know not what ’t is;
But I charge you all to hold him fast.
Pray you that are learned this letter reade;
Which presently made them all aghast.

“Then they did reade this letter plaine,
The Lawyer must pay him a hundred pound.
You see the King’s letter, the poore man did say,
And unto a post he sal straight way be bound.

“Then unto a post they tide him fast,
And all men did rate him in cruell sort;
The lads and the lasses, and all the towne
At him had great glee, pastime and sport.

“He pay it, He pay it, the Lawyer said,
The attachment, I say, it is good and faire;
You must needes something credit me,
Till I goe home and fetch some meare.

“Credit! nay thats it the King forbad:
He bad, if I got thee, I should thee stay,
The Lawyer payd him an hundred pound
In ready money, ere he went away.

“Would every Lawyer were served thus!
From troubling poore men they would cease:
They ’d either show them a good cause why,
Or else they ’d let them live in peace.

“And thus I end my merry tale,
Which shews the plain man’s simplenesse,
And the King’s great mercy in writing his wrongs,
And the Lawyer’s fraud and wickednesse.”

Mr. Moore has not inserted any songs in his volumes, as most collectors of ballads have done. We cannot forbear

adding a little piece not so well known as it deserves to be, called

“ROSELYND’S MADRIGAL.

“Love in my Bosom like a Bee
Doth suck his sweet ;
Now with his wings he plays with me,
Now with his feet.
Within my Eyes he makes his nest,
His bed within my tender Breast.
My Kisses are his daily feast,
But yet he robs me of my Rest !
Ah Wanton — will ye !

“And when I sleep, then percheth he
With pretty flight,
And makes his pillow on my Knee,
The live-long night.
I strike the harp, he tunes the string,
He music plays if so I sing,
He gives me many a lovely thing,
But cruel, he my heart doth sting !
Whist, Wanton, still ye.”

Here is a little piece by Anastasius Grün, a German poet of the Swabian school, not without merit. We know not the name of the translator.

“THE LAST POET.

“ ‘When will be poets weary,
And throw their harps away ?
When will be sung and ended
The old, eternal lay ?

“ ‘When will your horn of plenty
At last exhausted lie ?
When every flower is gather’d,
And every fountain dry ?’

“As long as the sun’s chariot
Rolls in the heavenly blue,
As long as human faces
Are gladdened with the view :

“Long as the sky’s loud thunder
Is echoed from the hill,
And, touched with dread and wonder,
A human heart can thrill :

“ And while, through melting tempest,
The rainbow spans the air,
And gladden'd human bosoms
Can hail the token fair :

“ And long as night the ether
With stars and planets sows,
And man can read the meaning
That in golden letters glows :

“ As long as shines the moon
Upon our nightly rest,
And the forest waves its branches
Above the weary breast :

“ As long as blooms the spring
And while the roses blow,
While smiles can dimple cheeks,
And eyes with joy o'erflow :

“ And while the cypress dark,
O'er the grave its head can shake
And while an eye can weep,
And while a heart can break :

“ So long on earth shall live
The goddess Poesy,
And make of human life
An endless melody.

“ And singing, all alone,
The last of living men,
Upon Earth's garden green,
Shall be a poet then.

“ God holds his fair creation
In his hand, a blooming rose,
He smiles on it with pleasure,
And in his smile it glows.

“ But when the giant-flower
For ever dies away,
And earth and sun, its blossoms,
Like blooms of spring, decay ;

“ Then ask the poet — then —
If you live to see the day —
' When will be sung and ended *
The old, eternal lay ? ' ”

ART. VI.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

- 1.—*The Princess*. By ALFRED TENNYSON. Boston: W. D. Ticknor & Co. 1848. 16mo. pp. 168.

ON the day after the publication of "*The Princess*" we were informed that Timms had pronounced it an entire failure. Timms is a gentleman who readily admits whatever has been universally admitted for a century or two, but has his fears that the world will admire too much. He therefore devotes his energies to putting down all new aspirants to the lucrative office of giving the public a fresh source of delight. He protects his fellow-citizens from being too easily pleased. For this desirable purpose he has erected a small battery, mounted with what he calls the received canons of criticism, and serves the guns himself. When there is no immediate danger of a hostile incursion, he fires at nothing, for practice; and it must be allowed that his shots tell upon this kind of target with admirable precision and effect. It cannot be denied that Timms possesses a large amount of valuable information. He is as familiar with schools of poetry as a Cape Ann fisherman is with schools of mackerel, and regards them very much from the same point of view. He has a notion that Pope and Goldsmith are exactly alike, and that, though nobody can ever be like them, every body ought to be. Within a few years he has made prize of the terms "objective" and "subjective," which he uses merely as conductors whereby to convey his own confusion of ideas into the heads of other people. He considers poetry as only a convenient disguise assumed by designing men whose real object is to destroy all our time-honored institutions. He has a vague horror floating in his mind with regard to some German school, the master of which must be a very abandoned man, judging from our friend's account of the principles advocated by his scholars. Timms keeps a kind of private Valhalla, into which he admits the statues of such poets only as have nothing dangerous in them. A new idea, a new rhyme, a new metre, constitutes with him a violent presumption of poetical Jacobinism and heresy. Any one of these he considers as a blow aimed at the foundations of society. He only declared peace with Wordsworth on his being appointed laureate, and that out of reverence for an office which had been illustrated by a Pye and a Whitehead. He is a conservative of the amber kind, which conserves only grubs. In short, he is a valuable member of society, and the *original* (there have been five since,) American Jeffrey.

This fulmination* of our respected friend ringing in our ears, we opened the "*Princess*" with a tremulous hand. Not that we

ourselves had not been in the habit of interpreting his judgments, like dreams, by contraries, but we feared the effect of his verdict on the public, which has always shown a curious predilection for having its opinions made up for it by its Timmses. We read the book through with a pleasure which heightened to unqualified delight, and ended in admiration. The poem is unique in conception and execution. It is one of those few instances in literature where a book is so true to the idiosyncrasy of its author that we cannot conceive of the possibility of its being written by any other person, no matter how gifted. Had Tennyson left it unfinished, it would have remained a fragment for ever, like the stories of Cambuscan bold and Christabel. We beg pardon,—Mr. Martin Farquhar Tupper *has* completely finished the latter poem. We will therefore qualify our remark, and say, that had “The Princess” been broken off in the middle, it would have continued a *torso* till Providence sent us another Tupper.

In the first place, we must look at the poem not as the work of a beginner, but of an acknowledged poet, and of one who has gained his rank and maintained it by the unerring certainty with which he has produced his effects, and his conscientious adherence to the truths of Art. We know of few poets in whose writings we have found that entire consistency which characterizes those of Tennyson. His conception is always clear, his means exactly adequate, and his finish perfect. So entirely free is he from any appearance of effort, that many have been led to underrate him, and to praise his delicacy at the expense of his strength. It is true that he never wastes an atom of force. He never calls all his muscles into play for the plucking of a flower. Yet he is never found wanting to the demand of the occasion. Milo, with his fingers in the oak-cleft, made, after all, rather a sorry display of sinew. Though one chief characteristic of Tennyson’s mind be a flowing grace, and a feminine sensitiveness to every finest suggestion of beauty; though thought in him seems to be rather a luxury of sensation than an activity of intellect; though his metres adapt themselves to every subtle winding of expression with the yielding freedom of water, yet his outlines are always sharp-cut and severe. Perfection of form seems to be with him a natural instinct, not an attainment. We must therefore regard “The Princess” as the work of a master, and it must argue a poverty in ourselves if we cannot see it as a harmonious whole. For so perfect is Tennyson’s appreciation of his own strength, that he has never in a single instance fallen below himself. His self-command is not the least wonderful quality in him.

The growth of the poem is as natural as its plan is original. The gradual absorption of the author in his subject, till what was begun as a song “turns out a sermon,” the growing predominance

of the poet over the mere story-teller, as the higher relations of his subject appeal to him, and the creative faculty feels itself more and more taxed, are exquisitely true to the intellect and the heart. We know of no other man who could have mingled the purely poetical with the humorous in such entire sympathy as nowhere to suggest even a suspicion of incongruity. But Tennyson's humor is peculiar to himself. It is as refined as all the other parts of his mental constitution. We were about to compare it with Chaucer's. It is as genial and simple, but not so robust. It has more of the polish of society. It is like Addison's, etherealized and sublimated by the poetic sense. It has none of that boisterousness which generally goes with it when it is the predominant quality of the mind. It is not a laugh, but a quiet smile and a light in the eyes. It is a delicate flower which we can perceive and enjoy, but which escapes definition. In short, it is Tennyson's. If we take by itself any one of the little touches of humor scattered through "The Princess," it will seem nothing extraordinary, and we shall wonder whither its charm has flown, so perfectly and artistically dependent on each other are all parts of this delicious poem. For Art is like the invention of the arch. Each piece taken singly, has no especial fitness. The material is no rarer than that of the Cyclopean doorway, two upright blocks with a third laid across the top. Nor is the idea less simple, after we have once found it out. We feel this book to be so true an expression of the man, its humor is so thoroughly a part of him, and leads up to or falls off from the higher and graver passages with so graceful an undulation, that the whole poem would suffer vitally by losing the least shade of it. It subsides out of the story as unobtrusively as it had entered, at the moment when the interest, becoming concentrated in the deeper moral to which the poem is naturally drawn, necessarily excludes it. The progress of the poem is carried forward, and its movement modulated, with the truest feeling and tact. It is as if some composer, in a laughing mood, had seated himself at the organ to *fantasy* for the entertainment of a few friends. At first, he is conscious of their presence, and his fingers run lightly over the keys, bringing out combinations of notes swayed quaintly hither and thither by the magnetism of the moment. But gradually he becomes absorbed in his own power and that of his instrument. The original theme recurs less and less often, till at last he soars quite away from it on the uplifting wings of his art.

One striking excellence of Tennyson's poetry, as noticeable in "The Princess" as elsewhere, is its repose and equilibrium. There is nowhere the least exaggeration. We are never distracted by the noise of the machinery. No one beauty is so prominent as to divide the effect, and to prevent our receiving the full pleasure arising from our perception of completeness. The leading idea keeps all the rest in perfect subjection. He never gives us

too much. With admirable instinct, he always stops short where the reader's imagination may be safely trusted to suggest all the minor accessories of a thought or a situation. He gives all that is essential, not all that he can. He never indulges his invention with two images, where one is enough. And this self-denial, this entire subordination of the author to his work, has been remarkable in him from the first. It marks the sincere artist, and is worthy of all praise. If some of his earlier poems were chargeable with slighter excesses of mannerism, it was only the mannerism natural to a mind which felt itself to be peculiar, and was too hasty in asserting its peculiarity before it had learned to discriminate clearly between the absolute and the accidental. But he has long since worked himself clear of this defect, and is now only a mannerist because he is a Tennyson.

The profound and delicate conception of female character for which Tennyson is distinguished, and which, from the nice structure of his mind, we should expect to find in him, is even more perfectly developed in "The Princess" than hitherto. It marks the wisdom of the man no less than the insight of the poet. Whatever any woman may think of the conclusions he arrives at, she cannot help being grateful to the man who has drawn the Lady Psyche and Ida.

The design of "The Princess" is novel. The movement of the poem is epic, yet it is redolent, not of Homer and Milton, but of the busy nineteenth century. There are glimpses of contemporary manners and modes of thought, and a metaphysical question is argued, though without infringing upon the freedom of the story. Indeed, it is the story itself which argues. On the whole, we consider this to be the freest and fullest expression of Tennyson which we have had. The reader will find in it all the qualities for which he is admirable so blended and interfused as to produce a greater breadth of effect than he has elsewhere achieved. The familiarity of some passages, while it is in strict keeping with the character he assumes at the outset, indicates also the singer at last sure of his audience, and reposing on the readiness of their sympathies.

2.—1. *Traitement Moral, Hygiène, et Education des Idiots et des autres Enfants arriérés, &c.* Par EDOUARD SEGUIN. Paris. 1846.

2. *De l'Idiotie chez les Enfants, &c.* Par FELIX VOISIN.

3. *Briefe ueber den Abendberg und Heilanstalt fur Cretinismus*, von Dr. med. GUGGENBUHL. Zürich. 1846.

DURING the tempestuous and bloody fermentation of the French Revolution, when the human intellect was goaded into a delirium

of excitement and put forth its fiercest energies ; when demi-gods struggled with demons ; many noble plans for the elevation of humanity were proposed, and partially tried, but speedily failed in consequence of the death of their authors, or were forgotten in the excitement of new and more brilliant schemes. Many of those plans, however, contained germs of vitality which can never perish, and we find them reappearing after long years of neglect and forgetfulness. Among these was the plan of the philosopher and physician Itard, for teaching the SAVAGE OF AVIGNON.

This wild and strange creature in the human form, who was caught in the woods, furnished to the delighted *savans* of Paris an opportunity of proving the truth of their theory, that man was originally savage, and rose to civilization through long ages of painful travail in barbarism, *savagedom*, and semi-civilization. They thought that an individual might skip all these transition stages, and become at once a highly civilized being, if he were properly instructed.

Itard undertook to train, teach, and civilize this savage. No one was more capable of the task, and his enthusiastic confederates, accustomed to the rapid changes of the drama of the Revolution, expected that the savage of yesterday would be a *petit maître* on the Boulevards to-morrow, an haranguer of his fellow-citizens the next day ; ready to be a leader of some reform the next week, and a victim to the guillotine the next month.

But Itard failed, because, as it proved, his subject was not a savage, but only an IDIOT ! Itard failed, but truth never fails. He got a glimmer of it ; he saw that idiots might be taught ; he communicated the feeble light which dawned upon him to one of his disciples, Monsieur Seguin, who, by following it up, has been guided to the knowledge of a method of teaching all idiots, and vastly improving their physical, moral, and mental condition.

The first work named above contains not only the beautiful and satisfactory results of his treatment, but the theory on which he bases all his mental and physical appliances. It is not altogether sound and philosophical, but we have no heart to find fault with a man's philosophy when his practice brings such a harvest of good fruit.

The second work, *De l'Idiotie chez les Enfants, par Felix Voisin*, shows a more intimate acquaintance with what we regard as the only philosophy which can guide us in training and teaching idiots and backward children ; namely, the absolute and entire dependence of all mental manifestations upon the structure and condition of the bodily organization. In all cases where the mind does not manifest itself at the usual period, or in a normal manner, the cause must be sought in some original defect of the physical organization, or in some derangement of its functions.

Voisin is also a practical and successful educator of idiots : his

établissement orthophrénique, as he says truly, *manquait à la science et à l'humanité*; but it is wanting no longer.

Besides the establishment at Paris for the training and teaching of idiots, there is another among the magnificent edifices of Berlin, and a third high up among the more magnificent structures of the Alps, at Abendberg. The latter school, perched upon its lofty eyrie, seems like a monastery, nunnery, or other establishment devoted to pious purposes. But there is this difference, that while in them we find religion *in theory*, in this we find it *in practice*. It was established and is kept up by the labors of Dr. Guggenbuhl, and is devoted to the instruction of idiotic cretins.

We have no space for a detail of the interesting process of instruction pursued in these schools, or of their beautiful results. The good and gifted persons who manage them work greater miracles, without spell or charm, than even did necromancers of old, who transformed men into brutish beasts, while our modern magicians transform brutish beings back into the likeness of men again.

Idiots of the lowest grade, who could not talk, who could hardly stand erect, who could only eat, sleep, and fatten like swine, whose greatest enjoyment was to lie slaving in the noon-day sun, who seemed utterly without the pale of humanity, are gathered into these schools and taught to use their limbs; to speak intelligibly; to keep themselves tidy; to observe the decencies of life, and in many cases to write, to reckon, and to do some simple work.

There is probably no task assigned to man requiring more courage, zeal, patience, and perseverance, than that of training and teaching idiots. Some idea of its difficulty may be had from the following account given by Seguin of his course in teaching an idiot boy *to use his eye in looking at his teacher*.

The first exercise is that of taking the boy into a dark room into which a single ray of light is introduced, as by a hole in the shutter. The eye is naturally attracted to this, and the boy soon learns to command the muscles enough to keep the ball fixed. Afterwards this luminous point is moved about from right to left, and the idiot is gradually trained to follow it with his eyes.

Another exercise, and the one most depended upon, is for the teacher to place the pupil before him, and to endeavour to catch his wandering eye with his own earnest look, and to *fascinate him*, as it were. These and other methods are followed until the idiot learns *to see that he sees*.

These directions are easily given, but, as Seguin himself says, what exercise, what labor, what perseverance, is necessary before you can ever seize upon the favorable moment! "You approach your pupil,—he hides his face; your eye seeks his, which flies from you; you follow it up, but it escapes again; you seem to meet it, when he suddenly closes the lids; you wait, watching the

opening of the lids that your glance may penetrate them, and if, after all, the child repels you the first time he fairly sees you, or if, in order to avoid confessing the original idiocy of their child, his parents misrepresent and disparage all you have done, then you have got to begin again, and wear away your life with another, not for the love of the individual, but for the triumph of the doctrine which you understand, and in which you bravely trust."

"It is thus that I followed," says he, "during *four months*, the flying eye of an idiot boy. The first time that his eye fairly met mine, he uttered a wild cry and sprang away; but the next day, instead of placing his hand mechanically upon me as usual, in order to ascertain my identity, he looked at me an instant as at something new, and the next did so again, looking longer and more intelligently each time, until he could satisfy himself without manifesting any surprise or curiosity, and finally he used his sight like an ordinary person."

No school of this kind has yet been established in this country, but we rejoice to learn that the way has been prepared for one.

Commissioners appointed by the Governor have been for some time at work examining into the condition of idiots in this state. We learn that they find there are more than a thousand unfortunate creatures of this class within the borders of Massachusetts.

A thousand human beings here in our very midst, sunk in the depths of brutish idiocy, and not a helping hand held out to lift them up upon the platform of humanity! A thousand men and women in Massachusetts in whom exist the glimmer of reason and the elements of improvement, and yet we leave them to perish like the brutes, without an effort to awaken them to a consciousness of their humanity, while we send our missionaries to the uttermost parts of the earth to make doubtful converts of ignorant pagans at a thousand dollars a head!

But it will not be long so, we trust. Men are beginning to see that religion consists in something besides building churches and frequenting them; besides preaching, praying, and believing;—that it consists in work—zealous and steadfast work for the good of our brethren of mankind. We must work for their temporal good; we must supply their pressing wants; we must heal their bodily infirmities and enlighten their minds, or the barren WORD which we send them is but as a stone instead of bread. There is something repulsive in the subject, but we shall return to it in our next, and endeavour to learn from the condition and treatment of these pariahs of society some lessons which may be useful; for there is no subject so "ugly and venomous" that does not contain within itself precious jewels to reward the earnest seeker after truth.

- 3.— *General Principles of the Philosophy of Nature: with an Outline of some of its Recent Developments among the Germans, embracing the Philosophical Systems of Schelling and Hegel, and Oken's System of Nature.* By J. B. STALLO, A. M., lately Professor of Analytical Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Chemistry, in St. John's College, N. Y. Boston: Wm. Crosby and H. P. Nichols. 8vo. pp. 520.

NOTHING but a regularly projected article can do justice to or fitly introduce this book to the American public. It is altogether the best thing upon the profound subjects to which it relates that has ever appeared on this side of the water. It is the best, because it gives the most intelligible and thorough analysis of the modern Identity-systems of the Germans, and because that part of the book which is original with Mr. Stallo discriminates most sharply and successfully the true theory of Development from that bold, popular generalization which first appeared in the "Vestiges," and thence dribbled, but not distilled, through the abnormal predicament of Mr. Davis. It is a counter-revelation of reason and science, with which, luckily, "spirits from the second sphere of existence" did not meddle.

Some pages of Mr. Stallo's book are written with rare warmth and vigor; for instance, nearly all the sections under the head of "Organization of Society." But we must be allowed to say that we do not think he has fairly stated the theory of Fourierism, or rather, that particular foreshortening or modification of it which is held by the spirited and devoted associationists of this country. We agree with Mr. Stallo as to the fact that the centre must always create its circumference, and that, therefore, the phalanx, so long as it is an exterior scheme to be applied, is impracticable. But there is no associationist in this country who will dispute his position that "the *person and family* are an *essential* existence in society." It is not true that their system annuls the natural feeling, "the immediate *reality* of the relations of brother and sister," in favor of an abstract brotherhood. It should always be sufficient to state the central objections to Fourierism, without complicating the question with these special issues, which were first started by the newspapers. Mr. Stallo has had some private jousts on this arena; and personal arguments, which never convince any body, have left their sediment perturbing the discussion.

What is the Identity-system of the Germans? Briefly said, and without mentioning its necessary terminations in thought and science, it is this: Mind and Matter are "eternally opposed to each other, and, nevertheless, eternally one. They are different but corresponding revelations of the Deity, which is their source only

in so far as it is their identity." So that, to use Mr. Stallo's apt illustration, "the symbol of the absolute is the magnet; one principle constantly manifesting itself as two poles, and still resting in their midst as their identity. Divide the magnet; every part will be a complete system in itself,—two poles and a point of indifference. And just as every part of the magnet is the entire magnet in miniature, so, also, every individual development in nature is a miniature universe." This figure comprises the true theory of development, and involves the true immanence and function of God in the world. It is the formula of that great Synthesis of Nature, which is the present task of science to construct, and noble fragments of which, prophesying the whole harmonious system to which they must belong, are already discovered and accredited. "All science is but a rehearsal of the absolute science," starting from this new term of the Identity, yet difference, of God and the Real.

Mr. Stallo is completely informed upon the present state of science, and knows its latest acquisitions. He holds firmly and clearly the great idea which the active thought of this epoch, in every domain of life, is pledged to substantiate. He is a German, yet we are harassed by no mysticism. He has a system, yet it is not a mere scaffolding of formulæ enclosing nothing, and it has not crowded out a single tender feeling or moral aspiration. The destiny of the individual has been identified by him with the destiny of the race. God becomes completely manifested only when every individual has that "absolute egotism," which is the perfect expression of his nature, and which is embodied in the text, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself; that is, as much as God. Mr. Stallo, in speaking of social questions, finely says, "the assurance that the discords of this world are to be silent in a *better* one, is not accepted as an indemnification and a reprieve; these discords are to become *accord* here,—to resolve themselves *now* into harmony. A Sunday of uninterrupted, stagnant inactivity cannot compensate for the brutal, unmitigated toils of the preceding week; the descent of heaven upon earth, the consecration of every day of labor as a legitimate Sunday, is the great expectancy of our generation." Whittier expressed the whole humanitarian philosophy of the day in the single line:

"The New Jerusalem comes down to man."

We may as well pause in our notice here; for a discussion of all the points which throng upon us, suggested or re-awakened by this book, would carry us far beyond our limits. We cordially greet this work, and hasten to recommend it to our scholars. As far as we are able to judge, its analysis of the German systems from Kant to Oken is just, clear, and comprehensive. We should

object somewhat to his estimate of Fichte, were it not evident that he regards him simply from a metaphysical point of view. Some of Fichte's fine moral and social utterances are not unknown to the heart of Mr. Stallo.

Our young men will not find this book so easy to read as the last "Mysteries," or even the bloody campaigning pages of Mr. Headley. Yet we hope they will put themselves under its suggestive influence, undismayed by an occasional involution of sentences, a sturdy Germanism, or a stray obscurity of style. For these exist, and we think that a second edition might safely contain a few verbal alterations to the benefit of the general clearness of the text. It is a grand, solid book, full of German thought and Saxon sense, and just the thing for our meridian.

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- 4.—*Desultory Notes on the Government and People of China, and on the Chinese Language, &c., &c.* By THOMAS TAYLOR MEADOWS, Interpreter to Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate at Canton. London. 1847. 1 vol. 8vo. pp. xvi and 250.

THE work is readable and is evidently written by an intelligent man. He thinks the Chinese a sober-minded, rational people; that their official documents are generally superior to those of the English. He thinks the long duration of the Chinese Empire is explained by the fact that each successive dynasty has taught this as a cardinal principle: "that good government consists in the advancement of men of talent and merit only, to the rank and honor conveyed by official posts." To prove that this principle has long been recognized there, he cites numerous passages from ancient writers. Thus, Yu, who began to reign 2205 years before Christ, says to the Emperor Shun, his predecessor, "When a king knows how difficult it is to be a good king, and when a subject knows how much it costs to fulfil all his duties faithfully, the government is perfect, and the people make a swift progress in the ways of virtue."

"That is certain," replied the emperor, "and I love to be discoursed with in this manner. Truths so well grounded ought never to be concealed. Let all wise men be distinguished, then all the kingdoms of the world will enjoy a profound peace. But to rest entirely upon the sentiments of wise men, to prefer them to his own, to treat orphans with kindness, and never to reject the suit of the poor, are perfections only to be found in a very wise king."

In the year 179 B. C., the Emperor Wan te published a declaration, in which he says to the people, "You know that I have neither virtue nor qualifications sufficient for the weight of govern-

ment. This engages me to publish this present declaration, to inform all who are in posts in my empire, from the prince to the simple magistrate, to inquire carefully after persons of merit for my service. Such, for instance, as know the world perfectly well; others who have a thorough understanding of all affairs relating to the State; *but above all, such as have resolution and honesty enough to inform me fully of what they think amiss in my conduct.*"

The author concludes that "the certainty of attaining rank and wealth in the State, merely through personal qualifications, stimulates the whole nation to healthful exertions, thus diffusing prosperity throughout it, and multiplying its powers to a great extent."

The following quotation is from Mencius. "Those who wrangle and fight for territory and fill the wastes with dead bodies, and who fight for cities so as to fill the cities with dead bodies, may be said to lead [men] on the earth to eat human flesh. Death is not a sufficient punishment for such crimes. Those, then, who delight in war, deserve the highest punishment."

The family of the king, lineal descendants of Confucius, are still numerous, and have just claims to be considered the oldest and most noble family in the world. "Confucius never pretended to any superhuman powers, or intelligence with superior beings; was neither a fanatic nor an impostor, but simply a moral philosopher and a statesman, and his doctrines have obtained their present great authority merely because they are generally sound."

The author thinks infanticide is not much more common in China than in England; but lying is a vice almost universal.

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- 5.—*Theodore Parker's, neu-unitarischen Predigers zu Boston, Untersuchungen über Religion; aus dem Englischen übersetzt und mit einem Vorwort begleitet.* Von HEINRICH WOLF, Archidiaconus an St. Nicolai in Kiel. Kiel: Karl Schröder und Comp. 1848. 1 vol. 8vo. pp. xxvi and 374.

THIS is a translation of Mr. Parker's Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion, and is executed with extraordinary diligence, success, and beauty. In the preface the translator says, there has never been a period of so much movement of thought in the religious world since the Reformation, as now. He doubts whether the age of the Reformation itself was so rich as ours in religious developments. But it is still the old controversy between the One Religion and the various Theologies. The victory is certain, but the question is, How can it be achieved with the least cost? The old forms of theological belief are no longer tenable. The Reformation was a great advance, but not the end of progress. It

broke the chains of tradition, fell back on the Bible, and allowed entire freedom in the criticism and exposition of that. We have now to confess that the standard measure of religious truth is not to be found in the Bible, but in Reason and Conscience. The reformers were not advanced enough to accomplish that work. If we are to go no further than they went we may complain that the first step was taken; for what avails it to declare the soul free, and then insist on entire uniformity of theological belief? That can only be accomplished by fettering the soul. Men may create silence and call it peace, but the man who feels the fetters calls it sullen — Death.

He gives a brief account of the rise of the Unitarian sect in Europe, and thinks it was they who most clearly understood the fundamental principle of the Reformation, have most faithfully represented it in the ages, and have continually endeavoured to bring themselves and the world into a clearer consciousness thereof. He cannot understand how Francke could have said "The Socinians are the only Christian sect which have no seed of Regeneration in them." To an unprejudiced eye they are eminently the representatives of the Protestant Idea.

He touches briefly the history of the Socini and their followers, and says that at Siebenbürgen there are at present one hundred and four Unitarian parishes, one hundred and twenty clergymen, and about forty thousand souls; then follows an account of Unitarianism in England and America, taken mainly from the writings of Drs. Baird and Lamson. He thinks that in America the Unitarians have latterly been somewhat untrue to their first principles, and have neglected their high vocation. He mentions the distinguished men in America who have once been Unitarian preachers and have since left that calling, considering their action as an important sign of the times.

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- 6.—*An American Dictionary of the English Language, &c., &c., by Noah Webster, LL. D., &c., &c. Revised and Enlarged, by Chauncey A. Goodrich, &c., &c.* Springfield. 1848. 1 vol. 4to. pp. LXXXIV and 1368.

WE would have copied the whole title, but had not space to insert more than a brief notice of the work itself, and thought it better to omit part of the title than the whole of the notice.

This new edition contains all the matter of the former edition of Webster's Dictionary, in 2 vols, 4to., with additions by his son-in-law, the editor. It is a work of great research and learning,—a work of great value. No pains seem to have been spared to render the dictionary accurate and complete. The words relating

to various arts and professions have been examined by eminent men to whose special studies such words apply. An attempt is made to give all the words in common use, and all that are found in such writers as Bacon, Spenser, and Shakspeare. *American* words, also, have a place in the dictionary, though they are few in number. Some alterations have been made in the orthography of Dr. Webster, but perhaps not enough to satisfy the demands of a classic English reader. With all the gratitude we feel to Dr. Webster for his great services to all departments of English lexicography, we must confess that he has tended somewhat to vulgarize the tongue in some of his changes of the orthography. We could wish he had not been quite so obstinate in his adhesion to an opinion once formed and expressed.

The introductory furniture of the dictionary is abundant and valuable. The etymologies are sometimes extraordinarily felicitous,—sometimes a little far-fetched. We could wish to see a few more words relating to the ritual of the Roman and English churches, which an American often meets with both in ancient and modern writers, but which none of the common dictionaries help him to understand. The tables of proper names, Hebrew, classic, and modern, with their pronunciation, are exceedingly serviceable. We cannot hope Dr. Webster will be followed in all respects, but we are sure he has done a great service to all who speak the English tongue, and are happy to see the proof of his widening usefulness and increasing reputation which this new edition of his great work affords.

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- 7.—*Revolutionary Services and Civil Life of General William Hull, prepared from his manuscripts by his daughter, MRS. MARIA CAMPBELL; together with the History of the Campaign of 1812 and surrender of the Port of Detroit; by his grandson, JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE.* New York. 1848. 1 vol. 8vo. pp. xv and 482.

THE first part of this work, relating to the Revolutionary services of General Hull, is a valuable contribution to American history, reflecting honor on the early life of the General. But the second part is the more important, inasmuch as it entirely exculpates General Hull from the charges so long and so often brought against him, and, as it has long seemed to us, unjustly. This history has only confirmed the impressions made on us years ago by the report of the trial of the General,—that he was entirely innocent of the offences charged on him; that the failure of his expedition and the fall of Detroit were not to be charged to him. The work is written throughout with good temper, with evident

freedom from all party spirit, with clearness and simplicity, and as it should be, by a grandson—with mingled reverence and affection. Yet, while General Hull is defended, it became unavoidable that his detractors should be spoken of. Doubtless we shall hear from them, and the whole matter will probably be thoroughly sifted anew, the old charges reiterated, and the old battle fought over again.

8. — *A Letter to the People of the United States, touching the Matter of Slavery.* By THEODORE PARKER. Boston: J. Munroe & Co. 1848. pp. 120.

[The following communication has been handed to us as a note on the part of the work relating to the effects of Slavery on industry.]

“The aggregate annual earnings” of the free and slave states, *stated in dollars*, give no proximate idea whatever of the comparative *wealth* which a free and a slave population respectively produce; and for this reason:—

The *labor* which it costs to produce a commodity,—and not its market price *at a particular time*,—is the measure of its value, as wealth, judging generally. The market price of a commodity, at a given time, will depend mainly upon the greater or less quantity in the market, at that time, relatively to the demand. Thus, a commodity which has cost but one hour’s labor may, owing to the scarcity of the article at a particular time, bring as much in the market as another commodity that has cost ten hours’ labor. This shows why the productions of the South, when estimated in money, at their present market price, approximate in value to those of the North. The South enjoys a monopoly for some of its most important productions; and not producing enough to supply the demand, obtains a high price for what has really cost but little labor; and its “aggregate earnings,” estimated in money, make a somewhat tolerable comparison with those of the North. Yet it is probable that the population of the North, with its superior diligence, energy, skill, implements, and machinery, perform ten, twenty, or thirty times as much labor, and therefore produce ten, twenty, or thirty times as much wealth (judging wealth by its true *general* standard,) as that of the South, man for man. But the North, by its labor, produces such an abundance of its peculiar commodities, and sells them subject to so severe a competition from abroad, that their market value is reduced, and “their aggregate” value, *measured by money*, makes no fair comparison with the aggregate value of the commodities of the South, which are produced in but small quantities, and sold with all the advantages of monopoly in their favor.

If the South performed as much labor as the North, man for

man, its productions would be much more various, and yet so much more abundant, as to be reduced in price. It would thereby add ten or twenty fold more than now, to the aggregate wealth of the world, although the nominal value, *in money*, might be little or nothing greater than that of their present productions.

A necessary consequence of the present state of things is, that when the North and the South make an exchange of productions, of the same nominal value, the North gives the South ten or twenty times as much wealth — or the product of ten or twenty times as much labor — as the South gives in return.

When the North sells to the South a yard of cotton in exchange for a pound of tobacco, she gives to the South an article of wealth, which its *slave* labor, if educated only by the masters, with no aid or instruction from free laborers, would probably never have been able to produce. A community consisting solely of slaves and slave-holders, if cut off from the rest of the world, would probably never bring the mechanic arts to that degree of perfection that would enable them to manufacture a yard of our cheap cotton.

These things illustrate, in some measure, how little in comparison a slave population — if placed in the same circumstances as a free one — would contribute to the aggregate wealth of the world. They show also that *our* slave states in reality give comparatively little in exchange for what they receive, when they make exchanges with the free states.

[We learn from the best authority that there are not in the state of Connecticut *ten* adults born in that state and unable to read and write; of the 536 persons reported in the census as ignorant to that degree, almost all are Irishmen. This fact makes the educational difference between Connecticut and South Carolina still more enormous than before. — T. P.]

9. — *Essays, Lectures, and Orations, by Ralph Waldo Emerson.*

"Thus deeply drinking in the soul of things,
We shall be wise perforce."

London: William S. Orr & Co. 1848. 1 vol. 18mo. pp. xii and 364.

THIS is a piratical reprint of nearly all the published prose writings of Mr. Emerson. The volume contains a preface entitled "Emerson and his Writings;" the first volume of his *Essays*, his essay called "Nature," sketches or reports of three lectures on the Times, and four *Orations*; namely, the Addresses delivered before the Divinity School; before the Mechanic Apprentices' Library Association; before the Phi Beta Kappa Society; and before the Adelphi in Waterville College.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE.

- Arnobii: adversus nationes. Libri VII. Ex nova cod. Paris. Collatione recens. &c. Dr. G. F. Hildebrand. Hal. Sax. 1. 8vo.
- Dr. F. X. Diefinger. Die barmherzigen Schwestern vom heil. Karl Borromäus zu Nancy; geschichtlich dargestellt, &c. Bonn.
- J. H. Thommes. Thomas Morus, Lord Kanzler v. England. Historisches Gemälde d. despotischen Wilkürherrschaft Heinrich's VIII., &c. Augsburg. 1847. I. 1 Thl.
- F. T. Clemens. Giordano Bruno und Nikolaus v. Cusa; Eine philosophische Abhandlung. Bonn. 1847.
- Dr. F. X. Diefinger. Der heil. Karl Borromäus und d. Kirchenverbesserung seiner Zeit. Köln. 1. 8vo.
- Leibnitzens Gesammelte Werke, a. d. MSS. d. Kön. Bibliothek zu Hannover herausg. v. G. H. Pertz. Vol. I.-III., Annales Imperii occidentis Brunsvicensis. Vol. IV., Leibnitzens geschichtliche Aufsätze und Gedichte.
- Briefwechsel zwischen Leibnitz, Arnault, und d. Landgrafen Ernst v. Hessen-Rheinfels. Herausg. v. Dr. C. L. Grotefend.
- Leibnitz-Album, herausg. v. C. L. Grotefend.
- Historia et origo Calculi differentialis a G. G. Leibnitio conscripta. Herausg. v. C. L. Grotefend.
- Briefwechsel zwischen Goethe und Fr. H. Jacobi. Herausg. v. M. Jacobi. Leipzig. 1847. 12mo. s. VIII. u. 274.
- Schiller's Briefwechsel mit Körner. 1 Thl. Berlin. 1847. 8vo. s. 404.
- De l'Italie dans ses rapports avec la liberté et la civilization moderne. Par A. L. Mazzini. Paris. 1847. 2 vols. 8vo.
- Die Mährchen v. Clemens Brentano. Zum Besten der Armen, nach d. Willen d. Verf. herausg. v. Guido Görres. Stuttgart. 2 Bde. 8.
- Der deutsche Protestantismus, seine Vergangenheit, und seine heutigen Lebensfragen beleuchtet von einem deutschen Theologen. Frankfurt A. M. Gravenhorst. Dr. J. V. C. L. Vergleichende Zoologie. Breslau.
- Nasse, W. Commentatio de functionibus singularum cerebri partium, ex morborum perscrutatione indagatis. Bonn. 1. 8vo.
- Sammlung der schönsten Grabmäler im Baustyl des Mittelalters, &c. Coblenz. Heft 1.
- F. X. Karker. Die Schriften der Apostolischen Väter übersetzt und durch kurze Anmerkungen erläutert. Breslau. 1. 8vo.
- J. H. Friedslieb. Quatuor Evangelia sacra; Matthaeae, Marce, Lucae, Johannis, in harmoniam redacta, &c., &c. Breslau. 1. 8vo.
- Dr. A. Corul. Biblische Hermeneutik, nach den Grundsätzen der Katholischen Kirche. Fulda. 1. 8vo.
- Dr. J. Chr. K. Hofmann. Egyptische und Israelitische Zeitrechnung. Ein Sendschreiben an Dr. Böckh. 1. 8vo.
- H. Hattemer. Denkmale des Mittelalters, gesammelt und herausgegeben. Vol. III. 8vo.
- Von Hammer-Purgstall. Cardinal Khleff's Leben. Mit eine Sammlung von Khleff's Briefen, Staatschreiben, &c., &c., bisher ungesammelt. Bonn. 4 vols. 8vo.
- Waitz. Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte. Kiel. 1847. 8vo. xvii und 668 s.

LIST OF NEW PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED.

- The Past, the Present, and the Future. By H. C. Carey, author of "Principles of Political Economy," &c. Philadelphia: Carey & Hart. 1848. 12mo. pp. 474.
- Don Quixote de la Mancha. Translated from the Spanish of Miguel de

Cervantes Saavedra, by Charles Jarvis, Esq. Carefully revised and corrected, with numerous illustrations by Tony Johannot. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard. 1847. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 465 and 456.

The Haunted Barque, and other poems. By E. Curtiss Hine. Auburn: J. C. Derby & Co. New York: Mark H. Newman & Co., 199 Broadway. 1848.

The Children at the Phalanstery: a Familiar Dialogue on Education. By F. Cantagrel. Translated by Francis Geo. Shaw. Boston: Wm. D. Ticknor & Co. 1848. 24mo. pp. 60.

Position and Duties of the North with regard to Slavery. By Andrew P. Peabody. Reprinted from the Christian Examiner of July, 1843. Newburyport: Charles Whipple. 1847.

The Triumphs of War: a Sermon. By Andrew P. Peabody. Portsmouth: John W. Foster. 2d ed. 1847.

Fame and Glory: an Address before the Literary Societies of Amherst College, at their Anniversary, Aug. 11, 1847. By Charles Sumner. Boston: Wm. D. Ticknor & Co. 1847. 8vo. pp. 51.

Poems. By James Russell Lowell. Second series. Cambridge: George Nichols. Boston: B. B. Mussey & Co. 1848.

A Lecture delivered before the Female Anti-Slavery Society of Salem. By William W. Brown, a fugitive slave. Boston: 1847.

A Discourse delivered before the Plymouth Church, Brooklyn, N. Y., upon Thanksgiving day, Nov. 25, 1847. By Henry Ward Beecher. New York: 1848.

The Duty of Obedience to the Civil Magistrate. Three Sermons preached in the Chapel of Brown University. By Francis Wayland, President of the University. Boston: 1847.

The New Church Repository, and Monthly Review: devoted to the exposition of the Philosophy and Theology taught in the writings of Emanuel Swedenborg. Conducted by Geo. Bush, A. M. Vol. 1, No. 1., Jan., 1848. New York: John Allen, 139 Nassau street.

On Self-Government, together with General Plans of a State Constitution, and a Constitution for a Confederation of States, &c., &c., to which is added the new Constitution of the State of New York. Boston. 1847.

Supplement to Essays on the Progress of Nations in Productive Industry, Civilization, Population, and Wealth, illustrated by Statistics. By Ezra C. Seaman. No. 1. New York. 1847.

An Introductory Lecture delivered at the Massachusetts Medical College, Nov. 3, 1847. By Oliver Wendell Holmes, M. D., Parkman Professor of Anatomy and Physiology. Boston. 1847.

Ueber Religion und Christenthum, Eine Aufforderung zu besonnener Prüfung, an die Deutschen in Nordamerika. Von Frederik Muench. Herrman. Mo. 1847.

A Grammar of the Mpongwe Language, with Vocabularies. By the Missionaries of the A. B. C. F. M. Gaboon Mission, Western Africa. New York. 1847. 8vo. pp. 94.

Reminiscences of the last hours of Life, for the hour of Death, &c. By Jean Paul Friedrich Richter. Boston. 1. 24mo. pp. 98.

The Library of American Biography. Conducted by Jared Sparks. Vol. XXV. Second Series, XV. Boston: Little & Brown. 1848. 16mo. pp. 461. [Contains, 1. Life of Wm. Richardson Davis. By F. M. Hubbard. 2. Life of Samuel Kirkland. By S. K. Lathrop. With a portrait of Kirkland.]

Immigration into the United States. By Jesse Chickering. Little & Brown. 1848. 8vo. pp. 94.

Address and Poem delivered before the Boston Mercantile Library Association, Jan. 3, 1848. Boston: Printed for the Association.

The History of Roxbury Town. By Charles M. Ellis. Boston. 1848.

Oregon Missions and Travels over the Rocky Mountains, in 1845-46. By Father P. J. De Smet. New York: Edward Dunnigan. 1847.